Class 




Bonk Uh- 
Copyright N«_/Z_ 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



Imperiled America 



IMPERILED AMERICA 



A discussion of the complications 

forced upon the United States by 

the World War 



I By 

John Callan O'Laughlin, a.m., ll.d. 

Former Assistant Secretary of State; Secre- 
tary, United States Commission to Japan; 
Member American Society of Inter- 
national Law 




The Reilly & Britton Co. 
Chicago 

o JO y '^ 






V 



Copyright, 1916 
by 
The Reilly & Britton Co. n/ 




V^ 



Imperiled America 



MAY II 1916 
0)CI.A4310'i6 



To my guide, my counselor, my friend 

My Wife 



PREFACE 

At a time when high government offi- 
cials and eminent statesmen are demanding 
that the country be prepared against war, 
it is important for the people to be 
informed of the causes moving them. In 
the following pages I have tried as an 
American proud of his birthright and 
jealous of the honor and integrity of his 
country, to set forth our perilous situation 
in a world at war. I have refrained pur- 
posely from excessive detail, and present 
the facts in a fashion which I hope will 
bring home to those who read what I have 
written our actual points of international 
contact and international conflict. 

It is true to-day as in past ages that '' in 
union there is strength." Above all things, 
the American people must be united. They 
must learn the facts underlying our foreign 
relations and apply to them their common 



Preface 

sense, in order to develop policies which 
will make for right and justice and assure 
their prosperity in the prosperity of 
humanity. 

John Callan O'Laughlin 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I Points of Contact 11 

II Our Internal Situation and the 

War 29 

III The World and the Monroe 

Doctrine SO 

IV The Caribbean Sea Problem. . 82 
V The United States in the 

Pacific 102 

VI Shutting the Open Door 123 

VII The Japanese Portent 141 

VIII The War on American Life. . 158 
IX The War and American 

Dollars 184 

X Where We Stand with the 

Allies 202 

XI The Central Powers and 

America 221 

XII America in the World to 

Come 240 

Index 259 



IMPERILED AMERICA 



chapter i 

Points of Contact 

The great war which brought Arma- 
geddon to Europe in August, 1914, 
confronted the American people with 
facts of which they were ignorant or at 
the most dimly cognizant. It made them 
realize that their " splendid isolation " 
had vanished; that their "detached and 
distant situation," to which Washington 
referred as an important element of their 
security, no longer existed. The sea, once 
a barrier, had become an avenue. Progress 
in science and invention had overcome 
space and lessened time. The separate 
interests of nations had become the inter- 
related interests of mankind. What 

11 



12 IMPERILED AMERICA 

happened in Servia became of vital 
moment to the rest of the world, just 
as what happened in the United States 
provoked the unremitting attention and 
the direct concern of foreign countries. 

The American people know now, as 
they never knew before, that they belong 
to a great system of humanity, every part 
of which is affected by the prosperity or 
distress of every other part. The war, 
beginning in Europe, spread to every 
continent and every ocean, dislocating 
political affiliations, shaking economics 
and rocking finance. It inaugurated a 
reign of lawlessness on land and sea, 
wherein might rode roughshod over 
humanity and right. The actual or 
fancied necessities of belligerents were 
ofifered as an excuse for measures, with- 
out justice and frequently without reason, 
directed not only against each other but 
against nations which were not parties to 
their conflict. Thus, the maritime rights 
of the United States, in respect of persons 
and property, have been violated. This 



POINTS OF CONTACT 13 

country has suffered interruption of its 
commerce and disturbance of its industy. 
Its internal security and neutrality have 
been threatened by plots hatched by for- 
eign nations. It has felt, and, throughout 
the war — indeed, throughout its life — 
will continue to feel the pressure of out- 
side forces. In spite of the earnest wish 
of the American people to be let alone, 
in spite of their fervent desire to remain at 
peace, they have come to realize that there 
are points of conflict which menace them 
with war. 

Let us see where these danger points 
are: Do they lie within as well as with- 
out ourselves? Are we aggressive with- 
out being military? Do we lack the 
patriotism that inspires self-sacrifice? 
Are the conglomerate elements of which 
we are made, separate in their allegiance 
and disloyal to the point of revolution, 
as the German government believes? Is 
the strength we claim, in reality weak- 
ness? Does bluster take the place of 
courage, bluff, the place of decision? Are 



14 IMPERILED AMERICA 

we become another China as a result 
of our pursuit of wealth during the period 
following the Civil War? Will we suffer 
any humiliation rather than the pain 
which just action may cause? 

And then, turning to our international 
situation: Are we determined to protect 
the commerce, valued at more than five 
billion dollars a year, which our industry 
and activity have produced? Do we 
realize that the Monroe Doctrine is as 
necessary to our peace and safety now as 
it was when, militarily weak, we enun- 
ciated it? Have we built the Panama 
Canal at an expenditure of more than 
$400,000,000, for the benefit of another 
power of sufficient strength and vigor to 
take it? Why did we proclaim the prin- 
ciples of the integrity of China and the 
Open Door in that empire? Was it for 
the purpose of assuring equal opportun- 
ity for our commerce, or was it a foolish 
expression of American buncombe, with- 
out rhyme or reason, intended merely to 
minister to our pride as a world power 



POINTS OF CONTACT 15 

and for political effect at home? We 
sought to " neutralize " the Trans- 
Manchurian railroad. What was the 
object and what the result of this inter- 
vention in the vast northern province of 
China? 

We have acquired a chain of islands 
across the Pacific Ocean. For what pur- 
pose? We took the Philippines and are 
now paving the way for their inde- 
pendence. Yet we have no thought of 
withdrawing from Guam in the near-by 
Ladrone Islands! We got out of the tri- 
partite alliance with Germany and Great 
Britain respecting the Samoan Islands, 
and retained possession of Tutuila in that 
group. At intervals, we have endeavored 
to purchase the Galapagos Islands be- 
longing to and lying off the coast of 
Ecuador, which command the Pacific 
entrance to the Panama Canal. We are 
seeking to make, and we proudly call, 
the Caribbean Sea an American lake. 
Why all these measures? 

We hold Porto Rico and Culebra; we 



16 IMPERILED AMERICA 

have a protectorate over Cuba and a naval 
station at Guantanamo, on the south- 
eastern shore of that island; we are main- 
taining a financial protectorate over 
Santo Domingo; we are applying the same 
system to Haiti and Nicaragua, and have 
arranged for the purchase of the Danish 
West Indies. We kept a dictator out of 
Venezuela and drove another out of Nica- 
ragua. We interfered to save the former 
country from European exploitation and 
frustrated a German plot to control the 
latter. To what end have we done these 
things? 

We have been troubled for some years 
by anarchy in the neighboring " Repub- 
lic " of Mexico, for which we are largely 
responsible, and have prevented other 
nations from restoring order and protect- 
ing their nationals and interests. Is this 
advisable? We mediated in the Russo- 
Japanese war, used successfully our good 
offices with the European powers in the 
interest of a peaceful settlement of the 
Moroccan Dispute of 1905, and are keenly 



POINTS OF CONTACT 17 

watchful for a chance to end the present 
gigantic struggle. What enabled us to act 
in the instances referred to? What is back 
of our aspiration to restore peace out of 
the present condition? Has our policy 
brought us friendlier relations, and will 
it do so? Has it moved to our advan- 
tage, and will it continue to have such 
effect? What are the consequences of 
our representations in behalf of the Jews 
in Russia and in the Balkan States, in 
behalf of the Armenians in Turkey and 
the natives of the Congo in Africa? Our 
negroes founded the Republic of Liberia. 
Shall we continue to exercise ourselves 
for the continuance of that country as a 
free State? 

The commerce of the United States 
flows along broad lines to every settled 
land. By parallel routes come back to 
us, from far and near, things which we 
do not produce but which necessity or 
luxury causes us to buy. Our wheat fills 
English stomachs, our meats make Ger- 
man brawn. Our cotton runs the looms 



18 IMPERILED AMERICA 

of England and France and Japan and 
Germany. These countries are more eager 
for this product in time of war than 
they were in time of peace, for it is the 
base of high explosives. Our agricul- 
tural implements are used in Russia, in 
Argentina and other countries. Our steel 
makes rails for steam and electric roads 
in India and China, Egypt and South 
America. Transformed into weapons of 
war, it has been of the greatest value to 
the Allies, and has provoked the German 
charge that American munitions pre- 
vented an early and victorious peace. 
Our oil is lubricating the engines of war 
and our gasoline running the motors of 
the land transports and warships of the 
Allies. Our manufactured products, 
grown to a stupendous volume, are com- 
peting with European wares in markets 
everywhere. We have been dependent 
upon Germany for dyestufifs with which 
to make our cotton and woolen goods at- 
tractive to the eye. 

The United Kingdom and France con- 



POINTS OF CONTACT 19 

tribute heavily to our supplies of cloths 
and laces and ornaments. Great Britain 
sells us immense quantities of crude 
rubber. Japan, China, France and Italy 
provide us with silks. France sells us 
champagne and other wines and liquors; 
Japan and China, teas. We have no mer- 
chant marine; therefore wc pay immense 
freight bills to England, Norway, Japan 
and other states. We have no direct sys- 
tem of exchange, and as a result hand 
heavy commissions to London and Paris. 
We owe immense sums to foreign 
investors, principally English and French, 
and our goods pay the interest. Our 
business at once took advantage of 
Europe's fight for life, to extend its mar- 
kets, to build up a merchant marine, to 
establish banks in foreign lands in order 
to save commissions on exchange, and to 
displace English, French and German 
investments by American capital and 
thereby to force others to work for us. 

Do these activities make for friendship 
or irritation? Does the other fellow 



20 IMPERILED AMERICA 

regard them as a mean advantage taken 
of him when he is down? 

Recall what history teaches. If there is 
any lesson to be drawn from the past 
of the modern world it is that the great 
war-producing factor is the "peaceful 
struggle" for the control of trade. Nations 
which once sank their teeth in each other's 
throats for dynastic or religious reasons, 
now fight in order that they may sell. 
Peaceful penetration frequently has served 
as a preliminary to forcible intervention. 
We like to say the war with Spain was an 
expression of fine altruism. It was, in 
part; and nothing could have been more 
generous than our withdrawal from Cuba. 
But President McKinley, in describing 
the grounds for intervention in that island, 
specifically stated among them: "The 
right to intervene may be justified by the 
very serious injury to commerce, trade 
and business of our people, and by the 
wanton destruction of property and devas- 
tation of the island." 

When the European war broke out, a 



POINTS OF CONTACT 21 

congressman observed that " the present 
insanity of Europe is the logical result 
of the great nations abroad having per- 
mitted their souls to become corrupt, 
hard, cruel and atrophied, just to acquire 
wealth and power and imperialism." It 
is an obvious fact that morality is based 
upon condition. A standard in a rich, 
opulent and " civilized " country is not 
necessarily the standard in another where 
the struggle for life is keener. God has 
infinite ways to find expression. So, in 
Germany we find the people, moved by 
the memory of the sufferings of their 
ancestors under Napoleon, struggling for 
freedom, for unity, for empire, accepting 
militarism as an evil of necessity, and 
burdened by the taxes of excessive arma- 
ments. We find them growing in popu- 
lation, increasing tremendously their 
output of manufactures, believing them- 
selves deprived of that " place in the sun " 
which the Germans regard as their due. 

Occupied as they were for years with 
their internal development, they stood 



22 IMPERILED AMERICA 

aloof, careless that rivals were taking rich 
tracts of land throughout the world; and 
when they awoke, and looked for places 
to seize, they discovered that those of any 
value had already been sequestrated by 
other states. They found their country 
bottled-up, their water-borne trade men- 
aced, as their militarists taught, by English 
control of both exits from the North Sea, 
and competing in foreign-controlled mar- 
kets under unfavorable conditions. The 
Germany that prepared for " The Day," 
that seized the moment of her greatest 
strength and her adversaries' greatest 
weakness, that violated solemn treaties, was 
not the mystic Germany the world loved. 
It was a Germany that had turned from 
Kant and Goethe and Schiller, to 
Treitschke and Bernhardi and Krupp; 
from the expression of the soul to the 
materialism of the body. 

England, France, Russia and the United 
States are in no such territorial situation 
as Germany. England owns one-third of 
the earth. France has an area one-third 



POINTS OF CONTACT 23 

larger than that of the United States. 
Russia has practically an unlimited area. 
The population of France is stationary, 
that of Great Britain is increasing at the 
rate of eleven per thousand, of Russia at 
about fourteen per thousand, of Germany 
at fourteen per thousand. England, 
France and Russia have ample room in 
which to turn around, ample preferential 
markets for their products. The United 
States, still with plenty of unoccupied 
land, has concerned itself largely with 
internal affairs, and only in a haphazard 
way has it pushed its interests abroad. 
England, France and the United States 
prefer the maintenance of the status quo, 
and have been avowed advocates of inter- 
national peace. Change, to them, has 
meant and means danger and perhaps 
destruction. This is the reason for the 
strong hold the doctrine of pacificism 
has gained upon their peoples. No nation 
thinks of war unless it expects to profit 
thereby. England and France stood to 
lose if forced to battle. Because her 



24 IMPERILED AMERICA 

immense land holdings filled her needs 
though not her capacity, Russia produced 
a party of peace headed by the Czar, who 
called the first Hague Conference. But 
this party could not stand against the 
centuries-old desire, the centuries-old 
need, to win free access to the open sea. 
To a lesser extent, but equally important 
to her people, the same desire propelled 
Servia into war. Back of great events there 
are sometimes what to outsiders seem such 
little things! One of the interesting 
bases of Servia's dream of greatness lay 
in her inability to get her pigs to foreign 
markets save by the payment of taxes to 
surrounding states. 

Austria-Hungary, touching the sea only 
by way of the Adriatic, which is under 
the guns of Italy, sought an outlet into 
the Aegean Sea and through it to the 
world, unfettered by the proximity of a 
strong power. Japan, poor, heavily bur- 
dened by debt, crowded to the point of 
bursting, was forced into Korea and Man- 
churia, and expects, through the control 



POINTS OF CONTACT 25 

of China, to become a second Great 
Britain. The war has made Japan 
dominant in Asia, and enabled her to take 
a forward step in the direction of the 
mastery of the Pacific. Only one nation 
- — the United States — and that not a mili- 
tary nation, a nation that yearns for peace 
(some favor it at any price), is at this 
time in any position to dispute her desire. 
It may astonish Americans to know that 
their country has but one friend in the 
world — the United States. There are 
people who say self-interest will prevent 
England from ever making war upon us, 
that without our foodstuffs and raw mate- 
rials she would starve to death and die 
commercially, that her tremendous invest- 
ments in this country are and must be a 
great factor for peace, and that Canada 
constitutes a hostage the value of which 
can not be overestimated. To some 
extent this is true; but as an offset to 
our wheatfields there are the wheatfields 
of Argentina and Russia; and England 
has been battling to gain access to those 



26 IMPERILED AMERICA 

of the latter through the Dardanelles. 
Investments are capable of discharge 
prior to war or can not be permanently 
destroyed thereby, and the loss of Canada 
could be made good by Great Britain's 
seizure of the Panama Canal, to say 
nothing of Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii 
and the Philippines. Moreover, the Ameri- 
can people ought not to delude them- 
selves with the idea tht Great Britain is 
looking with complacency upon our efiforts 
to get her trade and the trade of Germany, 
for which she has poured out blood and 
treasure in unstinted measure. Trade is 
her life, and she will hold and increase it 
at whatever cost. 

With France, we have fewer points of 
conflict than with most nations. But 
France was disposed to enter into a 
European coalition against us in favor 
of Spain prior to and during the war 
of 1898. Russia can not understand 
American hostility, as evidenced during 
her war with Japan and by the denuncia- 
tion of the treaty of 1833 by the Taft 



POINTS OF CONTACT 27 

administration. Besides, Russia has found 
her aims in the Far East thwarted by 
the activity of the American government. 
Germany never has recognized, indeed 
always has been antagonistic to, the 
Monroe Doctrine. She desired land in 
the Western Hemisphere and resented our 
claim of a '' sphere of influence " which 
she and other nations must not penetrate. 
Her feeling against us has been accentu- 
ated by the general sympathy we enter- 
tain for the cause of the Allies. Japan 
regards our claim and her own in Asia 
and the islands of the Pacific Ocean as 
conflicting. 

Thus, even a bird's-eye view of interna- 
tional relations discloses many points of 
concentration for all the nations against 
the United States. Let no one think our 
potential strength will act as a bar against 
European protection of European interests 
wherever the latter are menaced. When 
the Great War ends, Europe will be 
equipped with superb fleets and armies 
of millions of veterans. Will they be 



28 IMPERILED AMERICA 

used for the purpose of making Uncle 

Sam pay at least a share of the heavy 

debt the war has created? 



chapter ii 

Our Internal Situation and the War 

It is obvious that for a democracy, such 
as the United States, to play an effective 
role in international affairs, it must pre- 
sent a united front and speak with a 
united voice. It may have divergent 
views upon purely internal questions, for 
the effect in such cases is domestic only. 
It ought not to show division upon 
foreign questions, for it thereby gives 
evidence of uncertainty and indecision 
which lends strength to its adversary. It 
should be cognizant of its vital interests 
and prepared to protect them. Above 
all, it should be inspired by the ideals 
of the spirit and seek to give them reali- 
zation. If it is to live, it cannot hold 
back in a great moral situation from fear 
of self-hurt. It must take its stand boldly, 

29 



30 IxMPERILED AMERICA 

courageously, and press on to its goal 
without count of cost. 

Did the United States during the long 
months of the great war show a united 
front, speak with a united voice? Did it 
mark out and pursue a definite course of 
action, in which ideals and vital inter- 
ests were blended? Neither question can 
be answered in the affirmative. There 
were occasions when it did take a bold 
stand, but did it press on to achieve the 
things demanded? Again the answer 
must be in the negative. The reasons for 
these inconsistencies, these failures, lie in 
a variety of causes, the first of which is to 
be found in the lack of real leadership and 
the second in the absence of a militant 
nationalism. The president of the United 
States, especially in foreign affairs, should 
not wait to ascertain the will of the people 
before taking action. They can not know 
the facts as he knows them. Again, he 
is or should be familiar with the cross 
currents that develop in connection with 
any important event, of which they neces- 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 31 

sarily are ignorant. It is for the presi- 
dent, when he has made himself acquainted 
with the facts and the law, to act, in other 
words, to lead. How often during the war, 
President Wilson delayed representation, 
how often modified or strengthened com- 
munications to foreign governments because 
of the interpretation he gave to the will of 
the people! In a note to Germany dated 
February 10, 1915, for example, protest- 
ing against the establishment of a war 
zone about the British Isles, he declared 
that the Berlin government would be held 
to a " strict accountability," if any Ameri- 
can ships were attacked or any American 
lives lost. During the next few months the 
British liners Falaba, Lusitania and 
Arabic were destroyed, American citizens 
were drowned, and attacks were made 
upon various American ships. The Presi- 
dent sent vigorous notes; they are master- 
pieces in respect of the demands made 
and the language used. But because the 
Adminstration felt the people were con- 
tent with expression and averse to action, 



32 IMPERILED AMERICA 

it allowed the questions raised to drift 
into the realm of discussion, and when 
this occurred the end could be fore- 
casted with a reasonable degree of cer- 
tainty. The really important features of 
the Lusitania note were the declaration 
that submarines could not be employed 
as commerce destroyers, and the demand 
for a disavowal. Eight months later the 
United States gave formal recognition to 
the submarine as a commerce destroyer 
and to the German contention that under 
certain conditions war on American life 
was permissible. (1) Subsequently, to the 
confusion of Europe, and to the injury 
of our influence abroad, the President 
switched back to the position that Ameri- 
cans were entitled to travel in safety upon 
the sea. The agreement which was reached 

(1) See note of January 18, 1916, sent by 
Secretary Lansing- to the British, Russian, 
French and Italian Ambassadors, in which 
he proposed abandonment of the American 
principle that merchantmen could be armed 
for defensive purposes and announced that 
the government thereafter was disposed to 
treat all such vessels as auxiliary cruisers. 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 33 

in February, 1914, in settlement of the 
Lusitania controversy, but not accepted by 
the President at the time because of the 
return of the Central Powers to their sub- 
marine operations, was in no sense a 
disavowal, and while construed by the 
Administration as an admission of ille- 
gality, was not so regarded by Germany. 

The lack of a consistent American 
nationalism, which the war brought home 
to the people, was realized abroad far 
more than in the United States. We 
accepted without comment the existence 
of a German- American vote, an Irish' 
American vote, a Scandinavian-American 
vote, a Polish-American vote, a Jewish- 
American vote, etc. Likewise without 
comment, we recognized the political 
necessity of seeking the ballots of these 
citizens from over the sea by the selection 
of candidates of their respective nativities 
for office. The constitution wisely pro- 
vides that only an American-born citizen 
may be president of the United States. 
This qualification has no application to the 



34 IMPERILED AMERICA 

membership of the Senate or House of 
Representatives or to any other federal or 
state office. The races which alone are 
excluded from the polls are the Chinese 
and Japanese. To secure the backing of 
the foreign elements that can vote, national 
administrations have deemed it expedient 
to insult and flout foreign states and 
thereby to sow seeds of dislike which 
some day may sprout a Jasonic harvest 
of spears. 

In a world-wide war, such as broke out 
on that fateful day of August, 1914, the 
great questions facing the powers involved, 
included the attitude of the United States. 
Had this country intervened, as Theodore 
Roosevelt intervened in the Morocco con- 
troversy in 1905, the war might not have 
occurred. But nothing was done, beyond 
the suggestion that the powers observe the 
Bryan Peace Plan, contemplating an inves- 
tigation of the causes of the Austro- 
Servian dispute. Germany rejected this 
suggestion, just as she had refused prior 
to the war to enter into a treaty based upon 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 35 

the Bryan plan. When Belgium was in- 
vaded, and the guaranteed neutrality of that 
nation was violated, the United States, 
bewildered, confused, appalled, by the 
approach of the conflagration, sought 
refuge in '' safety first." President Wilson 
adjured the people to be neutral in thought 
and act, when every person in the country 
of any intelligence had made up his mind 
as to the right and wrong of the struggle, 
and had squarely placed the responsibility 
for its occurrence on one side or the other. 
But more than this, the impossibility 
of neutrality in thought and act lay in 
the character of the American people. 
There was not a foreign government 
ignorant of the fact that the " melting 
pot " had become full and that there had 
fallen over its sides, unscarred or barely 
scarred by the heat of the American 
spirit, solid blocks of foreign nationalities 
imbued with the Old Country culture and 
responsive to some extent to the Old 
Country influence. Upon the vast number 
of immigrants who, because of economic 



36 IMPERILED AMERICA 

or political conditions at home, have come 
to the United States, we have succeeded 
in stamping our language, our laws and 
our literature. From their cross has 
developed a virile, aggressive race, which, 
by virtue of its numbers and " push," 
has made us one of the great world 
powers. 

Nearly fifteen per cent of our total 
population to-day is foreign born. One- 
fifth of this is German born, which by 
far is the largest proportion. Half of the 
foreigners we have are of northwestern 
European stock, than which there is no 
better. An equally large proportion has 
become naturalized and the vast majority 
are loyal to their adopted country. But 
practically all of them remember the 
agony of their Mother Land. So we 
find most of those of German extraction 
not only sympathetic with the German 
nation in its struggle, for which they can 
not be criticized, but, what Is reprehen- 
sible in the highest degree, many of them 
seeking to influence the policy of the gov- 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 37 

ernment at Washington in the interest 
of that nation. Action along the lines for 
which they agitate would provoke the 
Allies and precipitate us into war with 
that powerful combination. There are 
professional politicians of Irish birth who 
are aiding and abetting efforts of the 
unpatriotic Americans of German birth, 
not because they have love for Germany, 
but because of their belief that it will be 
to their personal advantage to clamor 
against England. There are but few Amer- 
icans of English and French birth who 
pursue the equally reprehensible course of 
urging an unneutral attitude in the in- 
terest of the Allies. All these men 
deserve the severe judgment of the real 
American, who may be sympathetic with 
one side or the other, but who places his 
country's interests first. 

It is an unfortunate fact that the sound 
advice of our first President should fall 
upon deaf ears to-day as it did when he 
felt impelled to give it. 

" Our citizens," wrote Washington, 



38 IMPERILED AMERICA 

*' would advocate their own cause instead 
of that of any other nation under the sun; 
that is, if instead of being Frenchmen or 
Englishmen in politics they would be 
Americans, indignant at any attempt of 
either, or any other power, to establish an 
influence in our councils or presume to 
sow the seeds of discord or disunion among 



us." 



Let us hark back over our history and 
see how administrations, in spite of Wash- 
ington's injunction, have permitted their 
foreign policies to be guided by the 
vote. Professional Irish politicians for 
years sensibly influenced our national atti- 
tude toward England; our Jews compelled 
diplomatic intervention in behalf of their 
coreligionists in Russia and the Balkan 
States; our Hungarians brought us into 
strained relations with Austria; our 
Armenians, supported by well-meaning 
missionaries, almost precipitated war 
between the United States and Turkey. 

The government, in the course it 
adopted in these several matters, claims 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 39 

to have been actuated by the broad prin- 
ciples of humanity. Can not such a jus- 
tification in fact be construed as a 
reflection upon and an insult to the state 
approached? Certainly it aroused irrita- 
tion which has found expression occa- 
sionally to our embarrassment. The 
American people as a whole, however, have 
remarked the steps taken with general 
approval, largely because of their strong, 
pulsing sympathy for the oppressed, 
and because of indifference or ignorance 
as to the effects upon themselves of unwise 
and ill-timed action. For example, the 
condition of the Belgians, resulting from 
their conflict with the Germans in the 
present war, caused a spontaneous move- 
ment for the relief of the sufferers. No 
one stopped to think of the principle of 
war that it is the duty of the conqueror 
to succor the conquered. No one stopped 
to think that the lifting of this burden 
from German shoulders would irritate 
Great Britain, France and Russia, which 
realize that the one sure way for them 



40 IMPERILED AMERICA 

to compass the defeat of their enemy is 
through the exhaustion of his supply of 
foodstuffs. For America to feed the 
Belgians was to enable Germany, in their 
view, to carry on the war that much longer. 
This consideration caused the Allies to 
decline to permit American charity to 
reach the Poles. 

And yet, after all, there is something 
fine about our meddlesome conduct, some- 
thing that appeals to the nobler instincts, 
even of the states we addressed and pos- 
sibly injured. We had nothing to gain by 
recognizing, in the person of the great 
Kossuth, the Hungarian movement for 
freedom; by agitating against England 
for a wiser policy toward the Irish; by 
constantly seeking to better the condition 
of foreign Jews; by protesting against the 
wanton massacre of the Armenians; by 
insisting upon the observance of a policy 
of humanity toward the natives of the 
Congo and Peru. Had Germany, instead 
of invading Belgium, first turned her 
attention to Russia, the sympathy of the 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 41 

American people probably would have 
gone out to the Vaterland. But, on the 
ground of necessity, the German armies 
swept into and through Belgium, an 
inoffensive bystander, with the intention 
of thrashing France, and when this task 
was accomplished they proposed to deal 
with the Russian Bear. The spirit of fair 
play and respect for the innocent and 
weak, are two of the most dominant char- 
acteristics of the American people. They 
saw Germany pouncing upon a peaceful 
nation with which she had no quarrel, 
merely as a matter of expediency, and 
their sympathy swelled out to that nation 
more unitedly than could have been 
expected in a land among whose inhabi- 
tants ten per cent at least are of German 
origin or extraction. Germany com- 
plained that through English control of 
cables a false color had been put on all 
news dispatches, and that the real truth was 
that Belgium, France and England had 
combined to attack her. It is unnecessary 
here to say more than this: The bulk 



42 IMPERILED AMERICA 

of the American people based their 
judgment upon the fact that German 
troops were the first to enter Belgium 
and that this had been preceded by 
an ultimatum either to permit them to 
pass without molestation or to suffer the 
consequences. Moreover, events quickly 
demonstrated that England, France and 
Russia were not ready for war, while Ger- 
many was prepared, down to the double 
set of suspender buttons upon the trousers 
of her soldiers. 

So Germany and Austria-Hungary 
entered upon the war under a serious 
handicap so far as the feeling of the 
American people was concerned. Blun- 
der followed on blunder. The careful 
diplomacy of years designed to cultivate 
American friendship was abandoned for 
a course of action which aroused resent- 
ment and tended toward the development 
of effective nationalism. There were 
efforts made to coerce the administration 
to adopt a pro-German policy by threat- 
ening it with the opposition of the 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 43 

German-American vote. There was an 
attempt to form a political party designed 
to further German aims. It was 
announced that German-Americans would 
not support any candidate for office who 
did not declare himself favorable to a 
pro-German neutrality. The Administra- 
tion, during the political campaign of 
1915, was refused democratic endorsement 
because of German-American opposition. 
There were movements directed against 
our peace and security; there were 
attempts, some successful, to destroy our 
industrial plants; there were measures 
enforced to violate our neutrality and 
to make us the base for one or the other 
of the contending parties; there were 
intrigues, plots, conspiracies, designed to 
involve us in the struggle, and there were 
even formulated plans contemplating an 
internal revolution in order to cripple us 
in case of war with Germany. 

It is apparent, even to the most super- 
ficial observer, that such events as occurred 
during the first year and a half of the 



44 IMPERILED AMERICA 

war could not have been produced save 
by years of careful, methodical prepara- 
tion. Great Britain long prior to the war 
had ceased to interfere in our internal 
affairs and had sought by consideration 
of, and concessions to, the government of 
the United States, to provide for a state 
of relations based upon reciprocal under- 
standing and on mutuality of interest. 
Germany, on the other hand, labored 
to undermine the government of the 
United States through the cultivation of 
Germans vs^ho had become American citi- 
zens, and through the use of their influence 
in behalf of German interests. The policy 
inaugurated by Baron von Holleben, the 
German Ambassador during and follow- 
ing the war with Spain, was carried on 
with remarkable ability by his successor, 
Baron von Sternburg, and with equal 
cleverness by Count von Bernstorff. Each 
of these men, working devotedly for his 
country, lost no opportunity to secure the 
greatest number of recruits for the Vater- 
land and to promote German interests 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 45 

through them. Germany's anxiety for 
friendly relations was manifested to the 
people in various ways: By the construc- 
tion of the Emperor's yacht, the Meteor, 
in the United States, by the visit of Prince 
Henry in 1902, by the reception of the 
American fleet at Kiel, by the exchange 
of professors between leading universities 
of the two nations, by messages of good 
will, a press propaganda, speeches by the 
Ambassadors and by courtesies extended 
to prominent American public men. Yet, 
under the surface, visible only to the offi- 
cials, ran a strong current of purpose to 
achieve the things in and from the United 
States which formed the goal of German 
statecraft. 

Unquestionably, Germany displayed the 
greatest political activity in the United 
States of any foreign nation. France 
relied upon the historic friendship 
between the two countries to bridge over 
any question that might arise; and this 
policy was of easy execution because of 
the lack of conflicting interests. Austria- 



46 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Hungary regarded the United States as 
so remote, just as the United States looked 
upon her as so distant, that the two govern- 
ments jogged along upon a perfectly polite 
basis, without either taking much interest 
in the policies of the other. Italy con- 
cerned herself with the protection and 
assertion of the rights of her subjects 
in the United States. Russia was aston- 
ished when American public opinion sup- 
ported the cause of Japan during the war 
between those empires in 1904-5. It was 
a rude awakening from her dream of 
American gratitude based upon her action 
in making a naval demonstration at New 
York and San Francisco in a critical 
period of the Civil War. But she had 
bigger fish to fry at home, and she allowed 
her relations with this country to drift 
until she received another slap in the face 
in the form of President Taft's denuncia- 
tion of the Treaty of 1833. She was 
inclined to make reprisal, but did nothing, 
for again she considered her larger inter- 
ests, and they could not be promoted by 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 47 

trouble with the United States. Japan 
for years has regarded this country as a 
probable enemy because of her belief in 
the existence of a conflict of interests in 
the Pacific and China. Then, too, racial 
antipathy has developed as a result of the 
treatment of Japanese laborers upon the 
Pacific Coast. At the same time, Japan has 
endeavored sedulously to bring about a 
better understanding, through the visits of 
distinguished Japanese to this country, 
through the establishment of news agencies 
designed to lull our suspicions of her 
designs, and by other means short of actual 
interference in our politics. 

The objects for which these various 
nations were working have been furthered 
by some of our own people. Those who 
shudder at the possibility of the United 
States becoming involved in war, no 
matter how serious the affront to our 
honor and our vital interests, who advo- 
cate the doctrine of non-resistance, and 
who regard armaments as provocative of 
conquest, would make their country voice- 



48 IMPERILED AMERICA 

less in the councils of the world. Thrice 
is he armed who hath his quarrel just, 
but thrice times thrice is he armed if he 
have a pistol at his hand. Had the 
United States, at the outbreak of the war, 
possessed an adequate fleet and an army 
of half a million men, there is no ques> 
tion that the lives of our citizens would 
not have been jeopardized and our rights 
would not have been violated. 

A man who is not blind must see that 
Japan can do what she wills in China 
because she realizes the United States, 
the only great power not at war, is 
in no position to make good militarily 
with reference to any protest against 
her conduct. What is true of Japan is 
true of other nations; for to them the 
United States is largely a big, ununified 
mass, with valuable outlying possessions in 
the Panama Canal, Alaska, Hawaii, and 
the Philippines, which it has not sufficient 
actual strength to defend. It is only the 
potential possibilities of the American 
people, their pluck and energy, their 



OUR INTERNAL SITUATION 49 

never-die spirit, that have deterred foreign 
governments from going too far with us. 
The attempts to make the United States 
the tool of foreign nations in the great 
conflict are by no means the first in the 
history of our country. It is easy to 
parallel the course of Germany with that 
of France in the early days of our infant 
republic. There were the same plots, the 
same conspiracies. The French agent was 
reluctantly dismissed because of his delib- 
erate violations of our neutrality, his 
attempts to discredit the national adminis- 
tration, and his angry outbursts over the 
refusal of the United States to go to the 
assistance of his people. There were coun- 
ter-plots by the enemies of France. There 
were measures taken to stir up the Indian 
tribes against the struggling nation, just as 
German agents gave aid to the revolution- 
ists in Mexico. The states were drawn 
closer together by these foreign machina- 
tions, and if history repeats itself that will 
be the ultimate efifect of what has taken 
place since the midsummer of 1914. 



chapter iii 

The World and the Monroe Doctrine 

The Monroe Doctrine is a pronounce- 
ment by the United States which owes its 
existence and the respect it has gained 
from foreign powers to the strength of 
the United States. It has been called into 
use within the memory of the present 
generation against Great Britain, Spain, 
Germany, Italy, France and Japan. In 
its inception it was directed against the 
Holy Alliance, made up of Russia, 
Prussia, and Austria, which France joined. 
It has been applied against practically 
every great power in the world to-day, 
and in the interest specifically of most, 
and generally of all, of the republics of 
the Western Hemisphere. It has been 
invoked by every administration since its 
declaration, and in such fashion as to 
keep its spirit a living force. 

50 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 51 

The Monroe Doctrine in a sense is 
altruistic. As a matter of fact, it is 
the essence of enlightened selfishness. 
Designed primarily in the interest of the 
safety of the people of the United States, 
and born of a purpose to exclude monar- 
chical institutions from the new world, it 
has worked for the liberty and independ- 
ence of the republics of Latin-America 
and has enabled them to proceed in their 
development along the lines they them- 
selves desired. Had there been no Monroe 
Doctrine, had the United States not pur- 
sued determinedly its purpose to prevent 
foreign powers from obtaining or extend- 
ing footholds upon the two American 
continents, this hemisphere would today 
be a scene of strife, offshoot of the great 
European war, just as it was prior to the 
time the United States became concerned 
over the destiny of the territory lying to the 
south of it. 

The Monroe Doctrine has no place in 
international law, though one of its bases 
is sound in international law — that of 



i2 IMPERILED AMERICA 

self-preservation. It was limited by the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with Great Brit- 
ain, which was superseded by the Hay- 
Pauncefote Treaty. On two occasions it 
is alleged indirectly to have received inter- 
national recognition, both times at the in- 
stance of the American delegation to the 
Hague Conference which drafted conven- 
tions for the peaceful settlement of interna- 
tional controversies. Fearing the first con- 
vention might permit European signatories 
to suggest arbitration of disputes arising 
under the Monroe Doctrine, the Ameri- 
can delegates made a formal reservation 
that nothing contained in the instrument 
should be considered to require any aban- 
donment of the traditional attitude of the 
United States toward questions purely 
American. No objection whatever was 
offered to this reservation. A similar 
declaration was made in connection with 
the convention adopted by the second 
Hague Conference. 

It is further contended that Great 
Britain assented to the Monroe Doctrine 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 53 

in the British Guiana- Venezuelan dis- 
pute, and that Great Britain, Germany and 
Italy did so in the Venezuelan controversy 
of 1901-2. 

In view of the way in which solemn 
treaties have been regarded in Europe as 
" scraps of paper," however, it is evident 
that mere acquiescence in declarations by 
representatives of the United States would 
not be considered for a moment as of 
binding force by any nation deeming it to 
its interest to violate the Monroe Doctrine. 

The Monroe Doctrine had its origin in 
European conditions and was suggested 
by George Canning, then Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, and later Prime 
Minister of Great Britain. It is one of the 
consequences of the disturbances of the 
balance of power in the Old World. Its 
importance to the struggling nation at 
the time of its inception in 1823, as well 
as to the country to-day, is best shown per- 
haps by the following extract from a letter 
written by Thomas Jefferson to President 
Monroe : 



54 IMPERILED AMERICA 

" The question presented by the 
letters you have sent me is the most 
momentous which has ever been 
offered to my contemplation since 
that of Independence. That made us 
a nation; this sets our compass and 
points the course which we are to 
steer through the ocean of time open- 
ing on us. And never could we 
embark upon it under circumstances 
more auspicious. Our first and fun- 
damental maxim should be never to 
entangle ourselves in the broils of 
Europe; our second, never to suffer 
Europe to intermeddle with cis- 
Atlantic affairs. America, North and 
South, has a set of interests distinct 
from those of Europe, and peculiarly 
her own. She should, therefore, have 
a system of her own, separate and 
apart from that of Europe. While 
the last is laboring to become the 
domicile of despotism, our endeavor 
should surely be to make our hemis- 
phere that of freedom." 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 55 

It is unnecessary to recite the details of 
the origin of the Monroe Doctrine; they 
are known to the world. But it is inter- 
esting to call attention to the fact that 
when the doctrine was proclaimed, it went 
far beyond the suggestion made by Sec- 
retary Canning. President Monroe, in 
his annual message of 1823, declared the 
United States would consider any attempt 
to extend the European system to any 
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous 
to our peace and safety. " With the exist- 
ing colonies or dependencies of any Euro- 
pean power," he said, " we have not inter- 
fered and shall not interfere. But with 
the governments who have declared their 
independence and maintained it, and 
whose independence we have on great 
consideration and on just principles 
acknowledged, we could not view any 
interposition, for the purpose of oppressing 
them, or controlling their destiny, by any 
European power, in any other light than 
as the manifestation of an unfriendly feel- 
ing towards the United States." Monroe 



56 IMPERILED AMERICA 

further served notice that the American 
continents were *' henceforth not to be con- 
sidered as subjects for future colonization 
by any European powers." 

Canning's position, as described by 
Stapleton, was simply that Great Britain 
would not permit other European powers 
to interfere on behalf of Spain in her 
contest with her American colonies. So 
far from assenting to the view that the 
unoccupied parts of America were no 
longer open to colonization from abroad, 
the British Prime Minister held " the 
United States had no right to take 
umbrage at the establishment of new col- 
onies from Europe on any such unoccu- 
pied parts of the American continent." 
The Monroe declaration, therefore, struck 
at England as well as at Russia, with 
which the United States was involved in 
a dispute concerning the Northwest Ter- 
ritory, and, as Calhoun remarked, gave 
offense to England to such an extent that 
she refused to cooperate with us in settling 
the Russian question. The Oregon dispute 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 57 

with Great Britain, of easier recollection 
by the famous " fifty-four forty or fight " 
slogan, was an expression by the Crown 
of its refusal to recognize the non-coloni- 
zation principle of the Doctrine. 

To-day the Monroe Doctrine is of 
high importance to Great Britain; and 
if it were desired by us, unquestionably 
she willingly would accord it formal 
recognition. As a matter of fact, from 
time to time, as her interests dictated, 
she sought to infringe and even violate 
it; but the firm adherence of this govern- 
ment to the original declaration prevented 
success attending her efforts. The culmi- 
nation occurred in connection with the 
boundary dispute between British Guiana 
and Venezuela. President Cleveland in 
1895 sent a special message to Congress in 
which he used this language: 

'' It may not be amiss to suggest 
that the doctrine upon which we 
stand is strong and sound because its 
enforcement is important to our peace 
and safety as a nation, and is essen- 



58 IMPERILED AMERICA 

tial to the integrity of our free insti- 
tutions and the tranquil maintenance 
of our distinctive form of government. 
It was intended to apply to every 
stage of our national life, and cannot 
become obsolete while our Republic 
endures. If the balance of power is 
justly a cause for jealous anxiety 
among the governments of the Old 
World, and a subject for our absolute 
non-interference, none the less is an 
observance of the Monroe Doctrine 
of vital concern to our people and 
their government." 

When Great Britain joined with Ger- 
many and Italy in the blockade of Vene- 
zuela in 1901-2, Lord Salisbury declared 
his government had no intention " to land 
a British force, and still less to occupy 
Venezuelan territory." As a matter of 
fact, there was little popularity in Eng- 
land in connection with the use of the 
navy to force the payment of a debt by 
an American state; so this declaration 
met with entire approval among the Eng- 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 59 

lish people, and was followed by accept- 
ance of President Roosevelt's proposal for 
an arbitration of the claims. Since that 
time there has never been the slightest 
question in the minds of the American 
government as to Great Britain's acqui- 
escence in the Monroe Doctrine. British 
statesmen realize its value to their own 
country. They have come to understand 
that the non-colonization principle is as 
much in their interest as it is in that of 
the United States; and, above all, that the 
declaration that the dominions of one 
European power can not be alienated to 
another, constitutes in fact a guarantee by 
the United States that it will not permit 
any of Britain's enemies to take possession 
.of British colonies in the Western World. 
In short, the United States is a power- 
ful potential backer of British control 
of territory in the Western Hemis- 
phere. Likewise, it is the backer of the 
possessions of France in the West Indies 
and in French Guiana, and of those of the 
Netherlands. The Danish West Indian 



60 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Islands are about to pass into our posses- 
sion. 

Germany has been and is in a position 
totally different from that of Great 
Britain in connection with the Monroe 
Doctrine. She regards it with disfavor. 
The records of the Department of State 
contain reports of coaling bases, always 
at strategic points, established ostensibly 
for German merchant lines, and later 
in reference to the erection of wireless 
stations. They call attention to German 
emigration to southern Brazil and Ger- 
man interest in the prosperity and de- 
velopment of these representatives of 
the Vaterland. In 1901, the government 
learned that German warships were 
inspecting the Island of Santa Margarita, 
off the coast of Venezuela, with a view to 
its occupation as a naval base. Subse- 
quently, information was received that 
secret negotiations were under way for 
German acquisition of two harbors in 
Lower California for the Kaiser's " per- 
sonal use." Interposition by the United 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 61 

States prevented these various essays from 
meeting with success. 

The real test of the Monroe Doctrine, 
so far as Germany was concerned, arose in 
connection with the blockade of Venezuela 
in 1901-2, which already has been referred 
to. Russia and France had renewed their 
treaty of alliance, leaving Germany iso- 
lated upon the continent; and Great 
Britain, which suspected Russia's designs 
in the Near and Far East and was on edge 
with France as a result of the latter's 
African adventures, was in a mood to 
listen to overtures. The result was an 
agreement between Germany and Great 
Britain, in which Italy joined, to collect 
certain claims pending against Venezuela, 
which the latter seemed indisposed to 
pay. Lord Lansdowne's assurance already 
has been quoted; that of Germany, as 
expressed by Baron von Holleben, the 
Kaiser's Ambassador in Washington, was 
as follows : 

" We declare especially that under 

no circumstances do we consider in 



62 IMPERILED AMERICA 

our proceedings the acquisition or the 
permanent occupation of Venezuelan 
territory. ... If this measure [a 
blockade] does not seem efficient, we 
would have to consider the temporary 
occupation on our part of dif]ferent 
Venezuelan harbor places and the 
levying of duties in those places." 
President Roosevelt had anticipated 
German action by inserting in his annual 
message (December 3, 1901), eight days 
before the formal declaration above 
quoted was made, the following reference 
to the Monroe Doctrine: 

" The Monroe Doctrine is a decla- 
ration that there must be no territorial 
aggrandizement by any non-American 
power at the expense of any American 
power on American soil. It is in no 
wise intended as hostile to any nation 
in the Old World. This doctrine has 
nothing to do with the commercial 
relations of any American power, save 
that it in truth allows each of them 
to form such as it desires. . . . We 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 63 

do not guarantee any state against 
punishment if it misconducts itself, 
provided that punishment does not 
take the form of the acquisition of 
territory by any non - American 
power." 

In spite of the German declaration, the 
Roosevelt administration was seriously 
concerned about the course of Germany. 
The previous activities of that government 
in this hemisphere, as well as information 
as to its purpose which had come to 
Washington, caused the impression that 
any " temporary " occupation by Germany 
would be translated into permanent occu- 
pation. So John Hay, then Secretary of 
State, protested against the " peaceful 
blockade," the form of coercion adopted, 
as illegal and a contradiction in terms, 
and declared that its enforcement against 
the rights of neutrals would not be toler- 
ated. Mr. Hay also urged arbitration, 
but without success. 

President Roosevelt thereupon took 
personal control of the situation. At a 



64 IMPERILED AMERICA 

moment when the Venezuelan crisis 
reached its point of greatest tension, he 
requested the German Ambassador to come 
to the White House. He explained to him 
the concern felt by the government and 
people of the United States at the course 
of Germany and her allies; that the United 
States could not look upon *'a temporary 
occupation" of ''fifty-seven years" as any- 
thing other than a permanent occupation; 
that he and the American people desired 
the continuance of the most friendly rela- 
tions with Germany, but that if within ten 
days he did not receive an official declara- 
tion from Emperor Wilhelm of his purpose 
to submit the Venezuelan dispute to arbi- 
tration, he would instruct Admiral Dewey, 
in command of the North Atlantic Fleet, 
which had been sent to the Caribbean Sea 
ostensibly for " maneuvers," to proceed 
to Venezuela and forcibly prevent the 
occupation of territory, temporary or 
otherwise. 

Baron von Holleben called attention to 
the fact that the Emperor had refused to 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 65 

arbitrate, and that this was final. Presi- 
dent Roosevelt informed the Ambassador 
that he did not propose to argue the 
matter, that he had come to the conclusion 
which he had set forth, and that he 
believed the Ambassador might deem it 
wise to transmit the conversation to his 
government. Baron von HoUeben asked 
the President if he realized the meaning 
of his words, and suggested that it might 
precipitate war. 

" Now that you have said the word, 
Mr. Ambassador," substantially replied 
the President, " it will mean war unless 
your government acts as I have pointed 
out." 

For a week. Baron von Holleben 
remained away from the White House. 
Then he called and entered upon a casual 
conversation. As he rose to go, without 
having mentioned the Venezuelan ques- 
tion, the President asked him if he had 
heard from his government. He replied 
that he had not taken the President's 
utterances seriously, and had not deemed 



66 IMPERILED AMERICA 

it necessary to cable Berlin. Thereupon 
he was advised that Admiral Dewey 
would be instructed to proceed to Vene- 
zuela twenty-four hours earlier than 
originally intended. This produced an 
emphatic protest, which did not shake the 
President's determination. Mr. Roosevelt 
assured the Ambassador he had no inten- 
tion to humiliate the Emperor or Ger- 
many, that nothing had been put in writ- 
ing, that if the Emperor would agree to 
arbitration, he would issue a statement 
praising his action and would give the 
public the impression that the Emperor 
had taken the initiative. Mr. Roosevelt 
added that within forty-eight hours he 
must have an acceptance of his program 
or Admiral Dewey would sail. 

On the morning of the day the ulti- 
matum was to expire. Baron von Holleben 
with a beaming face advised the President 
of his receipt of a dispatch that the 
Emperor would arbitrate. Thereupon, 
the President made a formal announce- 
ment, giving the entire credit of this step 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 67 

to the German Emperor. The greatness 
of the service which Roosevelt's diplomacy 
rendered to the United States has not been 
realized by the people, because of the 
necessity of keeping them in ignorance of 
the lengths to which he was forced to go. 

Thus Germany learned that the Monroe 
Doctrine was a living reality. Neverthe- 
less, it is known to this government that 
it was the influence of Germany which 
defeated in the Danish parliament a 
treaty made some years ago, ceding the 
Danish West Indies to the United States. 
A few weeks prior to the outbreak of the 
great European war, Germany demanded 
participation in the control of the customs 
revenues of Haiti, ostensibly in order to 
protect the loans of German subjects to the 
Negro republic. 

On September 3, 1914, a little more 
than a month after the outbreak of the 
war, Count von Bernstorff, the German 
Ambassador, sent a note to the State 
Department denying reports that Ger- 
many, if victorious, would seek expansion 



68 IMPERILED AMERICA 

in South America. He explained that his 
statement did not cover the entire hemis- 
phere, because no question had been raised 
as to alleged German designs upon any 
other part of the New World than that 
directly specified. On October 26, 1914, 
the Ambassador asserted the right of 
Germany to invade Canada, despite the 
Monroe Doctrine, since that Dominion 
had participated in the war by dispatch- 
ing troops to the European battlefields. 
Such a measure undoubtedly would arouse 
the American people; for the occupation 
of Canada would mean the establishment 
of a great military power on our northern 
border and a grave threat against the 
peace and integrity of the Union. If 
Germany should undertake a step of this 
kind against any British possession in 
this hemisphere, she would arouse the 
grave concern of the United States, and 
in all human probability would draw us 
into war. 

Japan's interest in the western world, 
while of recent manifestation, has had a 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 69 

significant effect upon the development 
of the Monroe Doctrine. Occupied as 
Japanese statesmen were by the reorganiza- 
tion and expansion of their country in 
the Far East, it never was believed they 
would direct their national ambition 
across the Pacific; and this particularly in 
view of the fact that by an exchange of 
notes with the United States during 
the Roosevelt administration, Japan had 
tacitly accepted the Monroe Doctrine by 
declaring that " the policy of both govern- 
ments, uninfluenced by any aggressive ten- 
dencies, is directed to the maintenance of 
the existing status quo in the region above 
mentioned (the Pacific Ocean)." Yet this 
government was aroused in 1912 by 
reports that a Japanese corporation was 
preparing to purchase land upon the 
shores of Magdalena Bay, Mexico, which 
furnishes an admirable site for a naval 
base and the occupation of which by a 
foreign power would menace the Pacific 
route between the United States and the 
Panama Canal. 



70 IMPERILED AMERICA 

The danger was met by the adoption 
by the Senate of a resolution introduced 
by Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachu- 
setts, under the terms of which foreign 
corporations, subsidized or controlled by 
their governments, are forbidden to 
acquire land in the Americas which is 
so situated as to menace the safety or 
communications of the United States. 
There is complaint abroad that the Lodge 
declaration is a forerunner to the exclu- 
sion of all foreign corporations, and 
diplomatic representatives in Washington 
expect this to happen as the logical out- 
come of President Wilson's Mobile speech 
against Latin-American " concessions." It 
may be said in passing that when the 
Senate adopted the Lodge resolution, it 
for the first time made the Monroe 
Doctrine a congressional policy; thereto- 
fore it had been exclusively an executive 
policy. 

The activity of a Japanese corporation 
thus resulted in a reiteration, a develop- 
ment, if it may be called such, of the 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 71 

Monroe Doctrine. But Japan did not 
take this rebuff to heart. She sent a 
special envoy to Mexico — the first she 
or any other Asiatic state had ever sent 
to that country — to investigate condi- 
tions there. Shortly after the outbreak 
of the war, Japanese warships were 
reported to be establishing a base on 
Lower California. This report was dis- 
posed of by a naval investigation which 
disclosed that a Japanese warship had 
been wrecked and that efforts were being 
made to salvage her. Attention is called to 
this incident merely to show the suspicion 
and concern which exist in Washington as 
to Japanese purposes in this part of the 
world. 

It is interesting now to pass to the Latin- 
American view of the Monroe Doctrine. 
With the principles of that Doctrine the 
people of Central and South America are 
in hearty accord. But they object to the 
appearance of overlordship which the sup- 
port of the Doctrine seems to give. Their 
pride is touched by such declarations as 



12 IMPERILED AMERICA 

that of Secretary of State Olney: "The 
United States is practical sovereign on this 
continent, and its fiat is law upon the 
subject to which it confines its interposi- 
tion." Moreover, there are Latin-Ameri- 
cans who point out that the Doctrine, 
while forbidding European and Asiatic 
conquest of the territory of their countries, 
contains no such prohibition against the 
author of the Doctrine; and proof of the 
predatory instinct of the United States is 
found in our acquisition of territory from 
Mexico, our alleged protectorate over 
Cuba, Haiti and Santo Domingo, our inter- 
vention in Nicaragua, and our participa- 
tion in the separation of Panama from the 
Republic of Colombia. Therefore, South 
Americans urge the United States to adopt 
as a corollary to the Doctrine the same in- 
terdict upon its conquest of American terri- 
tory as it has imposed upon cis-Atlantic, 
and cis-Pacific states. The state of this 
feeling was set forth in an article printed 
by the North American Review of Sep- 
tember, 1915, from the pen of John 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 73 

Barrett, Director General of the Pan 
American Union. 

'' There is also the suggestion that all 
Latin-America is opposed to the Monroe 
Doctrine," said Mr. Barrett. '' But what 
is interpreted as opposition to the Monroe 
Doctrine is not a feeling against the orig- 
inal Doctrine and the conditions under 
which it was declared, but against a kind 
of casual interpretation of it in the United 
States which carries the obnoxious inti- 
mation that the United States has a ' holier 
than thou,' a supreme, position among the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere. Latin- 
America, as a matter of fact, believes in a 
just and unselfish interpretation of the 
Monroe Doctrine — an interpretation 
which would make it a Pan-American 
principle or policy, by which all the 
countries of North and South America 
would stand for the sovereignty and 
integrity of each." 

The suspicion as to our purposes under 
the Monroe Doctrine has led to reports 
of the formation of an alliance by Argen- 



74 IMPERILED AMERICA 

tina, Brazil and Chile, of negotiations for 
a secret treaty between Chile and Colom- 
bia, in connection with the Panama Canal 
episode, and in various other ways. It 
was intensified by President Wilson's 
declaration that the United States was 
the champion of constitutional govern- 
ment in the American hemisphere, and by 
his announcement that he would not recog- 
nize a government which attained power 
through force instead of by the will of 
the people — a position which was wholly 
at variance with precedent and which he 
was compelled to abandon within a little 
more than a year of its declaration, in 
four specific cases: China, Peru, Haiti, 
and finally Mexico. In other words, Mr. 
Wilson was forced to return to the 
wiser policy pursued by his predecessors 
and first sounded by President Monroe 
in his last annual message to Congress 
in 1824. 

" These new states," said the astute 
Monroe, " are settling down under gov- 
ernments elective and representative in 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 75 

every branch, similar to our own. In 
this course, we ardently wish them to 
persevere, under a firm conviction that it 
will promote their happiness. In this, 
their career, however, we have not inter- 
fered, believing that every people have a 
right to institute for themselves the gov- 
ernment which, in their judgment, may 
suit them best. Our example is before 
them, of the good effect of which, being 
our neighbors, they are competent to 
judge, and to their judgment we leave it, 
in the expectation that other powers will 
pursue the same policy. The deep interest 
which we take in their independence, 
which we have acknowledged, and in 
their enjoyment of all the rights incident 
thereto, especially in the very important 
ones of instituting their own governments, 
has been declared and is known to the 
world." 

It is evident that sovereignty implies 
obligation. So long as certain of the 
Latin-American republics which were in 
a chronic state of revolution, did not 



76 IMPERILED AMERICA 

menace the peace and safety of the United 
States, so long were they left alone. But 
when by their acts and by their refusal 
to pay the debts they had incurred, they 
paved the way for foreign intervention, 
this government was forced to intervene. 
When Cuba was liberated by American 
arms from the yoke of Spain, the United 
States aided it in the establishment of a 
stable government. When Santo Domingo 
was threatened by foreign powers. Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, upon the request of that 
government, established what may be called 
a financial protectorate over the island, 
which made for its financial rehabilitation 
and the development of order and tran- 
quility. By this action President Roosevelt 
asserted the same right of self-protection 
against other American states as against 
Europe. The Taft administration sought 
to make arrangements for Nicaragua and 
Honduras similar in many respects to that 
adopted in the case of Santo Domingo. 
The Wilson administration took little 
action with reference to Haiti. The 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 11 

treaties with Haiti and the one with 
Nicaragua finally were ratified. 

What was aimed at in these several 
conventions was the establishment and 
maintenance of peace. With the kind of 
government in power the United States 
had no concern. The like motive caused 
the Taft administration to take the wholly 
unprecedented step of excluding General 
Castro from Venezuela, on the ground 
that he was a stormy petrel, and General 
Zelaya from Nicaragua because of his dic- 
tatorial conduct. President Wilson went 
even further than Taft when, in his annual 
message of December, 1913, he made this 
statement: 

" There can be no certain prospects 
of peace in America until General 
Huerta has surrendered his usurped 
authority in Mexico; until it is under- 
stood on all hands, indeed, that such 
pretended governments will not be 
countenanced or dealt with by the 
Government of the United States. 
We are the friends of constitutional 



78 IMPERILED AMERICA 

government in America; we are more 
than its friends, we are its champions." 
If we can force a constitutional govern- 
ment in Mexico, why may we not do like- 
wise elsewhere? ask those in authority in 
South America. If we can go that far, 
when the people of certain states are not 
ready for such liberty, may we not go 
even further and say they must accept our 
officials to show them how to run their 
countries? And if this step should be 
taken, is not the next inevitable step 
annexation to the United States? 

President Wilson sought to dissipate 
the cloud of suspicion through which 
Latin-America views the United States, 
by inviting Argentina, Brazil and Chile, 
and subsequently other Latin-American 
powers, to aid him in settling the 
Mexican question; by disclaiming, in 
his annual message of December, 1915, 
any idea of guardianship or thought of 
wards, in connection with the southern 
republics, and by proclaiming " a full 
and honorable association as of partners 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 79 

between ourselves and our neighbors in 
the interest of ail America, North and 
South." This thought received expression 
in proposals by Secretary Bryan for 
treaties with the Latin-American republics, 
containing a mutual guarantee of each 
other's independence and integrity, and the 
maintenance of a republican form of gov- 
ernment by each. 

Such treaties would strike at the vital 
interests of the United States as well as 
those of the southern states. There ought 
to be, of course, no thought of alliances 
with the southern republics, though a 
natural desire prevails for a solidarity of 
the Western Hemisphere, based upon its 
geographical separation from European 
and Asiatic concerns, the peculiar social 
conditions which it possesses, the character 
of its peoples, the vastness of its area and 
the richness of its soil, and finally the 
development of a public law which these 
distinctions have assured. It is evident, 
however, that since the Monroe Doctrine 
is a declaration based upon this govern- 



80 IMPERILED AMERICA 

merit's right to protect itself, it cannot, to 
quote the words of Elihu Root, " be trans- 
muted into a joint or common declaration 
by American states or any number of 
them. If Chile or Argentina or Brazil 
were to contribute the weight of her 
influence toward a similar end, the right 
upon which that nation would rest its 
declaration would be its own safety, not 
the safety of the United States. . . . 
Each nation would act for itself and in 
its own right, and it would be impossible 
to go beyond that except by more or 
less offensive and defensive alliances. 
Of course, such alliances are not to be 
considered." 

The real Monroe Doctrine, which exists 
to-day as in the time of Monroe, has not 
changed. Its fundamental base is that 
American territory shall remain American. 
The reason for its present enforcement is 
even more lively than it was when pro- 
claimed. The Caribbean Sea and Central 
America are our back yard. South 
America is nearer than it was in 1823. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 81 

The growth of Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile reduces the chance of their terri- 
tory being used for European or Asiatic 
colonization purposes. But the peace and 
safety of the United States, the impelling 
motives for the proclamation and mainte- 
nance of the Doctrine, must be guarded; 
and this can be accomplished only through 
the determination and ability of the Ameri- 
can people to enforce universal respect for 
their traditional policy. 



chapter iv 

The Caribbean Sea Problem 

The progress of events has forced 
another policy upon the United States, a 
policy included in the Monroe Doctrine 
and, like the Doctrine as a whole, based 
upon the recognized right of self-preserva- 
tion. It relates to the Panama Canal, to 
the territory lying between the Rio Grande 
and the southernmost boundary of the 
canal zone, to the countries washed by the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean in 
the vicinity of the Canal, and to the 
islands which dot those reaches of water. 
More than ever, the United States cannot 
permit any European or Asiatic power 
to gain possession of footholds in that 
important region. More than ever, it 
must keep within its control the com- 
munications between its continental limits 
and the Canal. Indeed, the policy of the 

82 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 83 

United States must be to consolidate its 
position in Mexico and Central America, 
in the Caribbean Sea and in those countries 
whose geographical situation lends them 
strategic value in connection with the 
waterway. 

The importance of the Caribbean Sea 
to the American people was realized by 
the founders of the Republic. They saw 
in its islands natural appendages to the 
North American continent, with one of 
them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores. 
The commanding position of that island, 
with reference to the Gulf of Mexico 
and the West Indian seas; its situation 
midway between our southern coast and 
the important island of Santo Domingo; 
its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, 
fronting a long line of our shores, destitute 
of the same advantage; the nature of its 
productions and wants, furnishing the 
supplies and needing the returns of a com- 
merce immensely profitable and mutually 
beneficial, lent it an importance in the 
sum of our national interests, in the view 



84 IMPERILED AMERICA 

of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, 
with which that of no other foreign terri- 
tory could be compared, and little inferior 
to that which bound the different mem- 
bers of the Union together. It was appre- 
ciated by Adams, as it had been appreci- 
ated by his predecessors in office, that the 
people of the United States could not 
look with indifference upon any attempt to 
transfer Cuba and Porto Rico, or, indeed, 
any of the West Indian Islands, from their 
owners to other powers. What was true 
of the islands was true likewise of Mexico 
and Central America, in fact, of all the 
nations on the Caribbean littoral. So we 
find the American people manifesting a 
supreme interest in the maneuvers of Great 
Britain, France and Spain and subse- 
quently of Germany, in connection with all 
the territory lying directly to the south of 
the Rio Grande. 

Thus there always has been a Caribbean 
Sea question, and a Central American 
question. The pivot of the question has 
shifted. To-day it is the Panama Canal. 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 85 

The southernmost boundary of the zone 
through which the waterway has been 
constructed has become in fact what Presi- 
dent Hayes predicted — a new coast line 
for the United States. It must be defended 
as we must defend our continental coast 
lines. Our sole dependence for the con- 
tinuance of the Canal in American owner- 
ship and under American control lies in 
our fleet. The time may come when we 
will deem it necessary to have another 
line of approach to the Canal in order to 
provide for its defense; and that line can 
be secured only through control, most 
probably possession, of the territory lying 
between the Rio Grande and the Republic 
of Colombia. 

The interest of the United States in this 
part of the world is an interest so vast that 
it may be regarded as comparable to that 
of ancient Rome in connection with the 
Mediterranean Sea. Any attack on this 
nation by a European power undoubtedly 
would be launched from an island in the 
West Indies. Any attack by an Asiatic 



86 IMPERILED AMERICA 

power upon this nation unquestionably 
would be directed from Mexico. Two 
distinct ends would be gained by such a 
maneuver: first, the severance of commun- 
ications with the Canal, and, second, the 
establishment of a base for operations 
against the Union. He who seizes the 
Canal annuls the Monroe Doctrine and 
dominates Central and South America; he 
deprives the United States of a mighty 
defensive and offensive weapon, and he 
enjoys possession of a second world high- 
way of the greatest political and economic 
value. 

The statesmen of Europe, as those of 
America, have realized the importance 
of the Canal; and this is responsible for 
the efforts they have made in the past to 
gain control of the Panama and Nica- 
raguan routes, as well as the Tehuantepec 
route through Mexico. It is responsible 
also for their efforts to acquire islands 
which command the Canal routes, and it 
has inspired, blindly, to be sure, a similar 
policy on the part of the United States. 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 87 

Sentiment is strengthened immeasurably 
by economic need, and above all by the 
necessity of self-preservation; and doubt- 
less that was in the mind of Elihu Root 
when he said: 

*' It is plain that the building of the 
Panama Canal greatly accentuates the 
practical necessity of the Monroe 
Doctrine as it applies to all the terri- 
tory surrounding the Caribbean or 
near the Bay of Panama. The plain- 
est lessons of history and the universal 
judgment of all responsible students 
of the subject, concur in teaching that 
the potential command of the route to 
and from the canal must rest with the 
United States and that the vital inter- 
ests of the nation forbid that such 
command shall pass into other hands. 
Certainly no nation which has acqui- 
esced in the British occupation of 
Egypt will dispute this proposition." 
It is obvious that the peace and safety 
of the United States forbid particularly 
the transfer by one over-seas power to 



88 IMPERILED AMERICA 

another of any territory in this region. It 
is obvious, furthermore, that the value to 
each of the republics of a stable and 
orderly government is no less important 
to them than it is to the United States. 
It follows as a necessary corollary that 
there must exist closer relationship between 
the United States and those republics, if 
possible without jeopardizing their inde- 
pendence. Chronic revolutions, refusal to 
pay debts, insults and injury to foreigners, 
invite retaliation, and retaliation awakens 
the keen apprehension of the American 
people. Orderly and stable government 
assuring discharge of the obligation to 
protect life, liberty and property, ought 
not to be too great a price to pay for 
independence. 

It was this sound view which was 
responsible for the adoption of the Piatt 
amendment in connection with Cuba, the 
application of the Roosevelt financial pro- 
tectorate to Santo Domingo, and the nego- 
tiation of similar protectorates over Hayti, 
Nicaragua and Honduras. It is the base 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 89 

for our guarantee of the independence of 
Panama and our diplomatic intervention in 
Venezuela and Mexico. And by virtue of 
the fact that our policy of " hands ofif " nec- 
essarily imposes obligations on us to those 
shut out, more and more the over-seas 
states are urging American redress of 
wrongs perpetrated upon them and their 
subjects. Their attitude in this respect 
has been manifested especially in Mexico, 
where revolutions have destroyed foreign 
life and foreign property. It is no secret 
that had not the European situation prom- 
ised war there would have been inter- 
vention as against the United States in the 
neighboring republic prior to 1914. 

That we have not met our responsibility 
in the case of Mexico is apparent to those 
who have followed the course of deplor- 
able events there. It is the international 
point of view more than the internal 
struggles in that republic which arouses 
the concern of those who have their coun- 
try's interest at heart. European nations 
have looked with amazement upon a pol- 



90 IMPERILED AMERICA 

icy of " watchful waiting," which has per- 
mitted the assassination and murder of 
American citizens, as well as of their own 
nationals, the destruction of hundreds of 
millions of foreign property, and the crea- 
tion of a condition that common humanity, 
which has been a mainspring of action by 
the United States in the past, demanded 
should be terminated. They have seen 
revolutionary and bandit chiefs insult and 
flaunt the United States; they have seen 
the American flag dragged in the dust, 
American soldiers and marines killed and 
wounded, and no reprisals, save a tem- 
porary occupation of Vera Cruz, enforced. 
They have witnessed the observance of 
two distinct and antipathetic policies: one 
a refusal to recognize a dictator, the other 
the recognition of a dictator. 

There developed abroad the conviction 
that the United States did not mean what 
it said, that American life and American 
rights could be violated with impunity, 
that American representations could be 
disregarded and American demands treated 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 91 

contemptuously. President Wilson's course 
in Mexico reduced American prestige 
to a stage so low that it is difficult 
to find a parallel in our entire history. 
This had a bearing on our international 
situation which the people little appre- 
ciated, for it left us without a friend in the 
world; and the President was compelled, 
in order to prevent our isolation, to regain 
the friendship of a foreign power by 
complying with the British demand for 
equal tolls on all ships passing through 
the Panama Canal. 

There are some who think that Mexico 
is a far cry to the Panama Canal. Yet 
Mexico has a direct relation to that water- 
way, not only from a strategic but from 
a commercial point of view. The genius 
of Diesel has dethroned King Coal, and 
the future will see greater and greater use 
of petroleum in place of the fuel to which 
the world has become accustomed. The 
employment of petroleum will revolu- 
tionize the entire realm of naval strategy 
and deep sea trade. Thus this mineral oil 



92 IMPERILED AMERICA 

becomes of vital moment in the sphere of 
military and political interests. It follows 
that every maritime nation, including the 
United States, must consider the oil 
production of the world. 

Great Britain, with that far-sightedness 
which has played such an important part 
in her development, realized long before 
other states the value of petroleum, and 
quietly began to acquire properties where 
they would be of strategic use. The Eng- 
lish Pearson interests, the head of which, 
Lord Cowdray, has close relations with 
the British Admiralty, have acquired oil 
fields in the State of Vera Cruz and on 
the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, as well as 
in other parts of Mexico. The wells in 
operation have an estimated annual output 
of one hundred million barrels; that is to 
say, nearly half the annual production of 
the United States. In a few years, Mexico 
may become the first petroleum producing 
country In the world, surpassing the 
United States in the output of this prod- 
uct. By reason of Its closer proximity to 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 93 

the Canal, which it can supply by pipe 
lines, yet to be built, Mexico thus has an 
enhanced importance with respect to the 
waterway. Besides the oil wells in Mex- 
ico, foreign interests have acquired mines 
in Colombia and Ecuador. It is appar- 
ent, therefore, that petroleum, " which 
seemed to be a gift of the gods to the 
economically weak Latin republics of 
Central America and of the neighboring 
countries of South America, has, on 
account of the Panama Canal, become the 
bone of contention of the great powers, 
which circumstance alone would justify 
us in speaking of a Central American 
question — " this from Germanicus in The 
American Journal of Ifiternational Law, 
April, 1914. 

The United States is both feared and 
hated in the states over which it has 
established a suzerainty. In Mexico, our 
armed intervention and withdrawal and 
our diplomatic intervention have created 
a feeling bordering on contempt. A 
way for a brigand chief to gain popu- 



94 IMPERILED AMERICA 

lar favor was and is to attack the 
United States. Huerta did so, Villa did 
so, and Carranza has found it desirable 
to do likewise. The Central Americans 
have been greatly exercised over the inva- 
sion of Nicaragua by American marines 
and their continued occupation of Man- 
agua, the capital of the country — an 
occupation which has lasted three years. 
The expulsion of President Zelaya by the 
Taft Administration aroused the appre- 
hension of the dictators of Guatamala 
and Honduras. Costa Rica is com- 
paratively friendly in sentiment. As to 
Panama, her existence rests upon the good 
will of the United States. It would seem 
there ought to be gratitude there; but the 
feeling against our country has found 
expression in attacks upon our soldiers 
who go from the Zone to the city of 
Panama. Colombia has never forgiven 
what she regards as President Roosevelt's 
" rape " of Panama, but is prepared to 
accept the tidy little sum of $25,000,000 
to salve her honor. The United States 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 95 

having kept Castro out of Venezuela, the 
people of that country fear it may intervene 
again to expel some other ruler to whom it 
has taken a dislike. Of the West Indian 
republics, Cuba, in spite of our interven- 
tion which produced her freedom, in spite 
of our magnanimous action in leaving her 
to pursue her own destiny, and in spite 
of our support of an orderly government, 
entertains no feelings of gratitude for us. 
The same is true of Santo Domingo, which 
we are helping to peace and tranquility. 
Our marines, only recently, have been 
engaged in " pacifying " Haiti, much to 
the dissatisfaction of native trouble- 
breeders who hold to the " inalienable 
right of revolt " whenever it is to their 
interest to exercise it. 

Bankers of foreign governments have 
lent money to practically all these countries, 
and at different times most of them have 
defaulted on their debts. Secure in our 
protection, they have gone on in their 
reckless course with full knowledge that 
none of the European nations can chastise 



96 IMPERILED AMERICA 

them for their aggressions and bring 
order out of chaos without antagoniz- 
ing the United States. Sooner or later 
some power will feel itself compelled, 
in vindication of its own honor and 
the protection of its citizens and their 
rights, to adopt forcible measures. In the 
last twenty years this has been done by 
the British against Nicaragua, and by the 
British, Germans and Italians against 
Venezuela. One happy development of 
the situation, so far as the safety of the 
United States is concerned, lies in the 
fact that the Central American and West 
Indian states are now borrowing money 
from American bankers. We have financed 
Cuba and Santo Domingo, neither of 
which can obtain loans without our 
approval; we are paying a subsidy to 
Panama; and we are arranging to finance 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti. 
Since the war began, other loans have 
been made to Latin-American states. The 
time will come when this grave question 
of finance will be settled through the hold- 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 97 

ing of a large proportion of the loans in 
the United States. 

The powers in the West Indies, besides 
the independent states mentioned, are the 
United States, whose flag flies over Porto 
Rico and Culebra; Great Britain, which, 
in addition to British Honduras in Cen- 
tral America, and British Guiana, South 
America, owns the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Jamaica, Turks, Trinidad, Tobago and 
the Leeward and Windward Islands; 
France, which controls Martinique, St. 
Pierre and Miquelon, besides French 
Guiana in South America; Denmark, 
which has a burden in St. Croix, St. 
Thomas and St. John; and the Nether- 
lands, which owns Curacao, six hundred 
miles from Panama, and Dutch Guiana 
in South America. 

American acquisition of the Danish 
West Indies will remove a constant source 
of worry to our statesmen. It is evident 
that if Germany should acquire con- 
trol of Denmark or Holland, she would 
claim their colonies; and the United States 



98 IMPERILED AMERICA 

would be forced to apply the Monroe 
Doctrine as against her annexation of the 
West Indian possessions of the nation con- 
quered or annexed. Through the perspi- 
cacity of Senators Root and Lodge, a 
grave danger was averted for the United 
States during the time William J. Bryan 
occupied the office of Secretary of State. 
Mr. Bryan negotiated with Denmark and 
the Netherlands his ill-considered peace 
treaties, the efifect of which, had the 
Senate ratified them, would have been to 
compel the United States to submit to 
arbitration the question of its right to 
forbid the acquisition of the Danish or 
Dutch West Indies by another European 
power. A similar instrument, negotiated 
with Ecuador, would have had a like 
effect with reference to the Galapagos 
Islands, off the coast of Ecuador, which 
furnish an admirable base for operations 
against the Panama Canal. 

In our contemplation of the commercial 
value of the Canal, we have, in a great 
measure, lost sight of an equally prime 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 99 

reason for its construction — the tremen- 
dous increase in military strength which 
it affords us. The Suez Canal is a great 
convenience to Europe; the Panama Canal 
is a necessity for the United States. The 
easy and quick transportation it permits 
for our fleet from one great ocean to the 
other is worth the money and time and 
brains we have expended in its building. 
For this advantage and for the Monroe 
Doctrine, it was necessary for President 
Roosevelt to insist upon an American 
guarantee of the Canal in contradistinction 
to the European guarantee of the Suez 
Canal. The international status of the 
two canals is practically the same, unless 
the United States itself be engaged in 
war. To preserve the international status 
of the Canal this country is obligated: 

1. To keep the Canal free (for pas- 
sage but not equal in respect of tolls, 
despite the Wilson interpretation) and 
open to all private vessels of nations 
observing the rules prescribed in the 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. 



JOO IMPERILED AMERICA 

2. To keep the Canal free and open 
to men-of-war, even to those of bellig- 
erents when the United States is not a 
party to the war. If the United States 
be at war, its enemy will not be permitted 
to use the Canal. 

3. To preserve the neutrality of the 
Canal and protect the property there in 
the same fashion as it does the neutrality 
of its own ports. 

4. Alone to guarantee that the Canal 
shall be kept free and open in accordance 
with the provisions of the Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty. 

5. To protect the Canal by permanent 
fortifications and a military garrison, this 
under a right granted by a treaty with 
Panama. 

In other words, the Canal is an Amer- 
ican waterway, of great political and mili- 
tary, as well as commercial, importance 
to the United States, and absolutely under 
the sovereignty, control and protection of 
the United States. It must be regarded, 
to quote the report of the Isthmian Canal 



THE CARIBBEAN PROBLEM 101 

Commission, as but " one link in a chain 
of communications of which adjacent links 
are the Caribbean Sea on the east and the 
waters of the Pacific, near the Canal 
entrance, on the west," and it is evident 
that, again to quote the report, " unless 
the integrity of all the links can be main- 
tained the chain will be broken." Neces- 
sity, vital necessity, therefore, forces the 
United States to play a dominant role in 
the region described, to guard jealously 
against foreign encroachment, and to main- 
tain a strength which will prevent its 
hegemony from ever being successfully 
assailed. 



chapter v 

The United States in the Pacific 

Fateful is the problem of the Pacific 
for the American people. That ocean, 
so vast that all the nations of the earth 
might well live in peace upon it, has 
become a scene of turbulent struggle 
which is certain to develop into deadly 
conflict. Fifty years ago William H. 
Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, 
pointed out that this ocean, its shores, its 
islands and the vast region beyond, would 
develop into " the chief theater of events 
in the world's great hereafter." Equally 
prescient, Former President Roosevelt, 
declared " the Pacific era, designed to be 
the greatest of all and to bring the whole 
human race at last into one comity of 
nations, is just at the dawn." The Pan- 
ama Canal has been constructed since 
these two statesmen made their predic- 
102 



IN THE PACIFIC 103 

tions; and this link of the west and the 
east already is having an influence upon, 
and will play an increasingly important 
role in connection with, the destiny of the 
human race. 

The problem of the Pacific comprises 
many questions, each of which is of vital 
moment to the United States. These ques- 
tions primarily are Racial, Industrial, 
Commercial, Territorial and Strategical. 
On this great ocean, the Occident and 
Orient meet, not on common but on alien 
ground. Here two powerful races face 
each other — the yellow and the white. 
Here there is a struggle between the cheap 
though relatively inefficient labor of the 
former with the expensive and more 
highly specialized labor of the latter. 
Here there is a determined, tenacious 
rivalry for markets. x\nd as the natural 
consequences of these conflicts of peace 
there is a reaching out by the aggressive 
nations for territory and the adoption of 
means less for their own defense than as 
an assistance to the aspirations which 



104 IMPERILED AMERICA 

consciously or subconsciously their need 
creates. 

What is the need of the United States 
in the Pacific and what are the aspirations 
it has created? Do we require an outlet for 
surplus population? Not at all. Do our 
conditions impel us to acquire territory 
for colonization purposes? We have a 
superfluity of land. Our underlying 
desire, our underlying aim, is to make 
money, to do so by expanding our trade, 
by the development of markets, by the 
investment of our surplus capital. In 
pursuance of this purpose we gave the 
world a new nation in the form of modern 
Japan; we have figured largely in recent 
years in the international maneuvers to 
preserve the integrity of China and equal- 
ity of opportunity therein, and we have 
acquired islands which we are turning into 
fortified bases both for our continental 
defenses and for pushing the commercial 
dreams which subconsciously inspire us. 
Our so-called higher motives, too, play a 
part In our Pacific development. We like 



IN THE PACIFIC 105 

to think of ourselves as the regenerator 
of the Philippines, the " first friend " of 
Japan, the preserver of China for the 
Chinese, of the Latin-Americas for the 
Latin-Americans, and above all as the 
champion of Christianity and the bearer 
of the Message of Hope to the heathen. 
The development of means of trans- 
portation, the increase of our manufac- 
tures, and the activity of our missionaries 
and traders have brought the United 
States into direct contact with at least 
six hundred millions of people, more than 
one-third of the human race, who inhabit 
lands bordering on or lying in the Pacific. 
Of these, four hundred million are inhab- 
itants of weak, helpless China, the prey 
of stronger powers, and sixty million are 
the sturdy sons of Japan, which is highly 
organized and ambitious to become the 
Great Britain of the Pacific and Far East. 
The balance populates Canada and the 
countries of Central and South America, 
having access to the Pacific and the 
Pacific Islands. The myriad wants of 



106 IMPERILED AMERICA 

these people we partially supplied, at a 
cost to them, for the year prior to the 
Great War, of $250,000,000; and in return 
they sold us products, during the same 
period, valued in the neighborhood of 
$350,000,000. Our own trade with our 
Pacific dependencies has attained the 
respectable figure of $160,000,000 annu- 
ally. As time goes on this commerce will 
swell to enormous proportions, provided 
of course it is safeguarded and assisted by 
the government of the United States. 

There is no clearer truth in history 
than that nations and races may be devel- 
oped or destroyed through their industries, 
and that national greatness is dependent 
upon the competition between the work' 
shops of the world. The records of our 
State Department reveal the careful man- 
ner in which the government always has 
fostered our foreign trade. It has been 
done, however, in haphazard fashion, 
rather with the thought of the day than 
of the morrow. There has been no settled 
policy, no definite goal. We seem to have 



IN THE PACIFIC 107 

been driven on in spite of ourselves, to 
be the creatures of Manifest Destiny. And 
this forward movement, caused by our 
virility and aggressiveness, has made us a 
power to be considered by the nations we 
face, as it compels us to consider the 
effect of their attitude toward and policies 
upon us. 

The United States is in control of the 
western flank of the Pacific Ocean. In 
fact, its coast line extends from the Arctic 
to the Antarctic Circle. Besides its own 
continental territory, which comprises 
Alaska as well as the Pacific Coast states 
and the Panama Canal Zone, it must pro- 
tect Canada and all the Latin-American 
republics from foreign occupation. In 
the Pacific itself it has various islands: 
those lying off the coast of Alaska; 
Hawaii; Guam, in the Ladrone group; 
the Philippines ; and Tutuila and Rose, 
in Samoa. Through the possession of 
Hawaii it has an advanced naval base 
for its own defense which commands all 
the trade routes across the North Pacific. 



108 IMPERILED AMERICA 

In the possession of Guam it has a site 
for a naval base which commands prac- 
tically every trade route in the Far East. 
In the possession of Tutuila it has a site 
for a naval base which commands every 
trade route in the South Seas. The Phil- 
ippines, also, furnish a base of value for 
operations across the China Seas. But the 
real fortresses of our control lie in Hawaii, 
Guam and Tutuila, and no Oriental enemy 
will pass over the sea to attack us until 
those fortresses, when they shall have been 
completed, are destroyed or contained. 

Thus the American nation is in a mag- 
nificent strategic position for the further- 
ance of its more or less unformulated 
aims, and, above all, for the assertion of 
its political and military purposes. It is 
in a strategic position where it can meet 
the shock of conflict with the Asiatic races, 
provided, of course, that it has the requi- 
site military strength. That conflict is no 
bogie of the future; it has begun. In the 
Pacific, the United States has been forced 
to adopt two totally variant policies. It 



IN THE PACIFIC 109 

has excluded the Far East from the 
Western Hemisphere, and, until the Wilson 
Administration came into power, it insisted 
upon entrance into China upon identically 
the same terms as those enjoyed by other 
nations. It wants no bar upon American 
activities in the Far East, but it has 
excluded Chinese and Japanese not only 
from its continental limits but from its 
islands. China has acquiesced in the pol- 
icy of the American government; Japan 
has done so officially, but proud as she is, 
it is natural that she resents the stigma 
of racial inferiority our action has stamped 
upon her. 

A mere superficial glance at conditions 
in the Pacific is sufficient to show that the 
great present-day powers in that ocean are 
the United States, Japan, Great Britain 
and Russia. Spain has been eliminated. 
Portugal has only the settlement in China 
known as Macao. The Netherlands, pur- 
suing a policy of passive resistance, and 
without the military strength to oppose 
aggression, is drifting along until the time 



110 IMPERILED AMERICA 

in the future when it shall be deprived 
of its Far Eastern possessions. Indeed, 
the government at The Hague is desper- 
ately afraid of becoming involved in the 
war on the side of the Central European 
Powers; for it realizes that such a step 
would mean an end to its colonial empire. 
Therefore, it guards its neutrality with 
zealous care. France, which has Tonquin 
and Indo-China wrested from China, also 
has possessions in the South Pacific; but 
France is not a colonizing nation, nor is 
she successful commercially. Rather does 
her ambition lead to influence, power, 
military glory. Italy sought a foothold in 
China when the great scramble for terri- 
tory was on in the closing years of the 
nineteenth century, but was thwarted by 
the United States. Russia endeavored to 
release herself from the grip of the Arctic 
North by acquiring Port Arthur and 
Dalny, on the Yellow Sea, but was driven 
therefrom by Japan. The Treaty of 
Portsmouth, which terminated the Russo- 
Japanese war in 1905, not only pushed 



IN THE PACIFIC 111 

back Russia into Northern Manchuria, 
but, by according Japan sovereignty over 
the southern half of Sakhalin Island, 
placed the Tokyo government in a posi- 
tion to command every route to and from 
China down to the Philippines. The tre- 
mendous strategic importance of this situ- 
ation has impressed students of world 
conditions; for the especial struggle of 
the Pacific is for the control of the trade 
and rich resources of the Chinese Empire, 
and the nation which dominates the routes 
of traffic is certain to enjoy an advantage 
of untold value over its rivals. By hold- 
ing the Philippines the United States would 
serve its own interests as well as those 
of the White Race. The continued posses- 
sion of this archipelago, which the naval 
genius of Dewey gave to us, would entitle 
the American people to a voice in Far 
Eastern affairs, supply them with a com- 
mercial as well as a military base, and as- 
sure them a splendid opportunity to further 
their trade activities on the Asiatic conti- 
nent. It is a crime against America's 



112 IMPERILED AMERICA 

future for the Democratic Party to seek 
to cast these valuable islands adrift. 

While Russia has no colonies in the 
Pacific, she has an immense coast line in 
the frozen North; and her ambition to 
acquire Chinese territory makes her a 
factor to be considered in the problem 
opening before the American people. 
Prior to the Taft Administration, the 
United States, without much thought about 
it, believed it desirable for Russia and 
Japan to be kept apart in the extreme 
Orient. This unformed, or rather unex- 
pressed, policy received a deathblow at 
the hands of Philander C. Knox, when 
Secretary of State. Mr. Knox, with no 
conception of the immense interests 
involved, indeed, believing he was carrying 
out the Hay Doctrine of the Integrity of 
China, proposed the neutralization of the 
Trans-Manchurian Railroad — the artery 
connecting Siberia with Port Arthur, con- 
trol of which had been divided by Japan 
and Russia in the Treaty of Portsmouth. 

The moment knowledge of the Knox 



IN THE PACIFIC 113 

plan reached the chancellories of Petro- 
grad, then known as St. Petersburg, and 
Tokyo, that moment the two governments, 
realizing the menace to their interests, came 
together. The present alliance, by which 
Japan is giving loyal aid to Russia in the 
great European struggle, had its roots in 
the understanding reached after the Knox 
proposal was made. Whether that alliance 
deals with China and the Pacific, as has 
been reported, is not of certain knowledge. 
Even a blind man can see, however, that 
there does exist a far-reaching understand- 
ing which undoubtedly has a direct bearing 
upon the interests of the United States. 

Japan's position in the Far East and 
the Pacific was established by the war 
with Russia. It was recognized by Great 
Britain immediately prior thereto, which 
entered into an oflfensive and defensive 
treaty with the Tokyo government. Great 
Britain was moved to take this step by 
the rapid rise of Germany as a commer- 
cial competitor, and by the latter's naval 
development, which unbalanced the Euro- 



114 IMPERILED AMERICA 

pean situation. It was necessary for her 
to concentrate her fleet at home, and at 
the same time to protect her interests in 
the Far East; and the Japanese navy 
assured this over-seas protection. The first 
treaty of alliance between the two powers 
stated as its purpose " a desire to maintain 
the status quo and general peace in the 
extreme East," " the independence and 
territorial integrity of the Empire of 
China and the Empire of Korea," and 
" equal opportunities in those countries for 
the commerce and industry of all nations." 
The results of the war enabled Japan 
to absorb Korea, in spite of the self- 
denying pledges she had made; and this 
necessitated a revision of the treaty, 
which was made in 1905. The new 
treaty contained no reference to the 
prior guarantee of Korean independence, 
and, in fact, contained a clause under 
which Japan's right to do as she pleased 
in the " Hermit Kingdom " was recog- 
nized. Korea as an independent country 
was promptly obliterated. While reiterat- 



IN THE PACIFIC 115 

ing the agreement to insure the independ- 
ence and integrity of China and the Open 
Door in that Empire, the convention broad- 
ened the original purpose by extending 
mutuality of action to the defense of the 
territorial rights and special interests of 
the contracting powers " in the regions of 
Eastern Asia and of India." 

That the treaty could be applied against 
the United States was evident; but six 
years later Great Britain made such appli- 
cation impossible by declaring the instru- 
ment could not be invoked against any 
nation with which she had a treaty of 
general arbitration; and she has such a 
treaty with us. But she did not have a 
treaty of the kind with Germany, and 
Japan, therefore, entered into the war 
against the Central European Powers. 
The Japanese did so gladly. The Euro- 
pean struggle furnished them the oppor- 
tunity they desired to humiliate Germany 
and eliminate that country from the Far 
East. The Nipponese people had never 
forgiven the Kaiser for joining Russia 



116 IMPERILED AMERICA 

and France to oust them from the Liao 
Tung Peninsula, upon which Port Arthur 
is situated, which their arms had acquired 
during the war with China in 1894-95. 
So, after the war of 1914 had begun, 
Tokyo sent an ultimatum to Berlin. 
It was couched in identically the same 
language as that used by Germany twenty 
years before. Demands were made for 
the retirement of Germany from Kiao 
Chou, the advanced base which the 
Kaiser's government had grabbed, and the 
abandonment of the sphere of influence 
which the Province of Shantung comprised. 
Germany refused; and Japan, without 
regard to the neutrality of China, which 
she violated as the territory of weak states 
always will be violated under the plea of 
military necessity, inaugurated military 
measures in cooperation with Great Brit- 
ain, that for the moment at least have put 
an end to Germany's aspirations in the 
extreme Orient. Great Britain, requiring 
all her available ships for operations in 
different parts of the world, requested 



IN THE PACIFIC 117 

Japan to aid her in dispossessing Germany 
from the Pacific Islands. That aid was 
forthcoming, with the result that we find 
Japanese forces occupying the Ladrone 
Islands, other than Guam; the Pelew and 
Caroline Islands, to the westward of the 
Philippines, and the Marshall Group. 
These islands furnish valuable outlying 
sites for bases, and could be utilized against 
the Pacific bases of the United States. 

Will Japan withdraw from the islands 
she has occupied when the war ends? It 
is to the interest of the United States that 
she shall surrender them. For her to 
remain in possession would be to violate a 
specific agreement with this government. 
Following the dispatch of the American 
fleet to the Pacific in 1908, Elihu Root, 
Secretary of State, and K. Takahira, the 
Japanese Ambassador, signed an agree- 
ment declaring, among other things, that 
it was " the wish of the two governments 
to encourage the free and peaceful devel- 
opment of their commerce in the Pacific 
Ocean," and they asserted that the policy 



118 IMPERILED AMERICA 

of both, uninfluenced by any aggressive 
tendencies, " is directed to the maintenance 
of the existing status quo " in that region. 
The agreement further noted an identic 
policy for " the defense of the principle 
of equal opportunity for commerce and 
industry in China " and for the support of 
" the independence and integrity " of that 
country. As one of those used by Presi- 
dent Roosevelt in the negotiation of the 
above agreement, the author can say 
that what the United States desired and 
obtained in making the agreement, was a 
public disavowal by Japan of an aggres- 
sive design upon any of the Pacific Islands, 
particularly the Philippines, belonging to 
the United States; but it was realized that 
it was to the interest of this nation that 
there should be no further change in the 
status of the territories in the Pacific, 
and it was for that reason the instrument 
was couched in such broad terms. 

From a strategical point of view, the 
British Empire has a distinct superiority 
over every other nation in the Pacific. It 



IN THE PACIFIC 119 

is established on both flanks of the ocean, 
with fine, safe harbors for its fleets, and 
is in possession of Australia, and other 
islands in the South Seas. With its genius 
for colonization, it has brought peace and 
prosperity to the territories it has occu- 
pied. It has made Australia and New 
Zealand a white man's land. It has an 
impregnable base in Hong Kong and the 
hinterland, and it has a sphere of influence 
in the rich, fertile valley of the Yangtse- 
Kiang, China. In Canada it has a domin- 
ion of unlimited possibilities, a dominion 
which is certain to have an important rela- 
tion to and influence upon the Pacific 
problem. Both Canada and Australia 
have the resources for manufactures, and 
as they increase in population they will 
become sharp competitors of the United 
States and Japan in the markets of Asia. 
In the unforeseen case of war with Great 
Britain, the United States, so far as the 
Pacific is concerned, would be menaced 
from the naval base of Esquimault, British 
Columbia, and from Australia and New 



120 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Zealand. That these British Colonies 
would be no mean antagonists has been 
demonstrated by the heroic conduct of the 
Canadians in Northern France and the 
unfaltering courage of the Australians and 
New Zealanders in the ill-fated adventure 
against the Turkish Dardanelles. 

It must be a matter of deep regret to 
all Americans that the relations of the 
United States and the British Dominions 
in this hemisphere and across the Pacific 
have been injuriously affected by events 
of the present war. The action of a 
*' yellow journal " on the Pacific Slope in 
supplying information to the German 
cruisers operating in the Pacific at the 
outbreak of the European struggle, has 
aroused bitter feeling in Australia. Can- 
ada cannot understand the failure of the 
United States to aid her and the British 
cause in the fight for ideals and principles, 
which, if lost, will directly affect the 
future of this nation. As a matter of fact, 
there is a great similarity between the 
ideals and institutions of Canada and Aus- 



IN THE PACIFIC 121 

tralia and the United States. There exist 
also between the United States and these 
British Dominions, indeed with the entire 
British Empire, common interests based 
upon the same vital needs. Both must 
stand for the Open Door in China and 
the exclusion of Asiatics. For them, there- 
fore, to have any other than a convergent 
policy contemplating in the end effective 
cooperation would be to strike a blow at 
the supremacy of the White Race in the 
great Ocean of the Future. 

The Panama Canal has made the United 
States the greatest industrial power in the 
Pacific. That waterway has brought our 
eastern factories nearer to the western 
coast of Central and South America, the 
British possessions in the South Pacific, 
and the Extreme Orient. We have a 
marvelous organization of industrial 
machinery, which must be supplemented 
by adequate financial, shipping and com- 
mercial machinery in the Pacific regions. 
Our merchant marine flag, which waved 
over a few ships on this ocean after the 



122 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Civil War, has disappeared, as a result of 
ill-advised legislation, and our freights are 
being carried more and more by Japanese 
vessels. Foreign banks have attended to 
most of our financial transactions. Our 
agents are in many instances natives, or 
non-Americans. But in spite of these 
handicaps, handicaps which must be 
removed, we have made a long start 
toward securing that supremacy which our 
geographical location, our resources, and 
our tremendous industrial and commercial 
activity justify us in striving to obtain. In 
the pursuit of our necessitous ambition, we 
must expect friction. It is to be hoped 
that it will be peacefully resolved; but we 
should not forget the years-ago prediction 
of the far-sighted Prince Ito, the Bismarck 
of the Japanese Empire: 

"The next great war will take place 
in Europe. It will be followed by a 
second conflict — the struggle for the 
mastery of the Pacific." 



chapter vi 
Shutting the Open Door 

Momentous events have occurred in 
China since the European war began, 
events which may be said to mark the 
beginning of a new era in the history of 
that weak and, therefore, long sufifering 
country. It is an era pregnant with the 
promise of Japan's assumption of control 
in the Far East, of the termination of ter- 
ritorial aggrandizement there by the White 
Powers, and of a long step toward realiza- 
tion of the dream of the wonderful Island 
People — Asia for the Asiatics. 

It is not at all astonishing that Japan 
seized the opportunity which the break- 
ing out of the European war provided. 
Rather would it have been astonishing had 
she not done so. Japan could no more 
afiford to have the great military powers 
of the West sitting upon her threshold 

123 



124 IMPERILED AMERICA 

than the United States could afford hav- 
ing them in Latin-America. Her vital 
interests were threatened when Russia 
sought to acquire the great Chinese region 
of Manchuria and the Kingdom of Korea. 
Had Russia succeeded, Japan would have 
felt the menace of an arrow pointed 
directly at her heart. The success of 
Japanese arms in the war of 1904-5 
destroyed this menace and made possible 
the annexation of Korea and the assertion 
of Japanese dominance over Southern 
Manchuria. 

There remained, within close proximity 
to Japan, the military force of Germany, 
entrenched at Kiao Chou. This port had 
been seized by the Kaiser in 1897 as com- 
pensation for the murder of two mission- 
aries, and thus constituted an assertion in 
the Far East of the policy of the " mailed 
fist." Several motives inspired Japan to 
attack this stronghold — the ridding of 
China of another European power, the 
extension of Japanese interests and influ- 
ence, and revenge. When Kiao Chou 



THE OPEN DOOR 125 

was conquered, the Japanese government 
turned its attention to the larger questions 
which concerned it — the increase of its 
power in China. It made demands upon 
the Pekin government which were granted 
in May, 1915, under threat of war, 
demands which conclusively established 
Japanese control over Southern Manchuria 
and Eastern Inner Mongolia; which made 
the Province of Shantung a Japanese in- 
stead of a German sphere of influence; 
which strengthened Japan's position in the 
Province of Fukien, gave her a voice in the 
rich Yangtse-Kiang valley, up to that 
time claimed as a British sphere of 
influence, and forced China to declare 
that it would not cede or lease any terri- 
tory or island along the coast of Shantung 
to any foreign power. In short, Japan's 
paramountcy received treaty recognition; 
and had it not been for foreign pressure, 
the Tokyo government would have com- 
pelled compliance with other demands 
which would have placed political, finan- 
cial and military control of the entire 



126 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Chinese nation formally in Japanese hands. 
How was this accomplished? Princi- 
pally as a consequence of the preoccupation 
of Europe and the unwillingness of the 
United States to do more than make 
paper protests. Great Britain, thinking 
more of Europe and her over-seas posses- 
sions than of China, looking to the preser- 
vation of the larger rather than the smaller 
interest, deemed it wisdom to acquiesce in 
Japan's demands. The possibility that 
Japanese troops might be needed in the 
Indian Empire to oppose invasion or sup- 
press revolt, doubtless also influenced Brit- 
ain's attitude. Russia, in agreement with 
Japan, expected territorial compensation 
in Outer Mongolia; besides, she could not 
oppose force to Japan, even had she been 
inclined to do so. Moreover, Great 
Britain was willing that Japan should 
acquire control of coal and iron mines in 
the Yangtse region in order that that 
country might obtain the raw materials 
needed in the manufacture of munitions 
for Russia. France, in Southern Asia and 



THE OPEN DOOR 127 

with a sphere of influence in the neighbor- 
ing southern provinces of China, was 
manacled by the necessity of concentrating 
every ounce of her strength against Ger- 
many. The single nation Japan had to 
reckon with was the United States. 

Would the American people remotely 
consider the idea of going to war in behalf 
of China? It does not take an instant's 
reflection to answer emphatically in the 
negative. Our interests in China are 
rather of the future, important as are 
those of the present in religion and trade 
and education. It was with a view to safe- 
guarding them, to promoting them by the 
attainment of influences and prestige, that 
the United States early concerned itself 
with the destiny of China. We aided 
materially in breaking down the policy of 
exclusion, which the Chinese government 
was enabled to pursue until the time, of 
the Chino-Japanese war in 1894-5. Fol- 
lowing that war, an era of encroachment 
by the foreign powers was inaugurated 
upon the Empire. Moved by political 



128 IMPERILED AMERICA 

as well as commercial reasons, they 
endeavored to partition the country among 
themselves through the creation of spheres 
of influence, the acquisition of sites for 
strategical bases, the construction and oper- 
ation of lines of railway and the securing 
of vast and loosely defined concessions 
covering the entire land. 

John Hay was Secretary of State of the 
United States at the time; and his Far 
Eastern adviser was William Woodville 
Rockhill, a man who combined knowledge 
born of long experience in China and 
statecraft to an unusual degree. In a 
memorandum, which some day will be 
published, Mr. Rockhill called the atten- 
tion of Mr. Hay to the prospect that if 
the United States stood aloof from the 
Chinese situation, its trade would be 
destroyed, its religious and educational 
interests restricted, and its influence and 
prestige reduced to a cipher. With Mr. 
Hay, to be convinced was to act. He 
issued, in the summer of 1899, his famous 
circular to the powers, advocating as a 



THE OPEN DOOR 129 

world policy the establishment of the Open 
Door in, and the maintenance of the in- 
tegrity of, the Chinese Empire. Politic- 
ally the step was important, for it 
contemplated general international agree- 
ment in behalf of Chinese integrity and 
Chinese independence, and commercially 
it was important, particularly for the 
United States, since it gave promise that 
our trade would be unrestricted through- 
out the length and breadth of China. The 
prestige which the war with Spain gave 
us, the support of Great Britain, and the 
situation of the powers at the time, enabled 
Mr. Hay to wring reluctant assents to his 
declaration. For five years he struggled to 
clamp his purpose, and when death took 
him from the State Department it was with 
the comforting knowledge that a new 
American policy had been written upon 
the book of international relations. 

The policy was incorporated in the 
treaties of alliance between Great Britain 
and Japan; it was observed in the Treaty 
of Portsmouth, which terminated the war 



130 IMPERILED AMERICA 

between Russia and Japan; it was the base 
of an agreement between Japan and 
France in 1907, and between the United 
States and Japan in 1908. The agreement 
with the United States specifically pro- 
vided that for the defense of the Open 
Door, Japan, after consultation on the 
measures to be taken, would join with the 
United States, whenever occasion might 
arise, to support " by all pacific means at 
their disposal the independence and integ- 
rity of China and the principle of equal 
opportunity for the commerce and industry 
of all nations in the Empire." 

These several treaties and agreements 
made Japan politically what her geo- 
graphical proximity to China and her 
military strength justified her in asserting 
— the guardian of the Open Door, and 
indeed its chief exponent. What she has 
done to take advantage of her position is 
a matter of history. British and American 
trade steadily declined in Southern Man- 
churia because it could not compete with 
Japanese trade, supported as the latter 



THE OPEN DOOR 131 

was by geographical proximity, preferen- 
tial customs and railway rates and shipping 
bounties, and by the refusal of Japanese 
traders to pay China's internal taxes. 

For some years prior to the war the 
attention of Great Britain and France 
became centered more and more upon 
other parts of the world. They were forced 
by events to sacrifice their commercial 
interests in China and to give Japan greater 
freedom in economic matters. The United 
States, with strange indifference to the 
important interests slipping from its grasp, 
permitted the duty and responsibility 
which the Hay policy enjoined on it, 
to pass to Japan. The act that practically 
terminated America's influence on the 
fate of China was President Wilson's with- 
drawal from the so-called Six-Power 
Loan, which had been a subject of nego- 
tiation between the powers and the United 
States during the entire Taft Administra- 
tion. While the President declared that 
" our interests are those of the Open 
Door, a door of friendship and mutual 



132 IMPERILED AMERICA 

advantage " and that " this is the only door 
we care to enter," he served notice of his 
declination to take any step to preserve the 
principle which the American people had 
so heartily approved and which had 
received at least lip-service from the rest 
of the world. It was realized by China 
and the powers interested in her situation 
that so far as the United States was con- 
cerned it would no longer concern itself 
over the integrity of the Far Eastern 
country. More than ever the responsibil- 
ity for China's preservation devolved upon 
Japan, particularly in view of the strained 
condition of affairs leading up to the 
Great War developing in Europe. Had 
not the war broken out, it is likely there 
would have been events in China quite as 
important as those which have occurred 
since the struggle began. Japan for years 
had been paving the v^^ay for the enuncia- 
tion of her Monroe Doctrine, and the time 
was about ripe for her to act. 

Whether the kind of a Monroe Doc- 
trine that will be favored by Japan will 



THE OPEN DOOR 133 

be similar to the American policy, remains 
to be seen. Our Doctrine has not kept 
this country from acquiring territory at 
the expense of the neighbors it was 
designed to protect, nor is it likely Japan 
will hesitate to extend her holdings at the 
expense of China, if it is to her advantage 
to do so. The fact should not be forgotten 
that China is densely populated, and that 
Japanese immigrants will labor in keen 
competition with the natives. Statistics 
show there has been a very small emigra- 
tion to Manchuria, and a large proportion 
of those who hastened to that region after 
the Russo-Japanese war have returned 
home. The Japanese can not work suc- 
cessfully alongside the Chinese even in 
their own island territory of Formosa. 
This economic fact undoubtedly will 
figure heavily in Japanese calculations, 
and the chances are that the Tokyo gov- 
ernment will be inclined to pursue a policy 
of exploitation rather than of annexation 
— for a time at least. 

Japan is in a position to adopt the policy 



134 IMPERILED AMERICA 

which is best suited in her judgment for 
her own interests. Manchuria is as good 
as Japanese to-day, and although Japan 
has agreed formally to return Kiao Chou 
in Shantung to China when the European 
war shall end, she has provided for the 
creation of an exclusive Japanese conces- 
sion, besides an international concession, 
at that port. The commercial, industrial 
and railroad rights which Germany 
enjoyed in the province have been trans- 
ferred to and will remain in the hands of 
Japan. It is evident, therefore, that 
Shantung's destiny ultimately will be that 
of Manchuria. Being in control of Man- 
churia and Shantung, Japan has her grip 
around the intervening Province of Pe 
Chili in which Pekin, the capital of the 
nation, is situated. Again, Japan forced 
China to engage not to grant to any other 
power the right to build a shipyard, coal- 
ing or naval station or other military 
establishment on the coast of the Province 
of Fukien, which lies south of the Province 
of Che-Kiang, which borders on Shan- 



THE OPEN DOOR 135 

tung. This engagement was required by 
Japan because an American firm had a 
concession for constructing a dockyard at 
a Fukien port, and because China, to 
curb Japan, desired the United States in 
that province. Looking at the map of 
China, it will appear, therefore, that 
strategically, Japan controls the entire 
coast of the country, a control which is 
strengthened by her ownership of the 
islands lying in proximity to the coast. 

The Wilson Administration followed 
closely the course of the Chino-Japanese 
negotiations. The representations it made 
undoubtedly influenced the Japanese gov- 
ernment to agree to the postponement 
of the demands included in what is known 
as Group V, which, more directly than 
those accepted, struck at the very heart 
of China's sovereignty. The postponed 
demands will be pressed at a more oppor- 
tune moment. Of that there is no doubt. 
In the meantime, the United States has 
contented itself with notifying China and 
Japan that it " can not recognize any 



136 IMPERILED AMERICA 

agreement or undertaking which has been 
entered into or which may be entered into 
between the governments of China and 
Japan impairing the treaty rights of the 
United States and its citizens in China, 
the political or territorial integrity of the 
Republic of China, or the international 
policy commonly known as the Open Door 
Policy." When the American Charge 
d'Afifaires presented the communication in 
Tokyo, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
asked what he was to do with it. " I 
presume it is intended for record," he is 
said to have responded. " It will be filed," 
gravely replied the Minister. 

With China's plight, the American peo- 
pie undoubtedly have sympathy. Yuan 
Shih Kai endeavored to keep his country 
out of the war by every means in his 
power. He was not successful, and the 
nation over which he ruled already has 
paid the price of enforced participation 
in the conflict, just as Belgium has paid 
the price. Heroic Belgium deliberately 
chose to sacrifice herself upon the altar 



THE OPEN DOOR 137 

of right; China pursued the easier alter- 
native, just as she did during the Russo- 
Japanese war when she permitted the 
belligerents to fight in Manchuria. In 
spite of the conclusion of hostilities, how- 
ever, the war is not yet over for China. 
There is little doubt that the capable 
German agents in China have fostered 
and are fostering dislike of the Japanese 
among the natives. There is little doubt 
they fanned the ambition of Yuan Shih 
Kai to restore the empire with himself as 
emperor. They figured his ambitious 
action would provoke a revolution in the 
southern provinces, that this would precip- 
itate Japanese intervention, and that the 
necessity of providing for her own troops 
would cause Japan to diminish the supply 
of munitions she has been furnishing to 
the Russian government. When Yuan 
Shih Kai ascends the throne, President 
Wilson undoubtedly will accord him for- 
mal recognition in the imperial dignity, 
just as he accorded him recognition as 
president of the republic, this in spite of 



138 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Mr. Wilson's declaration, issued seven days 
after the Administration began, that he 
would not recognize a man who achieved 
rulership through force. 

With Japan exploiting the resources of 
China, it is apparent Nipponese power 
will be tremendously increased. Her 
Manchurian railroad leases having been 
extended, she will be able to borrow 
money upon these lines. Her more solidly 
established interests in Manchuria, the 
rights she has acquired in Shantung and 
her title to the Hanyang Iron Works, will 
improve her credit. Altogether, the war 
has proved a profitable venture for Japan, 
and a correspondingly unfortunate occur- 
rence for China. It is to be regarded as 
certain that when the European Peace 
Congress assembles, China will seek to 
have international action in her behalf. 
Intimations concerning this purpose 
already have been made. But Japan will 
insist that the treaties she has signed with 
China are not a subject for action by the 
Peace Congress. 



THE OPEN DOOR 139 

A grave question in this connection will 
confront the United States. Its interfer- 
ence would be resented by Japan, and 
might even lead to war, for that govern- 
ment is determined to continue on the way 
its feet are planted. In this determination 
probably it will have the backing of Rus- 
sia, which is gripping northern Chinese ter- 
ritory. Nor are Great Britain and France 
apt to curb the ambitions of an ally. So 
the American people must consider care- 
fully how far they are justified in going, 
not merely in behalf of China but in sup- 
port of the interests they have in that 
country and which the future promises. 
It is argued that the real hope of the 
Chinese people lies in the preservation of 
the integrity of so much of their territory 
as remains to them and in their develop- 
ment under the tutelage of Japan. Con- 
querors have come and gone in that 
mysterious land, but China persists. 
Mongol and Tartar and Manchu have 
risen to power and disappeared. Japan is 
at the dawn of her day; but if history 



140 IMPERILED AMERICA 

teaches anything it ought to teach her 
statesmen that there is a point beyond 
which there will be absorption of Japan 
by China rather than absorption of China 
by Japan. 



chapter vii 

The Japanese Portent 

There are portentous questions at issue 

between the United States and Japan. The 

latter country, forced into the stream of 

modern progress by the frowning guns 

of Commodore Perry, has become in the 

short space of fifty years a great power, 

entitled by its military strength to sit at 

the council board of nations. Within 

twenty-one years it took part in four wars, 

from each of which it emerged with 

greater renown and greater prestige, and, 

as a result of three of them, with extended 

territorial boundaries. Its rise necessarily 

has restricted the operations and ambitions 

of other powers, including the United 

States. The keen sense of nationalism 

which has been developed, the pride of 

race which achievement has intensified, 

and the military character of a people 
141 



142 IMPERILED AMERICA 

always bred to arms, have led to an insis- 
tent purpose to be recognized as the equal 
of any race in the world. Japan has 
demonstrated her prowess at the expense 
of two Caucasian nations — Russia and 
Germany. She has likewise demonstrated 
her prowess upon an Asiatic nation — 
China. Her troops acquitted themselves 
with distinction during the Boxer Revolt 
in China, when they fought side by side 
with Americans, Germans, British, French 
and Russians. 

Unquestionably, the most serious prob- 
lem in the intricate relations of the United 
States and Japan is that which has arisen 
as a result of the attitude of the Pacific 
Coast states toward Japanese subjects. This 
question has three angles: first, our policy 
respecting Japanese immigration to conti- 
nental United States and its dependencies; 
second, the position of Japanese lawfully 
in the United States and its dependencies; 
third, the entrance of Japanese into Latin- 
America. As to the first, Secretary of 
State Elihu Root effected a temporary 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 143 

adjustment by negotiating a " gentlemen's 
agreement," under which Japan herself 
controls emigration to the United States 
and its dependencies. This was, and is, a 
makeshift, though it has worked well as a 
result of scrupulous observance by the 
Tokyo government. It is evident, how- 
ever, that our policy is discriminatory, dis- 
guise it as we mayj in view of the fact that 
American doors are open on equal terms 
to all Caucasian races. Regarding the 
second question, California in the spring of 
1913 enacted a law prohibiting Japanese 
from owning land in that state. Japan 
promptly protested, declaring the law to be 
" unfair, unjust, inequitable and discrimi- 
natory " . . . " primarily directed against 
Japanese, and prejudicial to their existing 
rights " . . . " inconsistent with the 
provisions of the treaty in force," and 
" opposed to the spirit and fundamental 
principles of amity and good understand- 
ing upon which the conventional relations 
of the two countries depend." 

The United States insists that the legis- 



144 IMPERILED AMERICA 

lation passed by California, and Arizona 
as well, is not political but economic, and 
in no sense to be regarded as part of any 
general national policy of unfriendliness. 
During the discussion which took place 
between the representatives of the two 
governments, Japan referred to the nat- 
uralization laws of the United States under 
which, she stated, "Japanese subjects are 
as a nation apparently denied the right to 
acquire American nationality," which was 
" mortifying to the government and people 
of Japan, since the racial distinction infer- 
able from those provisions is hurtful to 
their just national susceptibilities." 

In this last declaration, we have the real 
germ of Japan's complaint against the 
United States. It is no new issue for 
Japan. Under the Roosevelt Administra- 
tion, the " school question " developed in 
California, there were assaults upon Jap- 
anese, and there was a movement on the 
Pacific Coast directed against these peo- 
ple, in which the labor unions were 
involved. President Roosevelt earnestly 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 145 

deprecated the agitation, and, in order to 
remove the basic trouble, he recommended, 
in 1906, the passage by Congress of an 
act providing for the naturalization of 
Japanese coming to the country with 
the intent to become American citizens. 
The recommendation was not adopted. 
Flushed by the success of its arms against 
Russia, the Japanese government assumed 
a vigorous attitude. For the moral efifect 
such action would produce, the President 
ordered the battleship fleet to make a 
tour of the world, proceeding via the 
Pacific Ocean and Japan. Prior to the 
departure of the fleet, the " gentlemen's 
agreement " was negotiated, and after the 
visit of the men-of-war to Japan, the Root- 
Takahira Agreement, defining the policies 
of the two governments in the Pacific and 
the Far East, was signed. Under pressure 
by the President, Congress authorized 
American participation in the Tokyo 
Exposition; and though it early became 
apparent that the Exposition would not be 
held, nevertheless the American Commis- 



146 IMPERILED AMERICA 

sion was dispatched to Japan in order to 
show the warm desire of the Washington 
Government to maintain close and friendly 
relations with that empire. 

Count Komura, one of Japan's Minis- 
ters for Foreign Affairs, who deserves a 
high place in international history, 
describes the attitude of his government 
in 1909 as follows: 

" As regards the question of meas- 
ures unfavorable to the Japanese 
which are pending in the California 
legislature, the Imperial Government, 
relying upon the sense of justice of 
the American people, as well as the 
friendly disposition of the federal 
government, confidently hopes that 
such questions will not lead to any 
international complications." 
Count Komura's hopes have not had 
realization. In order to manifest her 
friendliness for the United States, in spite 
of the failure to adjust the differences in 
relation to Japanese subjects, Japan voted 
$1,000,000 to participate in the San Fran- 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 147 

CISCO Exposition. Hardly had this deci- 
sion been reached, when the anti-Japanese 
land ownership proposal was debated in 
the California legislature. A personal 
appeal by Secretary of State Bryan failed 
to stop the passage of the bill. Thereupon 
followed the negotiations containing 
the quotations given. These negotiations 
reached such a tense stage that Mr. Bryan, 
when asked by the Japanese Ambassador 
if the decision of the United States was 
final, replied: 

" There can be no last words between 
friends." 

The two governments entertained a pro- 
posal to adjust the controversy by the con- 
clusion of a special convention. The solu- 
tion considered has never been divulged; 
but whatever it is, it became apparent that 
it was not approved in Japan, for with 
a change in ministry at Tokyo a change 
occurred in the attitude of the government 
there. The negotiations ended for the 
moment; but there is not the slightest 
doubt they will be revived by Japan, per- 



148 IMPERILED AMERICA 

haps in a manner that will awaken the 
American people to the gravity of this 
question, and, above all, to the purpose 
of the Far Eastern Empire to assert the 
doctrine of equality. 

That Japan postponed pressing the 
United States to settle the question she 
regards as so vital, a question which 
directly affects her prestige in China, 
where she has been struggling to assert her 
paramountcy, may be attributed, not to the 
military power of the American nation, 
but to the attitude of Great Britain. 
Humiliating as it may be to our people, 
who think they can " lick the earth," there 
is not the slightest doubt that pressure 
from London exercised a potent influence 
upon the Japanese procedure. It was 
not to the interest of Great Britain to 
have Japan and the United States involved 
even in a condition of strained relations. 
She needed her ally free to protect her 
interests in the Far East, and events justi- 
fied the soundness of her judgment. 

Moreover, it was appreciated in London 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 149 

that the sympathy of the British Empire 
would be with the United States in a 
struggle with Japan, for identically the 
same question as to the Japanese exists in 
the British Pacific dependencies as in the 
western American states. Without the 
moral support of Great Britain and with- 
out the ability to borrow money in Lon- 
don, which lack of such support would 
mean, Japan was not in a position to 
force the negotiations to the point toward 
which they were trending. The sugges- 
tion has been advanced that the dispute 
might be arbitrated under the General 
Arbitration Treaty of 1908; but it is doubt- 
ful if the United States Senate would agree 
to arbitrate a question affecting the internal 
situation in the United States and the 
economic life of the American people. 
Mr. Bryan desired to negotiate with Japan 
his treaty for the investigation of all dis- 
putes. Japan declined to consider the 
proposal, realizing the situation in this 
country was such that an investigation of 
the immigration controversy would not be 



150 IMPERILED AMERICA 

authorized, and that if the treaty were 
made it would be made only to be broken. 
To pass now to the Japanese view of 
the American policy with reference to 
Latin-America. It is difficult for the 
Japanese people to regard this policy as 
essentially different from that of the 
'' Open Door " in China. Both in the 
broad sense have exclusion as their guid- 
ing principle. Both are directed against 
the acquisition of territory by foreign 
nations. As has been disclosed, the 
" Open Door " policy in China has been 
undermined. The Monroe Doctrine, how- 
ever, still maintains. Japanese have found 
conditions of life easier in Mexico and 
other Latin-American states than at home 
or in China. The law of gravitation from 
a poor, crowded land, to a rich, fertile, 
sparsely-settled region set their feet east- 
ward. They were told to stop in 1912 
by the Lodge Resolution, which was 
inspired by reports of a Japanese settle- 
ment on Magdalena Bay, which the Jap- 
anese Government was alleged to be pro- 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 151 

moting through a Japanese corporation. 
The resolution declared the United States 
could not see without grave concern the 
possession of a harbor " or other place " 
on the American continent by any cor- 
poration or association having relations 
with a foreign government, provided 
such harbor '' or other place " threat- 
ened the communication or the " safety " 
of the United States. It is quite true this 
resolution does not discriminate against 
Japan; it applies equally to all nations. 
But it was provoked by a Japanese settle- 
ment, and, therefore, is considered to have 
been directed especially against Japan. 

Japan knows her own situation and 
aims; she is not certain of the purposes 
of the United States. Nor is this surpris- 
ing in view of the day-by-day world 
measures we adopt, the lack of a perma- 
nent, well-thought-out policy, which is 
desirable not only for ourselves but for 
other nations. We were for the integrity 
of China in 1899; we practically aban- 
doned that principle fourteen years later. 



152 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Secretary of State Knox sought, or rather 
the Japanese so believed, to deprive them 
of the fruits of their victory over Russia, 
by proposing the neutralization of that 
part of the railroad running through the 
Chinese Province of Manchuria which 
had been ceded to Japan. Then came the 
scheme of American capitalists to build 
the Chinchow-Aigun Railw^ay as a rival 
to the South Manchurian Railway. Next 
followed the proposal of the four-power 
loan of $50,000,000, the interest to be 
guaranteed by all the unhypothecated 
resources of Manchuria and containing a 
provision that China should apply to the 
four powers for future loans, " thus de- 
throning Japan from her primacy in Man- 
churia." To quote a Japanese view: "To 
Japan, Manchuria is hallowed ground. 
Upon this plain twice she fought for the 
sake of her national existence. Two billion 
yens of her treasure were spent, and the 
precious blood of one hundred and thirty 
thousand of her noblest sons was shed for 
the honor of their beloved Nippon." 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 153 

Under the circumstances, it was not sur- 
prising that Japan, as well as Russia, 
which controlled the railroad in Northern 
Manchuria, rejected the Knox neutrali- 
zation proposal, that she prevented the 
construction of the Chinchow-Aigun Rail- 
way, and that she displayed keen resent- 
ment at the loan idea. It can be put 
down as a cardinal fact of Japanese policy 
that she will never voluntarily relinquish 
the rights she has obtained in Manchuria, 
and indeed will defend them to the last 
extremity. Likewise, she will defend the 
additional rights she has acquired since 
the war began, and, as developments have 
demonstrated, she will pursue without con- 
sideration of consequences the policies that 
she deems her vital interests in China and 
the Pacific demand. 

That the United States will pursue pre- 
cisely the same course with reference to 
its vital interests is equally obvious. What 
then will be the result? Are the many 
manifestations of friendship this country 
has given to and for Japan and that Japan 



154 IMPERILED AMERICA 

has given to this country, to be blown 
away in the swirl of war? God forbid. 
Japan does not forget that the sword of 
Perry was in fact an olive branch, and 
that the wisdom of Townsend Harris was 
the guide for her youthful feet in the 
early years of her modernity. She recalls 
with gratitude our refusal of the Shimono- 
seki indemnity, and the willingness dis- 
played by us to revise the old treaties and 
thus make her internationally sovereign 
throughout her entire territory. 

The statesmen of Japan know better 
than the people the great value of the 
moral sympathy this nation gave their land 
in its war with Russia, and above all the 
extent of the service rendered by Presi- 
dent Roosevelt in imposing peace upon 
the government of the Czar. It may be 
permitted now to say that it was Japan 
who asked for peace, not Russia; that it 
was only by the exercise of a high order 
of diplomacy that Mr. Roosevelt was able 
to bring the Slav Emperor to the point 
of entering upon the negotiations, which 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 155 

resulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth. 
Yet the Japanese people were led to 
believe that it was the United States which 
estopped them from securing an indemnity 
from Russia, and this belief is responsible 
to some extent for the feeling that the 
United States deliberately has endeavored 
to keep Japan poor. It is hardly necessary 
to say this government had nothing what- 
ever to do with Russia's rejection of the 
indemnity demand. Had Japan not aban- 
doned her attitude in this respect, the war 
would have continued. 

But such hostility as exists in Japan 
toward the United States could be sup- 
planted by the old-time friendship if there 
were a real statesmanlike effort made to 
compose our differences. There is, in 
theory, certainly no irreconcilable differ- 
ence between the two nations. If the 
United States were to authorize the nat- 
uralization of Japanese as President Roose- 
velt recommended, if Japanese were to 
receive identically the same treatment as 
Europeans, if there should be general 



156 IMPERILED AMERICA 

restriction of immigration, applying to all 
other nationalities the same as to Japanese, 
it is evident the fundamental cause of bad 
feeling would be removed. Whether this 
remedy is practical is another question. 
The Pacific Coast states regard the Jap- 
anese as an economic, even a political, 
menace. It is impossible to expect under 
present conditions a congressional enact- 
ment authorizing the naturalization of 
these people. The hyphenated situation 
in the United States has revealed the 
necessity of placing a limitation upon 
immigration, and this undoubtedly w^ill 
lead to the passage of a law raising the 
bars against most of the applicants for 
admission. A policy amounting to prac- 
tical exclusion would be welcome to 
Europe, which will desire to keep its 
men and women at home in order to 
repair the ravages of war. If the policy 
should be made to apply to Japan in 
precisely the same fashion as to Cau- 
casian nations, the stigma of racial 
inferiority which humiliates the Far 



THE JAPANESE PORTENT 157 

Eastern people, would be removed. 
Japan would then believe we stand for 
the " Open Door " at home as we have 
stood for the " Open Door " in China. 
There would be, in other words, legal 
equality; and this would have an impor- 
tant influence not only upon the relations 
of the two countries but upon their poli- 
cies in the Pacific and in China. The 
people of the United States frequently 
forget they have as much to learn from 
other nations as those nations have to learn 
from us. They can not overlook the fact 
that while geographically, Japan lies in 
Asia, she is the most western of Eastern 
nations; that she has a culture and civili- 
zation which justify respect; that by 
remarkable energy, in the short space of 
half a century she has reconstructed her 
whole scheme of political and social life 
with standards approximating those of the 
West; and that she has a strong govern- 
ment able to maintain peace and order 
at home and capable of fulfilling pledges 
made to foreign nations. 



chapter viii 
The War on American Life 

Neutral diplomacy never has had to 
deal with more intricate problems than 
those arising out of the European strug- 
gle. The introduction of novel engines of 
war, such as the submarine, the aeroplane, 
the wireless telegraph, asphyxiating gas, 
and new forms of explosives, the substi- 
tution of mechanics for man as motive 
power, and the imperative need of petrol- 
eum products for operations in the air, on 
the surface of the earth, and beneath the 
sea, have created conditions unknown to 
humanity in the past. The precedents of 
prior wars frequently lack application to 
modern incidents; and there is no guide 
save natural justice difficult to define and 
practical common sense hard to get. 

But the underlying principles of hu- 
manity and international law which are 

158 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 159 

founded on natural justice, are as light- 
houses in a raging sea of blood. They 
are immutable, because they appeal alike 
to the conscience and the reason of man- 
kind. They can not be changed by new 
engines of destruction. Let them be vio- 
lated or infringed, and throughout the 
world there is vigorous condemnation of 
the guilty. Normal acts of war, which 
involve the killing of thousands upon thou- 
sands of men, the maiming of thousands of 
others, and the imposition of terrible hard- 
ships upon noncombatants in the field of 
operations, produce sympathy and charity 
for the sufferers — nothing more. But to 
burn a town like Louvain, with its uni- 
versity, its cathedral, and its priceless 
library; to damage works of art like the 
cathedrals of Rheims and Soisson; to drop 
bombs from aircraft upon populous com- 
munities; to shoot a nurse like Miss 
Cavell; to sink a liner and destroy the 
lives of innocent men, women and chil- 
dren — such occurrences provoke an out- 
burst of indignation not only in the bellig- 



160 IMPERILED AMERICA 

erent countries injured, but in those coun- 
tries free from war. It is an honor to 
humanity that this is true; and that it is 
true is due to the growth of the public 
conscience everywhere. No sign of the 
advancing times is clearer than this: That 
there exists in every land a national sensi- 
tiveness to international opinion. This 
has been shown by the rapidity with which 
a defense is offered to a charged breach 
of the laws of war. 

Against the use of the submarine, the 
aeroplane or any other " humane " weapon 
of destruction in strictly military opera- 
tion and in accordance with what have 
come to be regarded as the customary 
laws of war, there has been and can be 
no complaint. But when these agencies 
are employed in violation of the recog- 
nized rights of the belligerent against 
which they are directed, and particularly 
in violation of the obligations the employ- 
ing state is under to neutrals, wrongs are 
perpetrated for which redress properly 
can be exacted, and measures taken to 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 161 

insure against their recurrence. The 
rights of belligerents are described in the 
Hague Convention, and these include ex- 
emption from the employment of force in 
so far as it would constitute an act of bar- 
barity or treachery. There may be some 
shadow of excuse for the violation of each 
other's rights by belligerents. The anger 
and bitterness war provokes, the brutality it 
produces, necessarily mitigate the judgment 
humanity renders. But there can be no ex- 
cuse for acts committed in pursuance of a 
deliberate policy, acts which strike at the 
lives of neutrals and other noncombatants 
as well as at belligerents. 

Such a policy was inaugurated by Ger- 
many in her under-seas campaign. That 
policy was an expression of the terrible 
German doctrine of Kriegsraison, that is 
to say, that in war the end justifies the 
means. Deprived of the command of the 
sea by the powerful British fleet, and 
fearful of the throttling effect British 
maritime operations would have upon the 
Central Powers, Germany resorted to the 



162 IMPERILED AMERICA 

use of the submarine against all merchant- 
men trading with the Allies. Her Naval 
General Staff, of which Admiral von Tir- 
pitz was the head, believed the inhabitants 
of the British Isles could be terrorized 
and made to feel the pinch of starvation, 
and that an internal situation would 
develop which would be helpful to the 
German cause. 

Following the outbreak of the war, 
floating mines, lurking terrors of the deep, 
were set adrift. Each belligerent charged 
the other with committing this crime 
against humanity and international law. 
In this connection it may be pointed out 
that at the second Hague Convention, the 
German delegation defeated an English 
proposal estopping belligerents from lay- 
ing mines in the open sea. The British 
government charged, moreover, that the 
mines Germany had planted were not in 
accordance with the requirements of the 
Hague provisions which were adopted. 
Irrespective of the truth or falsity of this 
charge, it is certain that steamers were 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 163 

blown up. The United States made no 
investigation and no protest, a course 
which, as a powerful neutral entitled to 
navigate the seas in absolute safety, it is 
apparent it should have followed. The 
Trent case is in point in this connection. 
From this British steamer, Confederate 
agents were removed by an American man- 
of-war. France as well as Great Britain 
protested against the action of the Ameri- 
can naval officer on the ground that the 
rights of all neutral nations, as well as the 
specific rights of Great Britain, had been 
violated. 

The effect of Germany's action, or at 
least the charge made against her, was to 
cause the British government to declare 
the North Sea " within the military zone," 
and to notify neutral shipping that if any 
other than a prescribed route were fol- 
lowed, vessels would move " at their own 
peril." 

While avowedly acting in the interest 
of the safety of merchant ships, it is mani- 
fest the British government went beyond 



164 IMPERILED AMERICA 

its power in describing the North Sea as 
a " military zone." The United States, 
whose rights, in common with those of 
other neutrals, were violated, again 
refrained from protesting. Its silence was 
construed by Germany as acquiescence in 
an unlawful condition, as proof of sub- 
servience of its neutral rights to the needs 
of the Allies. 

Germany, although using neutral flags 
herself, complained of the systematic use of 
neutral flags by British merchantmen — 
the case of the Lusitania, which hoisted the 
American colors in February, 1915, is 
cited, because it led to a protest by the 
United States. Germany was angered, too, 
by the refusal of Great Britain and her 
Allies to respect the Declaration of Lon- 
don, which had been signed by British 
delegates but not ratified by the British 
parliament nor by any other govern- 
ment; by the alleged unlawful exten- 
sion by the Allies of the list of absolute 
contraband goods; and by the measures 
taken by European neutrals to stop trade 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 165 

with Germany as demanded by the London 
government. 

These various grounds were set forth 
by Germany as justification for the sub- 
marine campaign against merchantmen for 
which she had been sedulously preparing. 
The German Admiralty issued a procla- 
mation on February 4, 1915, describing 
the waters surrounding Great Britain and 
Ireland, including the whole of the Eng- 
lish Channel, as a " war zone." Begin- 
ning February 18, it was announced that 
every enemy merchant ship found in the 
" war zone " would be destroyed, without 
its being " always possible to avert the 
dangers threatening the crew and passen- 
gers on that account." It was added that 
" even neutral ships are exposed to danger 
in the war zone, as in viev/ of the misuse 
of neutral flags ordered January 31 by the 
British Government and of the accidents 
of naval war, it can not always be avoided 
to strike even neutral ships in attacks that 
are directed at enemy ships." A memo- 
randum conveyed to neutral governments 



166 IMPERILED AMERICA 

an explanation of the reasons avow- 
edly animating the German government. 
" Great Britain," said this memorandum, 
" invokes the vital interests of the British 
Empire which are at stake in justification 
of its violations of the law of nations, and 
the neutral powers appear to be satisfied 
with theoretical protests, thus actually 
admitting the vital interests of a belligerent 
as a sufficient excuse for methods of wag- 
ing war of whatever description. The 
time has come for Germany also to invoke 
such vital interests." 

One of the " theoretical protests " to 
which Germany referred was a note sent 
December 26, 1914, by Secretary of State 
Bryan to the British government through 
Ambassador Page, in London. In this 
communication the United States pro- 
tested against the seizure and detention of 
American cargoes. Our attitude induced 
no modification of the British policy, 
which later, indeed, was made more rigid 
and effective. 

The German " war zone " proclamation 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 167 

produced a feeling of irritation in the 
United States because it constituted an 
assertion of belligerent rights over the 
open seas. Recognition of its propriety and 
legality would have meant that a belligerent 
could declare the entire Atlantic, even up to 
the three-mile limit of the United States, 
as a " war zone." Further, it was realized 
the Germans had advanced the claim to 
sink on sight any merchant ship that came 
within the range of a submarine torpedo, 
without making provision in accordance 
with the solemn dictates of humanity, for 
the safety of passengers and crew. They 
had declared their purpose not to observe 
the laws and customs of war, among which 
are those of visit and search of all ships 
overhauled, and the destruction of prizes 
only in extraordinary circumstances, such as 
danger to the safety of the captor or to 
the success of the operations in which the 
latter is engaged at the time. 

They had determined to employ in this 
kind of warfare, submarines, which by 
their very character could not observe the 



168 IMPERILED AMERICA 

principles of humanity and international 
law; which could not perform visit and 
search without danger to their own safety; 
which could not take captures which they 
made within the jurisdiction of a prize 
court, and which could not provide accom- 
modations for the passengers and crews of 
large merchant ships. Of particular im- 
portance to the United States was the fact 
that the German " war zone " proclamation 
was in direct violation of Article XII of 
the Treaty of 1785 with Prussia — a treaty 
made by direction of the Great Frederick 
and signed by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas 
Jefiferson and John Adams. That treaty 
specifically recognized our freedom of 
navigation in the waters of an enemy of 
Germany. 

Prior to the issuance of the German 
" war zone " proclamation, the German 
auxiliary cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich, on 
January 27, 1915, captured the American 
schooner William P. Frye, in the South 
Atlantic. This vessel was laden with a 
cargo of wheat consigned " to order " for 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 169 

delivery at Queenstown, Falmouth or Ply- 
mouth. The Frye was destroyed, in spite 
of the position taken by the German gov- 
ernment that wheat or other foodstuffs 
consigned to the German civilian popula- 
tion, should be exempt from seizure or 
destruction, under the Declaration of Lon- 
don and the principles of international 
law upon which that document was based, 
and also in violation of the express stipu- 
lation of the treaty of the Great Frederick. 
Moreover, as the crew of the schooner was 
taken aboard the Prinz Eitel Fried rich, 
which was liable to destruction if over- 
hauled by a British man-of-war, it could 
not be claimed these American citizens 
had been put " in a place of safety " within 
the meaning of international law. 

The case of the Frye necessarily did not 
come up for consideration between the 
two governments until news of her destruc- 
tion reached the United States almost 
a month later. Then the negotiations 
dragged along for a year, with a promise 
of adjustment of the amount of indemnity 



170 IMPERILED AMERICA 

to be paid by Germany. The case is referred 
to here merely to show that Germany 
countenanced the very things she com- 
plained of against England, with the addi- 
tional failure to make proper provision 
for the safety of the crew of the Frye. 
Berlin's defense of the action of the Prinz 
Eitel Fried rich was that the Frye was 
en route to one of several fortified ports, 
which serve as bases for the British fleet, 
and that the cargo therefore was in reality 
destined for the armed forces of the enemy. 
Even this contention, however, crumbles in 
the light of the treaty of 178S. 

A consideration of all the facts leading 
up to the German " war zone " proclama- 
tion as well as the terms of the procla- 
mation itself, caused President Wilson and 
his cabinet to formulate a note, cabled to 
the German government under date of 
February 10, 1915. This note pointed to 
the critical situation which might arise in 
the relations of the United States and 
Germany, were the German naval forces, 
in carrying out the policy foreshadowed 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 171 

in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy 
any merchant vessels of the United States 
or cause the death of American citizens. 
It described the limitations applicable to 
belligerent maritime operations, denied 
that the conduct of the United States justi- 
fied any imputations upon its neutrality, 
and closed: 

" If the commanders of German 
vessels of war should act upon the 
presumption that the flag of the 
United States was not being used in 
good faith and should destroy on the 
high seas an American vessel or the 
lives of American citizens, it would 
be difficult for the Government of the 
United States to view the act in any 
other light than as an indefensible vio- 
lation of neutral rights which it would 
be very hard indeed to reconcile 
with the friendly relations now so 
happily existing between the two 
Governments. 

" If such a deplorable situation 
should arise, the Imperial German 



172 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Government can readily appreciate 
that the Government of the United 
States would be constrained to hold 
the Imperial German Government to 
a strict accountability for such acts of 
their naval authorities and to take any 
steps it might be necessary to take to 
safeguard American lives and prop- 
erty, and to secure to American citi- 
zens the full enjoyment of their 
acknowledged rights on the high 
seas." 

Did this semi-ultimatum stop Germany's 
submarine campaign? The world knows 
it did not. On March 28, 1915, a sub- 
marine torpedoed the British liner Falaba, 
and among those drowned as a result was 
an American citizen. On April 28, the 
American vessel Gushing was attacked in 
the English Channel by a German aero- 
plane. On May 1, the American vessel 
Gulflight was attacked by a German sub- 
marine, and two or more Americans lost 
their lives. On May 7, the British liner 
Lusitania was torpedoed, and of the 1,256 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 173 

men, women and children drowned, 115 
were of American nationality. 

Intense indignation swept over the coun- 
try when the fate of the Lusitania became 
known. What did the government at 
Washington propose to do to hold Ger- 
many to that " strict accountability " prom- 
ised in the note of February 10? President 
Wilson, a few days after the destruction of 
this vessel, delivered an address in Philadel- 
phia in which he used the expression " too 
proud to fight." It was insisted at the 
White House the following morning that 
this expression had no relation to the 
attitude of the government with reference 
to the Lusitania outrage, and action was 
forecasted which, it was asserted, would 
appease the wrath of the people. Prior 
to this declaration appeared a statement 
from Colonel Roosevelt, denouncing the 
attack upon the Lusitania and demand- 
ing instant measures to obtain redress and 
put an end to so barbarous a method of 
warfare. The importance of that state- 
ment cannot be overestimated; for it forced 



174 IMPERILED AMERICA 

the administration to realize that some- 
thing must be done and done quickly. 

The negotiations with reference to the 
Lusitania and the long list of liners and 
merchantmen that followed her to the 
bottom of the sea, are now history. In 
their early stages President Wilson pro- 
claimed sound principles, appealing alike 
to the humanitarian and the international 
law authority. He made polite but firm 
demands upon Germany, and peremptory 
demands upon Austria-Hungary, when that 
nation began her submarine campaign in 
the Mediterranean. In September, 1915, 
he obtained assurances from Germany that 
liners plying in the " war zone " about 
the British Isles would not be sunk with- 
out warning, unless they resisted or 
attempted to escape, and in January, 1916, 
he obtained like assurances with respect 
to all merchantmen plying in the Medi- 
terranean. In the case only of the British 
liner Arabic did he receive a " disavowal," 
and that in the form of a personal letter 
from Count von Bernstorfif to the Honor- 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 175 

able Robert Lansing, who had succeeded 
Mr. Bryan as Secretary of State, not as an 
official declaration by the German govern- 
ment to the American government! The 
solution of the Lusitania question which 
finally was determined upon but which 
was not adopted because of the return of 
Germany to her " sink on sight " policy, 
was predicated upon the admission, rather 
the reiteration, by Berlin (recall the Ger- 
man memorandum establishing a " war 
zone" about the British Isles), of the 
view that the sinking of the liner was 
an act of retaliation, which Germany justi- 
fies and which the United States holds 
to be illegal; and that insofar as American 
citizens were drowned the German govern- 
ment was liable. Austria-Hungary pun- 
ished the submarine commander who 
shelled and sank the Italian liner Ancona, 
while defending his action. Not a dollar 
of indemnity has been paid, though prom- 
ised. As a matter of fact, the curse of 
this whole wretched business lies in the 
action of the government of the United 



176 IMPERILED AMERICA 

States in placing American lives upon a 
monetary basis. 

Are neutral and noncombatant lives 
safer at sea as a result of the diplomacy of 
Washington? Germany and Austria- 
Hungary have not abandoned their sub- 
marine warfare; they have not agreed to 
live up to the spirit of the principles of 
humanity and international law. It is of 
first importance that passengers and crew 
shall be transferred to " a place of safety " 
before the vessel they are aboard be sunk. 
Germany promised in January, 1916, that 
all persons should be " accorded safety." 
Austro-Hungary about the same time 
declared that vessels " may " not be 
destroyed without the persons on board 
" being brought into safety." In a prior 
note relating to the Frye, Germany ex- 
plained her pledge of safety by stating 
that persons found on board a vessel 
" may " not be ordered into lifeboats, 
except when the general conditions — that 
is, the weather, the state of the sea, and 
the neighborhood of the coasts — afford 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 177 

absolute certainty that the boats would 
reach the nearest port. A condition of 
sea and weather and distance from the 
coast may mean one thing to a submarine 
commander and a totally different thing 
to delicate men, women and children, 
unable to prepare themselves for the ordeal 
thrust upon them. The Austro-Hungarian 
pledge was by no means final, as indicated 
by the reservation of the right accom- 
panying it to bring up at a later period 
*' the difficult questions of international 
law connected with submarine warfare." 
It should be observed further that Ger- 
many did not abandon her " war zone " 
about the British Isles, liners only being 
assured of security. 

What little the United States obtained 
was taken away, and submarine warfare 
with all its horrors restored, as desired by 
the Central Powers, at the instance of the 
United States itself. On January 18, 1916, 
Secretary Lansing suggested to the Allies 
that merchantmen should be deprived of 
guns for defensive purposes in order that 



178 IMPERILED AMERICA 

they might not attack submarines, and de- 
clared that President Wilson was consid- 
ering the advisability of treating merchant- 
men so armed as auxiliary cruisers. From 
the foundation of the Republic, the United 
States has recognized the right of mer- 
chantmen to arm for defense. This right 
was solemnly upheld against the intention 
of his government by Chief Justice Mar- 
shall in the case of the Nereide and has 
been a feature of our maritime law. To 
surrender it is to place a ship at the 
mercy of a brutal commander, as was the 
Ancona, which, while stopping, was shelled 
and some of her passengers and crew 
killed. By treating merchantmen armed 
purely for defense, as auxiliary cruisers, 
submarines thereby gain the right to 
sink them without warning and without 
consideration of the innocent life on board. 
Germany promptly took advantage of the 
position of the United States and an- 
nounced that from March 1, 1916, all 
vessels carrying guns would be regarded 
as lawful war prey and torpedoed on sight. 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 179 

Mr. Lansing's suggested change of the 
rules of war while the war is in progress 
was deeply resented by the Allies, who 
indicated their objections to any such ac- 
tion. Thereupon President Wilson re- 
sumed the view that merchantmen could 
be armed for defensive purposes. Congress 
and the country evidenced division upon 
the question, and a legislative crisis oc- 
curred over a proposal to warn Americans 
against traveling in belligerent armed 
ships. Fortunately, this proposal was lost. 
German diplomacy, it is apparent, has 
won substantial victories, and Herr von 
Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign 
Afifairs, and Count von Bernstorfif, the 
German Ambassador to the United States, 
deserve, in large measure, the credit there- 
for. Crises were bridged over at critical 
moments for their country. At the time 
the Lusitania question was at a white heat, 
the Balkan situation was reaching a climax. 
Bulgaria was on the eve of entrance into 
the war, and Greece and Roumania seemed 
to be hesitating as to the side upon which 



180 IMPERILED AMERICA 

to cast their fortunes. Germany realized 
the tremendous moral effect upon those 
nations a rupture with the United States 
would produce. She devoted herself to 
the task of preserving relations with the 
American government; and it was the 
less difficult for her to do this because 
of the terrible havoc wrought among her 
submarines by the well calculated opera- 
tions of the British fleet. What effect the 
representations of the United States had, 
therefore, was indirect rather than direct. 
As a matter of fact, the disposition in 
Berlin and Vienna has been to discount 
American demands. It was not forgotten 
that before Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan en- 
tered into power, they declared that while 
they were connected with the government 
there would be no war. In the foreign view 
this was a confession of purpose to avoid 
trouble whatever circumstances might arise. 
Then the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, 
Dr. Dumba, interpreted a statement of 
Mr. Bryan in connection with the Lusitania 
note, as evidence that the President was 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 181 

acting to satisfy American sentiment rather 
than to enforce American rights. Again, 
Mr. Bryan, the man who made Mr. Wilson 
president, resigned from the cabinet 
because of his expressed belief that the 
course of the Chief Executive would lead 
to war, which he said he intended to pre- 
vent by the exercise of his influence as a 
private citizen. Thus was apparent to 
foreign nations a sharp division in the 
councils of the party in power. This divi- 
sion was made the more striking (the 
seriousness of the matter justifies repeti- 
tion) by the action of Democratic senators 
and members of the House in advocating 
legislation prohibiting Americans from 
traveling on belligerent merchant ships; 
though this right had been maintained by 
their government from its independence to 
the present day. 

What other course could the United 
States have pursued than that which it 
actually followed? How could it have 
done dififerently and still have kept out of 
the war? This resembles a discussion of 



182 IMPERILED AMERICA 

the old question of locking the stable door 
after the horse had disappeared. Neverthe- 
less, it may be said that from the beginning 
Germany has not believed the United States 
really intended to back up its demands. 
Not only did she know we lacked the armed 
force with which to support our representa- 
tions, but she believed we would have a rev- 
olution if we pushed her too far; she be- 
lieved we were so involved in the Mexican 
imbroglio that we feared to precipitate a 
clash with another nation, and she believed 
we were impressed with the danger of war 
with Japan, and that this would influence 
us to observe a policy of hesitation. In 
short, she relied upon our timidity, our 
internal differences, and the division in the 
party in power, to prevent us from pro- 
ceeding to extremes, and therefore she felt 
assured of that freedom of operation which 
she enjoyed for so many fevered months. 
Had the United States fully realized what 
the " strict accountability " note meant and 
was determined to enforce it, or, rather, 
had Germany believed the United States 



WAR ON AMERICAN LIFE 183 

would compel respect for the principles 
laid down in that admirable document, it 
is exceedingly doubtful if the Lusitania 
would have been destroyed or, if she had 
been torpedoed, that the distressing out- 
rages which followed would have occurred. 
Drowned, one hundred and forty-eight 
American men, women and children. That 
is the price we paid for the first year of 
the German submarine campaign ! 



chapter ix 
The War and American Dollars 

Trade is life. A belligerent deprived 
of necessities from other markets is brought 
to his knees, unless a decision can be had 
on land, as in the Austro-Prussian, the 
Franco-Prussian and other wars of a like 
character. Napoleon's brilliant victories 
were made futile by British command of 
the sea. The Confederacy was starved 
into submission by the blockade established 
and maintained by the Union. Germany 
has been uniformly successful in the land 
operations of the present war. Yet she is 
struggling, as no other nation ever before 
has struggled, to avert the weakness which 
the suppression of her trade with other 
states inevitably will produce. 

One of the reasons for the rage of Ger- 
many at Great Britain for entering the 
war, was the realization of the strangling 

184 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 185 

effect of sea power. To meet that danger, 
Germany endeavored to bring home the 
threat of starvation to the British people 
and thus force them to make peace. She 
relied upon her submarines to accomplish 
this purpose, but the activity of the British 
fleet soon demonstrated that this reliance 
was vain. Then she applied her wonder- 
ful organizing powers to the conservation 
of the necessities of life and the intensive 
expansion of her crops, and above all to 
their distribution so that all should be fed. 
Her blows through the Balkans, which 
resulted in the crushing of Servia and 
Montenegro, were inspired in part by her 
need of obtaining food supplies from 
Turkey and Bulgaria. 

In the meantime, there were slowly 
tightening about her the invisible coils of 
the Allied fleets. Her commerce, as well 
as that of the nations fighting with her, 
became greatly reduced from what it was 
prior to the war. Yet it has not been 
destroyed, largely because of the activities 
of neutral traders. Where there is a 



186 IMPERILED AMERICA 

demand, a determined effort always will 
be made to provide the supply. In the 
case of Germany there are no physical 
difficulties in the way. Surveyors' lines 
are the only boundaries between her and 
Holland and Denmark, and a short strip 
of sea furnishes easy access to and from 
Sweden, which is contiguous to Norway. 
Modern means of handling and transporta- 
tion have made Dutch and Danish ports 
as convenient for German trade, so far as 
geographical conditions are concerned, as 
the German ports of Hamburg and 
Bremen. 

There are certain specified belligerent 
rights recognized by international law, 
certain neutral rights which likewise are 
recognized by international law, and a 
twilight zone between, where controversy 
flourishes. A belligerent has the right to 
seize and confiscate absolute contraband, 
that is, articles solely or primarily useful 
in war, destined for his enemy's territory. 
He has the right to seize and confiscate 
conditional contraband, that is, articles 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 187 

useful for peace as well as war, destined for 
his enemy's territory, if intended for the 
use of the armed forces or the government 
of the enemy state. He has the right to in- 
stitute a blockade of his enemy's ports and 
coasts and thereby prevent commercial in- 
tercourse of all kind. He has the right to 
visit and search all neutral ships upon the 
high seas, to take such ships into port on 
evidence of the illegitimacy of their con- 
duct, and to condemn the cargoes they 
carry if the noxious character of the voyage 
and cargo shall be established, and even 
the ship itself under a recent practice 
recognized by the Declaration of London. 
This practice is not, however, law so far 
as the United States and Great Britain 
are concerned. 

The neutral, on the other hand, has the 
right to trade freely in non-contraband 
with belligerent territory, unless that terri- 
tory shall be blockaded; and, indeed, sub- 
ject to the danger of seizure and confisca- 
tion, he has the right to trade in contraband 
or anything he sees fit. As peace and not 



188 IMPERILED AMERICA 

war is the normal relation of nations, he 
has the right to free intercourse with others 
not party to the conflict, and if his trade 
should be interfered with, such interfer- 
ence must be limited to the imperative 
necessity of the belligerents, and then only 
to the extent that it is a necessity. He has 
the right to insist that evidence and not 
mere suspicion shall be the ground for 
seizures of ships and cargoes, and that the 
burden of proof shall rest upon the captor; 
such proof to be the evidence derived from 
the ship at the time of seizure. He has a 
right in connection with all seizures to 
full hearing by a prize court and a judg- 
ment in accordance with international law, 
not in accordance with domestic or munic- 
ipal law. He has a right to disregard a 
blockade which is not formally proclaimed 
and not effectively maintained; and to 
refuse to be bound in any way thereby. 

He has a right to insist upon the division 
of all articles into three classes: absolute 
contraband, conditional contraband and 
non-contraband. Under the first must be 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 189 

included only those articles which are sus- 
ceptible of use for war purposes; under 
the second, those which may be susceptible 
of such use or which are consigned directly 
to the enemy forces or the enemy govern- 
ment; under the third, those which are 
incapable of use for war purposes. 
Further, the neutral has the right to 
belligerent respect of the principle that a 
ship shall not be sunk save under extraor- 
dinary conditions, such as imminent danger 
to her captor or to the success of the opera- 
tions in which the latter is engaged; and 
in this exceptional contingency, provision 
must be made for the safety of the pas- 
sengers and crew. 

There is hardly a belligerent right which 
has not been illegally extended during the 
operations of the present war, scarcely a 
neutral right which has not been violated 
or infringed. By virtue of the fact that 
conditions had made it the " Great 
Neutral," the United States became the 
chief protestant against unlawful conduct 
on the part of belligerents, and the prin- 



190 IMPERILED AMERICA 

cipal champion of the rights of neutrals. 
We know that German and Austro-Hun- 
garian submarines tore great gaps in the 
fabric of international law, and that in 
defiance of solemn dictates of humanity 
they willfully drowned hundreds of non- 
combatants, including American citizens. 
We know that all belligerents have ex- 
tended their lists of absolute contraband, 
such extension being based rather upon 
their own views as to the other's necessities 
as well as their own, than upon any regard 
for neutral rights. 

We know that by her decree of Febru- 
ary 4, 1915, Germany sought to establish 
a " blockade " of the British Isles without 
the effective force to maintain it and with- 
out respecting, without indeed intending 
to respect, the fundamental principles of 
humanity and international law. Great 
Britain retaliated by Orders in Council 
of March 11, 1915, which were open to 
criticism not so much for their failure to 
conform to the technical requirements of 
international law as for their application to 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 191 

German commerce passing through neutral 
ports. The latter was justified by the exten- 
sion of the doctrine of " continuous voy- 
age " to contraband goods consigned to 
neutral ports when their destination was 
believed to be enemy territory. It does 
not or should not, apply to goods of enemy 
origin issuing from neutral ports. 

The United States, in common with 
European neutrals, protested against the 
Orders in Council and a similar French 
decree, declaring the measures appeared 
to menace the rights of trade and inter- 
course of neutral nations, not only with 
belligerent powers but with one another, 
and that they constituted a *' practical asser- 
tion of unlimited belligerent rights over 
neutral commerce with the whole Euro- 
pean area, and an almost unqualified denial 
of the sovereign rights of nations now at 
peace." Moreover, the United States 
claimed that the measures of the Allies 
were partial in their application, since they 
had no relation to Scandinavian ports and 
therefore did not fall, as required, with 



192 IMPERILED AMERICA 

equal severity upon the commerce of all 
neutrals. 

As a matter of fact, what the Allies 
endeavored to do was to enforce a block- 
ade against Germany, minus the heavy 
penalties visited for violation of a pro- 
claimed blockade. They delayed the date 
of the enforcement of the Orders in Coun- 
cil, they permitted the exportation of 
particular products indispensable to the 
conduct of certain American industries, 
they bound themselves to inflict no loss 
on owners save in the case of contraband. 
It is evident from a study of the British 
notes that a sincere desire underlay the 
British and French policy to interfere as 
little as possible with legitimate neutral 
trade and to reduce to a minimum the 
inconveniences and hardships which en- 
forcement of the measures of those govern- 
ments inevitably inflicted. It is worthy 
of remark in this connection that as a 
result of British and French activities, 
not a single innocent life has been lost, 
and there has been no destruction of a 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 193 

single neutral vessel or property of any 
kind without due process of law. 

Great Britain contends, and her con- 
tention has been ably presented by her 
Ambassador to the United States, Sir Cecil 
Spring Rice, that her course is in con- 
sonance with the spirit if not the letter 
of international law, and with reference 
to the application of the doctrine of 
continuous voyage, that it is in accordance 
with the practice of the Union during the 
Civil War. It is quite true that through- 
out that conflict the Washington govern- 
ment maintained the legality of its right 
to suppress the over-sea trade of the Con- 
federacy, not only directly through a block- 
ade, which in its early stages was extremely 
tenuous and hardly binding, but indirectly 
through the seizure of goods en route to 
neutral ports whence they were to be trans- 
shipped and forwarded to the South. Sub- 
stantially, this is the policy of the Allies; 
but the operations are necessarily of greater 
magnitude to-day because of the tremend- 
ous growth in commerce. Cargoes were 



194 IMPERILED AMERICA 

condemned for violating the Union block- 
ade; those seized by the Allies have been 
paid for or restored. The precedents 
established by our own courts have been 
cited by the Allies in justification for their 
procedure, and it must be admitted that 
those precedents frequently embarrass us 
in our efiforts to assert neutral rights. 

The truth is, the present war has demon- 
strated the irreconcilable character of the 
conflict between belligerent and neutral 
rights. It is impossible for a belligerent 
to intercept the trade of his enemy without 
restricting the freedom of a neutral, and 
it is impossible for a neutral to enjoy 
freedom of trade without striking at the 
interests of a belligerent. There can be, 
of course, no question as to the legitimacy 
of a blockade. It has been recognized by 
the publicists of every state, and it has 
been enforced by our own government. 
Austria-Hungary proclaimed a blockade 
against Montenegro in the early days of 
the war, and the neutrals accepted it. 
There is no ground either in international 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 195 

law or practice for Germany's denuncia- 
tion of a blockade as cruel and inhuman. 
Its purpose is to compel the surrender of 
the enemy by cutting off the supplies of 
the civilian population. It was the wide- 
spread want and suffering of the South 
that brought the Confederacy to Appo- 
mattox. But until Great Britain proclaims 
a formal blockade, until she lives up to the 
established principles of international law 
governing interference with enemy trade, 
neutrals not only have the right but it is 
their duty to refuse to respect her pro- 
cedure. 

To obviate the development of such 
questions as have arisen, the United States 
on the outbreak of the war sought to induce 
all the belligerents to observe the principles 
of the Declaration of London, an instru- 
ment in treaty form which had been nego- 
tiated and signed by representatives of 
Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy and 
Japan, now fighting as the Allies, and 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain and 
the Netherlands. This Declaration failed 



196 IMPERILED AMERICA 

of ratification, in spite of the fact that the 
rules it set forth conformed in substance 
with the generally recognized practices of 
international law. The Allies declined to 
be bound unqualifiedly by the Declaration, 
though the Central Powers were willing to 
abide by it. The war has seen this excel- 
lent work of able men fail to stand the test 
of practice. The blockade provision has 
been disregarded; the difference between 
absolute, conditional and non-contraband 
has been practically wiped out, and neutral 
vessels have been destroyed under pecu- 
liarly horrible conditions. There has 
remained nothing for the neutral govern- 
ments to do but to base their protests upon 
international law as recognized prior to 
the beginning of the war. 

There are other acts of the Allies, 
besides interference with legitimate trade 
between ourselves and other neutrals and 
the seizure on mere suspicion and undue 
detention of ships and cargoes, justly 
deserving of American complaint. Our 
mails have been interfered with, our com- 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 197 

mercial messages interrupted, and persons 
have been taken from our ships. The 
censorship of the mails is supported by the 
argument that they serve as a channel for 
the conveyance of contraband and enemy 
information. The censorship of com- 
mercial messages is based upon the possi- 
bility that they may contain enemy 
information. There can be no justification 
for the removal of members of a crew or 
of passengers from an American ship; and 
in every case that has arisen, such persons, 
upon demand, have been released. This 
government, likewise, is justified in object- 
ing emphatically to interference with or 
supervision over our commercial activities 
when such activities have no relation to 
war operations. 

It is of course incumbent upon a nation 
to insist upon respect for its rights. It 
must do so as strenuously in times of pros- 
perity as in times of adversity. Neces- 
sarily there is a languid public interest 
in what the government may do during the 
former period, and an aroused and excited 



198 IMPERILED AMERICA 

public interest during the latter. For sev- 
eral years before the great war began, the 
American people were afflicted with hard 
times. Though they always had prided 
themselves upon their economic independ- 
ence, they suffered during the first two 
weeks following the declaration of war an 
almost total paralysis of their over-seas 
commerce. Sterling exchange on London 
rose to unprecedented heights, the stock 
and other business exchanges were forced 
to close, and a large number of commer- 
cial failures took place. Nothing could 
have more clearly demonstrated our 
economic interdependence with the rest of 
the world. 

Fortunately we emerged from that ter- 
rific financial strain without being com- 
pelled to resort to moratoriums and other 
measures which were adopted abroad. As 
time passed, and the necessities of bel- 
ligerents forced them to turn to us for 
supplies, an era of prosperity was in- 
augurated. From a commercially pro- 
vincial and secondary power we leaped 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 199 

in the course of a year to a rank of first 
importance among the great nations of the 
world — economically, industrially and 
financially. Our international position has 
changed from that of a debtor to that of a 
creditor country. Our exports were valued 
at a billion dollars more during the 
calendar year 1915 than ever before in our 
history — this in spite of the fact that we 
were cut ofif from trade with Germany, 
Austria-Hungaria, Bulgaria and Turkey. 
Our imports, with the exception of gold, 
naturally were below those of times of 
peace. To meet their obligations in part, 
belligerents shipped us large quantities of 
gold. 

The United States now has the promise 
of becoming the world's greatest banker. 
In order to facilitate trade, credit loans 
amounting to hundreds of millions were 
negotiated by foreign governments with 
American financial houses. There is not 
the slightest objection in international law 
to the making of loans by private indi- 
viduals to a belligerent; yet determined 



200 IMPERILED AMERICA 

pressure was applied to the administration 
to proclaim such a prohibition, happily 
without effect. Likewise pressure was 
exerted to obtain an embargo on munitions 
of war, an act which not only would seri- 
ously affect American industries, but would 
be tantamount to the adoption of a policy 
of unneutrality toward the Allies. It is 
evident that an embargo on munitions, in 
order to be effective, would have to be 
complemented by an embargo on all the 
products entering into such munitions. In 
other words, there would have to be a 
prohibition of exports of cotton, which is 
a base for high explosives, steel, etc. To 
refuse to sell munitions to the Allies would 
be to change the rules of war while 
the war is in progress; and unquestionably 
this would precipitate a crisis in our rela- 
tions with Great Britain, Russia and 
France. That our position is sound is 
shown by the fact that both Germany and 
Austria-Hungary while at peace have sold 
to belligerents. It follows that a general 
embargo likewise would be regarded by 



AMERICAN DOLLARS 201 

the Allies as an act of unneutrality, besides 
being extremely harmful to the American 
people. 

Thus, in spite of the restrictions which 
have been placed upon neutral commerce, 
the war has been highly beneficial to the 
American people. We are now enjoying 
obvious advantages which will disappear 
when the treaty of peace shall be signed. 
It is important that our government in its 
foreign policies shall insist upon the main- 
tenance of neutral rights, and it is likewise 
necessary that our business men shall pre- 
pare for the conditions following the war, 
conditions which will involve sharper com- 
petition, better organization of industry 
and an energy the greater because of the 
spur of necessity. 

Trade of the United States with the 
world : 

Fiscal year 1913-14. .. .$4,258,504,805 
Fiscal year 1914-15. .. .$4,442,759,080 



chapter x 

Where We Stand With the Allies 

The great moving factors in the relations 
of states are self-interest and sentiment. 
The latter is influential and sometimes 
seems paramount; but careful inquiry 
always discloses that its development and 
expression impinge on self-interest. Pre- 
revolutionary France furnished aid to the 
American rebels against England, not 
because the French monarchy looked w^ith 
favor upon democracy, but because of 
hatred of England and a desire to weaken 
and thus contest the latter's maritime 
supremacy. In spite of the powerful assist- 
ance received from France, and of the 
continued feeling against Great Britain, 
President Washington declined to pursue 
any other policy than that of strict neutral- 
ity in the war between those countries, a 
policy adhered to by his immediate succes- 

202 



WITH THE ALLIES 203 

sors. The Mexican War was precipitated 
by our annexation of Texas. The Civil 
War was the direct result of the contro- 
versy over slaves as property. The war 
with Spain was an emotional expression 
by the American people, but nevertheless 
had important underlying economic and 
strategical causes. 

But our history also discloses an intense 
pro-French sentiment in the days of Wash- 
ington, an intense pro-Texan sentiment 
preliminary to our war with Mexico, an 
intense abolition sentiment in the North 
prior to the Civil War, and an intense 
sentiment for " Free Cuba " during the 
Cleveland and McKinley administrations. 
In foreign wars, our people always have 
taken sides as in the war between Russia 
and Japan when sympathy went out to the 
latter as the " under dog." In that in 
which the world is involved to-day, our 
sympathy unquestionably is on the side 
of the Allies, largely because of the Ger- 
man invasion of Belgium and the opera- 
tions of German submarines. 



204 IMPERILED AMERICA 

What is true of the United States, neces- 
sarily is true of other nations. Each has 
its own interests, its own culture, its own 
aspirations. Because humanity is what it 
is, each reaches out to advance its own 
interests and its own aspirations and to 
spread its own culture. Clashes follow, 
usually of a character, in the present spirit 
of civilization, to permit an adjustment. 
When so-called " vital interests " or ques- 
tions of " honor " or " territory " are 
involved, war takes place. 

It therefore behooves us, in considering 
the relations of the United States and the 
powers which began the war under the 
popular designation of " The Allies," to 
examine the basic ideals and basic interests 
of each country and establish where they 
conflict, if at all. The United States has 
a passion for individual liberty and indi- 
vidual development. So have Great 
Britain and France. The United States 
insists on popular government. So do 
Great Britain and France. The United 
States requires respect for the rights of 



WITH THE ALLIES 205 

property. So do Great Britain and France. 
In short, it is the people in each of these 
three countries who manage their own 
affairs and whose ideals their governments 
endeavor to express and whose interests 
their governments endeavor to expand and 
protect. Italy's civilization is different 
from that of the United States and Great 
Britain and rather resembles that of 
France. It is founded on Latin traditions, 
on Latin culture. The anachronisms in 
the Allied combination are Russia, Japan, 
Servia and Montenegro. Russia is an autoc- 
racy. Japan is a democracy springing 
from feudalism. Servia and Montenegro, 
sturdy in their mountain independence, are 
feudal. 

The United States has no desire to 
extend its territorial dominions; indeed is 
disposed to surrender the Philippine 
Archipelago. Prior to the war, Great 
Britain was equally content territorially; 
but events of the war have placed German 
colonies in Britain's possession, and she 
is likely to retain some of them, particu- 



206 IMPERILED AMERICA 

larly those sections of Africa which will 
enable the realization of Cecil Rhodes' 
dream of a Cape-to-Cairo Railroad 
through British-owned land. France had 
become reconciled to the loss of Alsace and 
Lorraine, but if she should be victor in 
the present struggle, she will demand their 
return and will extend her boundaries and 
control at German expense in north 
Africa. Russia expects to obtain an outlet 
on the Mediterranean — this may be pro- 
ductive of a war with Great Britain when 
that now raging is ended — is fanatically 
inspired by the doctrine of Pan-Slavism, 
and is covetous of North China. Japan 
aspires to the mastery of the Pacific and 
the Far East and intends to enforce the 
policy of *' Asia for the Asiatics." De- 
vastated Servia hopes for the restoration 
of her one-time greatness. Montenegro, 
now in irons, looks for extended boundaries. 
There is no conflict territorially be- 
tween the United States and any of the 
Allies, with the exception of Russia and 
Japan with reference to China; and there 



WITH THE ALLIES 207 

is no American who would consider for a 
moment the idea of fighting over the ques- 
tion of Chinese integrity. The rearrange- 
ment of European and African territory, 
with the sole exception of Liberia in the 
Dark Continent, is not a matter of Amer- 
ican concern; though we unquestionably 
would give our moral support to the pro- 
gram Sir Edward Grey, the British Min- 
ister for Foreign Affairs, outlined to the 
author: Restoration of Belgium to the 
Belgian people, acquisition of Alsace and 
Lorraine by France, and a decision by 
each of the small peoples of the Old World 
as to the country to which it desires to 
attach itself, or to work out its own destiny 
as an independent state. In the fate of the 
German Pacific Islands we are more deeply 
interested. We also are watchful over 
China's destiny, largely because it is 
important for us commercially that the 
integrity of that country should be 
maintained. 

The war with Spain marked a new epoch 
in the life of the American nation. Prior 



208 IMPERILED AMERICA 

thereto we had been a potential world 
power. Thereafter we became in fact a 
recognized member of the world's council 
of Great Nations. We took part in the 
international expedition which rescued the 
beleaguered Legations in Pekin and sup- 
pressed the Boxer revolt; we brought about 
the adoption by all the powers of the Hay 
principles of the integrity of China and 
the Open Door in that country; we exerted 
our good offices and served as mediator 
in the Russo-Japanese war; we filled 
a like role in effecting the settlement 
of the Moroccan dispute, which threatened 
a European conflict; we substituted the 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty for the Clayton- 
Bulwer Treaty, and, freed from the obliga- 
tion of joint action with the British gov- 
ernment, we acquired the Panama Canal 
Zone and constructed the Panama Canal; 
we forced arbitration of the claims of 
Great Britain, Germany and Italy against 
Venezuela, after those countries had 
attempted to collect by force; we were a 
leader in The Hague Peace Conferences, 



WITH THE ALLIES 209 

and in the negotiation of treaties of arbi- 
tration; we began an active commercial 
campaign, which resulted in our foreign 
commerce jumping from $1,850,000,000 in 
1898 to $4,258,000,000 in 1914. 

In the various things we did, our ideal 
was peace, our interest the extension of 
our trade. Nor were we selfish in connec- 
tion with the latter effort. We had no 
desire for exclusive markets. We were 
willing to meet competition, provided it 
was on equal terms. Therefore, we 
became the exponent of the commercial 
" open door " everywhere. 

This also was the policy of Great Britain. 
The government of that empire gave 
powerful assistance to the Hay proposals 
relative to the integrity of, and equality of 
opportunity in, China. It seconded our 
efiforts to induce Japan to make peace, 
just as the German Emperor seconded our 
efforts to bring Russia to Portsmouth. It 
welcomed our peaceful intervention in the 
Moroccan controversy. As a concession 
to the United States, it agreed to waive its 



210 IMPERILED AMERICA 

right to cooperate with us in the construc- 
tion of the Trans-Isthmian Canal. Public 
opinion in England did not sustain the 
government in the Venezuelan adventure 
with Germany and Italy, and it acquiesced 
gladly in the Roosevelt demand for arbi- 
tration of the claims against that South 
American republic. It negotiated a treaty 
of arbitration with us in 1908, whereby all 
disputes of a legal nature or relating to 
the interpretation of treaties, must be 
referred to arbitration at The Hague, pro- 
vided they do not involve the honor, vital 
interests or territory of either nation, and 
subsequently it signed a Bryan Treaty for 
the investigation of all disputes, whatever 
their character. Similar engagements have 
been made by the United States with 
France and Italy. Japan signed an arbi- 
tration treaty in 1908; Russia did not. 
Russia signed a Bryan treaty; Japan 
refused to do so. 

Russia, and France as her ally, was 
reluctant to adhere to the Hay proposals 
regarding China. Finally they were 



WITH THE ALLIES 211 

brought into line. Japan, realizing the 
importance to her ultimate aim of a world 
declaration in regard to the maintenance 
of Chinese integrity, promptly announced 
her support of the American doctrine. 
Italy, deprived by American intervention 
of Chinese territory, did likew^ise. When 
Secretary Hay was felicitated upon his 
achievement and told that he had written 
a new and indelible world policy, he 
remarked: "You don't recall American 
history. Ten years from now this will be 
relegated to the storeroom of discarded 
policies." Mr. Hay's prediction was 
based upon his realization of the lack of 
a continuous foreign policy by his country, 
and had no relation to the sincerity of his 
belief that what he had accomplished was 
in the real interest of the American people. 
The policies of all European countries 
have caused them sedulously to cultivate 
the United States. That of Great Britain 
has been marked, especially since the Civil 
War, by a keen desire to remove all ques- 
tions of dispute from her relations with us. 



212 IMPERILED AMERICA 

She has made billions of investment in 
this country, and desires us prosperous in 
order that we shall be able to pay the 
interest thereon. She arranged the Ala- 
bama claims, growing out of the operation 
of the Confederate cruiser during the Civil 
War, the Behring fur-seal, the Fisheries 
and the Alaskan boundary questions, in a 
manner satisfactory to the United States. 
She swallowed her pride when she agreed 
to President Cleveland's ultimatum in con- 
nection with the boundary of Venezuela. 
One of the most fruitful causes of the hun- 
dred years' peace between the United 
States and Great Britain is the Rush-Bagot 
Agreement of 1818, requiring disarmament 
upon the Great Lakes; and an additional 
cause for continued peace lies in the Root- 
Bryce treaties of 1909, under which all 
pending Canadian controversies were set- 
tled, and provision made for the arbitration 
of future controversies. 

There are other mutual interests which 
make for friendly relations between the 
United States and Great Britain. It is 



WITH THE ALLIES 213 

evident that the Monroe Doctrine is inval- 
uable to the British Empire. Under that 
Doctrine, the United States will not per- 
mit British territory in this hemisphere to 
be acquired by another government. This 
likewise is true of French territory. It 
may well be said that the Monroe Doctrine 
is a close bond between the United States 
and Great Britain and France. Another 
matter of economic importance is that the 
United States and the British Pacific 
Dominions have the same objection to the 
invasion of their territories by the Mon- 
golian races. It was likewise to the interest 
of Great Britain that Germany's sway over 
Pacific islands should not be extended; 
nevertheless, deep gratitude was evoked in 
the United States by the action of the 
British Naval Commander in notifying the 
German Admiral in Manila Bay that he 
would join Commodore Dewey in resisting 
attack upon the American squadron. Nor 
should the American people lose sight of 
the forbearance Great Britain has dis- 
played in connection with Mexico. British 



214 IMPERILED AMERICA 

subjects have been murdered, British inter- 
ests have been destroyed and injured. Yet 
the London government, prior to the war, 
steadily refused to listen to suggestions that 
Europe restore peace and order, in spite 
of the United States. 

France's adventures in the American 
hemisphere really ended vs^hen the United 
States assembled troops on the Mexican 
boundary and ordered Napoleon the Little 
to withdraw from Mexico. Before the war 
with Spain, France took part in negotia- 
tions looking to the creation of a foreign 
combination to compel the United States 
to remain at peace. Lord Pauncefote, the 
British Ambassador, informed President 
McKinley of what was going on; and the 
negotiations became abortive. The real 
inspiration of those negotiations came from 
Berlin. France has given evidence of 
every desire for our friendship, but in her 
foreign policy, particularly in connection 
with the Far East, she has been handi- 
capped by her alliance with Russia. 

Russian statesmen cannot understand the 



WITH THE ALLIES 215 

attitude adopted by the United States. As 
proof of their friendship and of their desire 
for American independence and strength, 
they point to the substantial aid they gave 
the Union when during the Civil War 
their government sent warships to New 
York and San Francisco as a demonstra- 
tion against European intervention; and 
to the sale of Alaska. They have found 
us, on the other hand, combating their 
moves in the Far East and insulting them, 
as they regard it, by making representations 
in behalf of the Jews at Kishnieff and by 
denouncing the Treaty of 1833 because of 
Russian refusal to admit American Jews 
into the empire, and by certain commercial 
measures which injured Russian trade with 
this country. Japan sees in the United 
States one of the prime obstacles in the way 
of her necessitous policies. 

It is interesting now to note what change 
the war has made in the relations of the 
United States with the Allied Powers. At 
the outbreak of the struggle there is no 
doubt England and France looked with 



216 IMPERILED AMERICA 

more or less hope upon the translation into 
action of American condemnation of the 
invasion of Belgium. President Wilson's 
proclamation appealing to Americans to be 
neutral in thought and deed, shattered this 
hope. The English and French people 
were grateful for the charity we offered, 
but they wanted more than charity; they 
wanted help. There was general approval 
of our " strict accountability " note to Ger- 
many, and when the Lusitania was de- 
stroyed, there was an expectation that we. 
would hold Germany to a complete 
responsibility. President Wilson's " too 
proud to fight" speech was made at this 
juncture, and its effect upon English and 
French public opinion was to arouse con- 
tempt for Americans. The peoples of 
those two countries finally came to the 
conclusion that the United States would 
not intervene. A common expression was: 
" We are fighting for your ideals and your 
civilization, and you are chasing dollars." 
The spectacle of a nation waxing pros- 
perous on the agony of other lands is not 



WITH THE ALLIES 217 

one to promote friendship. Moreover, 
when that nation insists upon respect for 
its commercial rights, when it seems to 
place injury to the latter upon the same 
plane as destruction of neutral life upon 
the high seas, it is natural for resentment 
to develop. On the other hand, the states- 
men of England and France realized that 
the United States was serving, in fact, as a 
military and commercial base for the 
Allies; that it was supplying them with 
foodstuffs, munitions of war, and other 
materials necessary for the conduct of the 
war. These men did not want the United 
States to join in the struggle. They desired 
it to keep aloof, to be in a position to 
protect their nationals and their interests 
in enemy territory, as far as such protec- 
tion could be accorded by a neutral. From 
their point of view, it was important that 
the United States should continue at peace, 
though they believed it should manifest 
its sympathy by withholding protests 
against what was conceived to be necessary 
supervision of ocean commerce. 



218 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Advocates of an embargo on munitions 
of war and even a general commercial 
embargo, believe such action would assure 
American peace. Nothing could be more 
erroneous. If the United States should 
apply any kind of an embargo, an ugly 
situation would develop with the Allies. 
Undoubtedly there would be retaliation. 
Rubber, wool and other products, which we 
need, would be withheld. More than this, 
however, the probability is the Allies 
would feel that the United States was 
giving support to the Central Powers, and 
they would treat us as an enemy. The 
American people cannot afford to lose sight 
of the fact that Great Britain deliberately 
restrained Japan from going too far in 
1913 in connection with the California 
dispute. In case of difficulty with the 
United States, Great Britain could afiford 
to finance Japan for a war upon us. 
Further, the fact should not be lost to 
view that Canada is no mean military 
antagonist In our state of unpreparedness; 
and that with the British navy and troops 



WITH THE ALLIES 219 

operating upon our Atlantic seaboard, the 
Japanese navy and troops operating on our 
Pacific Slope, and Canada menacing us 
from the north, we would be in an exceed- 
ingly dangerous situation. This con- 
tingency is remote, fortunately, and is men- 
tioned only to show that Great Britain is 
not helpless, whatever the view of those 
who believe we are free from possibility 
of successful attack. It is obvious, of 
course, that such a situation would be brim- 
ful of trouble for the Allies, for they would 
be deprived of our products. Frankly, they 
do not want it to arise. They prefer to 
buy of us, to arrange loans with us, to have 
our friendship not only during the war, but 
during the time when the negotiations of 
peace shall be under way. 

It may be expected, therefore, that in all 
things not vital to what the Allies consider 
the successful prosecution of the war, they 
will accede to the wishes of the American 
government. But in those things they 
regard as vital, the absolute suppression of 
trade with Germany, for instance, they will 



220 IMPERILED AMERICA 

not yield an inch. They have not pro- 
claimed a blockade, because to do so would 
mean the condemnation of ships and car- 
goes; they prefer, out of desire to maintain 
friendly relations with the United States, 
to pursue an illegal policy which attains 
the same ends but which permits the com- 
pensation of owners of ships and cargoes. 
But this government cannot acquiesce in 
such procedure, for to do so would be to 
give the Central Powers ground for com- 
plaining that while we insist upon their 
living up to the conditions of international 
law, we refrain from doing so with refer- 
ence to their enemies. 

However serious the dispute that arises 
with Great Britain or France, or indeed 
with any of the Allies, the American 
people may be sure of this: The nations 
of this combination will exhaust the 
resources of diplomacy to effect a settle- 
ment, and if this be impossible, they will 
appeal to the treaties providing for investi- 
gation and arbitration. 



chapter xi 

The Central Powers and America 

Two strikingly inconsistent, even con- 
flicting, policies have been pursued by 
Germany in her dealings with the United 
States. On the one hand she has sought 
to prove her disinterested friendship to the 
American people, on the other, she has 
committed acts against their avowed inter- 
ests. Prior to the war we find her shower- 
ing honors and courtesies upon the United 
States and its citizens, and endeavoring 
earnestly to cultivate close and friendly 
relations. In glaring contrast therewith 
was her conduct in seeking to establish 
coaling bases in the American hemisphere, 
and especially in the vicinity of the Panama 
Canal, in displaying an unwonted activity 
in Brazil, Haiti and later in Mexico, and 
in pressing her own interests elsewhere at 
the expense of those of the United States. 

221 



Ill IMPERILED AMERICA 

Precisely the same conflicting policies 
have been pursued since the war began. 
A propaganda was inaugurated at the out- 
break of the war designed to gain the 
sympathy of the United States for the 
Teutonic cause. Concurrently therewith 
were deliberate violations of American 
peace and neutrality within the United 
States, and violations of our rights upon 
the high seas. It has been necessary for 
the Federal Government to take steps to 
detect and suppress German conspiracies, 
aimed at the tranquility and safety of the 
United States; to prosecute German agents 
guilty of crimes against the laws of the 
United States, and to dismiss the Austro- 
Hungarian Ambassador and the military 
and naval attaches of the German Embassy, 
because of their connection with plots 
affecting the sovereignity of the United 
States. 

Is there any deep-rooted national differ- 
ence between the United States and Ger- 
many, which would justify the making of 
war by one upon the other? We are not 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 223 

neighbors. It is quite true that in Germany 
the individual exists for the state, while in 
the United States the state exists for the 
individual. Yet to suggest this as a cause 
of strife is to suggest the ridiculous; for in 
both countries the right of others to live 
under the kind of government they desire 
is recognized as beyond question. We 
would like to see the republican form of 
government prevail everywhere; the Ger- 
man government considers the form it 
maintains to be the one best suited for the 
needs of a people. Similarly, the United 
States believes in the excellence of what is 
known as *' Anglo-Saxon " civilization. 
Germany is equally as ardent in proclaim- 
ing the superiority of her own " kultur," 
and with a commendable missionary spirit 
has sought to impose its influence upon 
other countries. 

We have benefited tremendously by the 
mixture of German blood with that which 
has come to us from other lands. We are 
under a heavy debt to men of German 
origin for services rendered both in peace 



224 IMPERILED AMERICA 

and war. We have gained a great deal 
through the adoption of German economic 
and social principles and methods, and we 
would gain more by adopting others. The 
nation would be immensely benefited by 
patterning after the marvelous economic, 
industrial, and military organization of the 
German Empire. Such danger as exists in 
our relations with Germany, outside of 
questions arising in connection with the 
war, is the direct outgrowth of the policy 
Germany deliberately adopted, and which 
Dr. Karl Helfiferich, at present Imperial 
German Minister of Finance, described 
in 1913 as follows: 

*' With the negotiation of treaties for 
securing the interests of our commerce 
and shipping, we have not been, and 
dare not be, satisfied to stop. Our 
dependence upon foreign countries, the 
counterpart to the great advantages 
derived by us from having taken our 
place in world-economy, calls for 
stronger counterpoises. Such a counter- 
poise can be created by German enter- 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 225 

prise and German capital establishing 
a field for their activity beyond the 
borders of our own country, and 
thereby gaining a direct influence over 
foreign territories that may be im- 
portant to us as sources of supply and 
as markets. This can be done in an 
effectual way by acquiring over-sea 
colonial possessions; for in such a case 
economic influence is secured and 
strengthened in the most effective 
manner possible by political domina- 
tion. In so far, however, as this way 
is limited or barred up altogether 
our end must be reached 
by means of a far-sighted financial and 
economic activity." 

Here then we have, first, a specific 
declaration that it is to the interest of 
Germany to acquire over-seas possessions 
and, failing in this efifort, to observe a far- 
sighted financial and economic activity. It 
is unfortunate that in pursuit of the former 
ambition, the German government deemed 
it necessary to act in such fashion as to 



226 IMPERILED AMERICA 

arouse the suspicion of the United States. 
With reference to the latter policy, the 
American believes in a fair field and no 
favor, so that it has not up to this time 
aroused any irritation. 

The prime motive of Germany during 
the present wslt has been to prevent this 
country from serving as a base for the 
Allies. It long ago became evident that 
the Germans, with their hopelessly inferior 
fleet, could not wrest the command of the 
seas from the British and French. All 
they could expect to do on the ocean was 
to engage in sporadic commerce raiding by 
surface and under-water craft. After Ger- 
man submarines had been so relentlessly 
picked ofif by the British, Berlin came to 
realize that the results of the war would 
not be affected by their operations, and 
that other measures must be adopted. 
Therefore, efforts were made, through the 
agencies established before the war, and 
through propagandists like Dr. Dernburg, 
former Minister of Colonies, to preach 
the German cause in the United States, 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 227 

and to arouse a sentiment which would 
force either a change of policy by the 
Administration or legislation by Congress, 
which would effect the same result. 

Germany desired, on the one hand, 
that the United States should insist upon 
the right freely to convey foodstuffs and 
cotton to the civilian population of her 
empire, and, on the other, to impose an 
embargo upon the export of munitions of 
war. She was entirely willing that the 
United States should apply the doctrine of 
nonintercourse, realizing that the English 
people, cut off from wheat supplies from 
Russia and foodstuffs from the United 
States, would run the danger of starva- 
tion or such grave deprivation that a 
popular movement for peace would be 
inaugurated or, at least, the London gov- 
ernment hampered in the conduct of the 
war. 

Although the doctrine of nonintercourse 
has been mooted more or less, it is evident 
the American people cannot afford to apply 
it. They tried it once against Great 



228 IMPERILED AMERICA 

Britain, and war was preferable to its con- 
tinuance. To do so again would be to 
bring to a sudden stop the prosperity the 
war has given, to disrupt industry and pro- 
duce a condition of general distress. A 
trade which mounted to more than five 
billion dollars for the calendar year 1915, 
cannot be summarily ended without pre- 
cipitating a domestic cataclysm. 

Great Britain years ago adopted the 
doctrine that foodstuffs are conditional 
contraband; that is to say, such products 
could be seized only if an attempt were 
made to break through a blockade or if 
their destination were an enemy state or 
enemy forces. It is clear such a policy was 
in the interest of the British people, because 
of their dependence upon over-seas coun- 
tries for their supply of food. Likewise it 
was and is in the interest of the American 
people, because they produce the wheat, 
corn and meat which foreign countries 
require. President Wilson has protested 
against the British seizure and sale of such 
articles in English ports, in spite of the 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 229 

compensation promised or paid to Amer- 
ican shippers; but the German government 
itself has embarrassed our representations 
by regarding foodstuffs en route to England 
as contraband and destroying them, and by 
the organization and distribution of the 
food supplies available in Germany in 
order to prevent distress among its popu- 
lation. 

The British have advanced the claim 
that as the result of government assump- 
tion of control and distribution of food- 
stuffs, imports of this character necessarily 
pass into the charge of the state, and under 
such circumstances the British navy is justi- 
fied in seizing all cargoes of German 
destination. Moreover, the contention is 
made that in the highly organized condi- 
tion of Germany, where all the healthy 
males perform military service, imported 
foodstuffs would in fact be used by the 
military forces of the enemy. The weak- 
ness of this latter argument is apparent 
when it is recalled that the principle the 
United States and Great Britain have 



230 IMPERILED AMERICA 

advocated was pronounced with the knowl- 
edge that a nation at war necessarily must 
draw upon its population for soldiers. 
Unquestionably, however, a new element 
is introduced into the discussion by the 
action of the German government in assum- 
ing control of all foodstuffs imported. 

The United States sought to avoid the 
difficulties which have arisen, by proposing 
to limit the consignment of foodstuffs to its 
own agencies in Germany, which should 
supervise the distribution and see that non- 
combatants only received them. Germany, 
of course, assented, but the British and 
French governments declined to consider 
the proposal, asserting they were moved to 
act as they were doing against Germany 
in consequence of the '' unprecedented 
methods, repugnant to all law and moral- 
ity, which Germany began to adopt at the 
very outset of the war, and the effects of 
which have been constantly accumulating." 

Because cotton is an ingredient in the 
manufacture of high explosives, the British 
and French took steps to prevent it from 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 231 

reaching Germany. At the outset of the 
war they were disposed to look upon it as 
innocent, and permitted American ships to 
convey the product to German ports. But 
as the war proceeded, they placed it upon 
the conditional contraband list, and now 
it is regarded as absolute contraband. The 
United States contends that raw cotton, 
because of the many innocent uses to which 
it may be put, should be regarded as con- 
ditional contraband. The British counter 
by calling attention to the conduct of the 
Union during the Civil War, when all 
cotton raised in the South was seized, to 
the great distress of British industry. 
However, this product was money to the 
South, for through it only could the Con- 
federates pay for absolutely needed mili- 
itary supplies and as such it was 
contraband. 

Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, 
early began their campaign to prevent the 
exportation of munitions of war, in spite 
of the fact that there could be no question 
as to the propriety of the sale of such 



232 IMPERILED AMERICA 

products by individual citizens. President 
Wilson recognized it in his proclamation 
of neutrality issued at the outbreak of the 
war; and his recognition was sound in law 
and precedent. Munitions, by their very 
character, are absolute contraband and 
subject to seizure. Germany herself, to 
mention recent prior wars, sold such 
products to Russia, during the Russo- 
Japanese War; to Turkey, during the 
Turko-Italian War; to Great Britain, dur- 
ing the Boer War, to the Balkan States, 
during their wars, and even to General 
Huerta in Mexico, when that person was 
in control of the situation in Mexico City. 
In a memorandum to the State Department, 
the German Ambassador asserted that the 
situation in the existing war was different 
from that in any preceding war; that the 
United States was partial in that it was 
supplying only one side of the struggle, 
and that by its development of the arms 
industry, it had in fact created a new 
industry, all of which was in violation of 
the spirit of true neutrality. In his reply 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 233 

President Wilson pointed out that any 
change in our laws of neutrality during the 
progress of a war, which would affect 
unequally the relations of the United States 
with the nations at war, would be an 
unjustifiable departure from the principle 
of strict neutrality; and the placing of an 
embargo as had been suggested would con- 
stitute such a change and be a direct 
violation of American neutrality. Subse- 
quently Austria-Hungary filed a protest 
against our traffic in arms with the Allies. 
It was answered by an admirable note 
denying the existence of any grounds in 
law for the Austro-Hungarian contention, 
and closing: 

" The principles of international 
law, the practice of nations, the 
national safety of the United States 
and other nations without great mili- 
tary and naval establishments, the 
prevention of increased armies and 
navies, the adoption of peaceful 
methods for the adjustment of inter- 
national differences, and finally, neu- 



234 IMPERILED AMERICA 

trality itself, are opposed to the pro- 
hibition by a neutral nation of the 
exportation of arms, ammunition and 
other munitions of war to belligerent 
powers during the progress of the 
war." 

It is evident, of course, that in spite of 
the conclusive legal answers of the United 
States, the governments of the Central 
Powers resent our sale of arms to the 
Allies. When the writer was in Vienna 
and Berlin in December, 1914, he was told 
that had it not been for the action of Amer- 
ican manufacturers in selling munitions to 
Great Britain, Russia and France, the war 
would have been ended two months before. 
Reports were circulated in the two empires 
that American bullets were killing German 
and Austrian soldiers; and General von 
Hindenburg was quoted as saying: 

" How can I feel friendly toward a 
people with whom we have no quar- 
rel and whose ammunition is daily 
killing my soldiers?" 
It is interesting to remark in this connec- 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 235 

tion that at the time the German papers 
were publishing letters denouncing our sale 
of munitions to the Allies, the quantity of 
such supplies crossing the seas was neg- 
ligible. It was only during the latter part 
of 1915 that the exports began to assume 
anything like large figures; and from then 
on it was evident they would be in such 
proportions as to have an appreciable effect 
upon the war. The German maneuvers 
were inaugurated early in the war for the 
purpose of creating a feeling in the United 
States against the sale of munitions, and by 
this means it was hoped an embargo eventu- 
ally would be imposed. 

Germany has complained that if she vio- 
lates or infringes international law, the 
United States instantly and sharply objects, 
whereas if the Allies commit outrages, this 
government limits itself to an innocuous 
protest or does nothing. The direct charge 
was made by the German Ambassador that 
President Wilson " acquiesces in the viola- 
tions of international law by Great 
Britain." This charge is untrue. It was 



236 IMPERILED AMERICA 

given color, however, by the attention the 
Wilson administration gave to the sub- 
marine operations of Germany and the 
delay with which it handled trade questions 
with Great Britain. The policy Mr. Wil- 
son adopted contemplated dealing with one 
thing at a time — the settlement first of the 
submarine controversy, and then the trade 
disputes. The difficulty of pursuing this 
" single-track " course lay in the fact that 
the questions intermingled, and that inci- 
dents multiplied with electric speed. 

Germany has conceived and observed a 
policy toward the United States based upon 
the belief, first, that any action against 
her would lead to a civil war in this 
country; second, that we feared complica- 
tions with her would seriously embarrass 
us in connection with the Mexican ques- 
tion; third, that we realized a war with a 
European power would cause Japan to 
spring upon our back; and fourth, that we 
were absolutely unprepared. Developments 
have certainly discredited the German view 
that there would be a civil war. In this 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 237 

connection it may be said that evidence was 
placed before the American authorities 
alleging that the Germans have dis- 
tricted the United States, made caches of 
arms and ammunition, and given instruc- 
tions to reservists and others to report 
at designated headquarters w^henever the 
necessity arose. The prospect that we will 
get ready for trouble also is having a 
considerable influence upon the attitude of 
the Central Powers. Moreover, it has 
been borne in upon the Berlin and Vienna 
authorities that it would be highly unwise 
to list the United States among their 
enemies. Without declaring war, we could 
impose an embargo on all supplies going 
to Germany; and thus stop the large quan- 
tities which pass through neutral terri- 
tories. In itself, this would be a serious 
blow. Again, for the United States 
definitely to join the Allies would be to 
prevent the realization of the hope, always 
in the German breast, that we will become 
involved in a deadly quarrel with their 
enemies over trade questions. 



238 IMPERILED AMERICA 

War always produces resentments, es- 
pecially against the innocent bystander. It 
is apparent Germany will not soon forgive 
us for the aid she considers we have given 
her enemies, and for our failure to compel 
them to live up to the principles of inter- 
national law; that Austria-Hungary will 
not soon forgive us for dismissing Dr. 
Dumba, her Ambassador, and above all for 
our intimation in the note relative to the 
destruction of the Italian liner Ancona 
that we looked upon her as subservient to 
Germany; and that Turkey will not soon 
forgive us for the protests we made against 
the massacre of Armenians. 

Moreover, the United States not only has 
furnished supplies to the Allies, but actu- 
ally has financed them; and the Central 
Powers undoubtedly will remember this 
fact against us in the future. It is human 
for them to do so, for, given the same 
circumstances, the American people would 
take a like view against a foreign land. 
But looking at the matter from a perfectly 
cold-blooded point of view, it is apparent 



THE CENTRAL POWERS 239 

the objections we have offered to Teutonic 
methods of warfare and to the action of the 
Central Powers in fighting the war within 
the United States, were in accordance with 
our duties as well as our rights of sover- 
eignty. It is only to be regretted that our 
words have not been taken at their face 
value, and that we have been in the posi- 
tion of making threats which we had not 
the intention to carry out. 



chapter xii 
America in the World to Come 

Change and adjustments therewith are 
laws of nature. They go on in times of 
peace as an internal force in nations, and 
necessarily meet and harmonize or clash. 
Wars are the direct result of this constant 
movement. They strike the balance be- 
tween peoples or within a people, make 
new relations or rather certify the rela- 
tions which prior conditions produced, and 
establish a different plane whereon the 
process of adjustment continues. 

Mark what has happened in the United 
States within the history of the present 
generation! Our thought, our needs, the 
government under which we live, have 
been sensibly influenced by the influx of 
immigrants. The increased control of 
disease has destroyed the old theory that 
a race to be healthy must live above the 

240 



THE WORLD TO COME 241 

frost line, and a movement has set in 
toward the south. Our diet has changed. 
Southern products are as important in our 
list of foods as northern products. Our 
commercial situation has changed. Indus- 
tries once local have become national. 
There was a time when our wheat, corn, 
meat and cotton gave us a glow of self- 
sufficiency. To-day we need foreign prod- 
ucts for our maintenance and to reduce the 
cost of living. Our exports were confined 
to raw materials; now one-fourth of them 
are manufactured articles. There have 
been modifications of our standards of 
social morality. The responsibilities once 
provincially limited to the family, the 
ward and the state, have crossed all 
political subdivisions and even passed far 
beyond our coastlines. 

The foreign policies of the United States 
have been reflective of these changing 
conditions. A popular government is 
naturally sensitive to internal developments 
and consciously or unconsciously is con- 
trolled by them in its foreign conduct. It 



242 IMPERILED AMERICA 

is becoming more and more important to 
us that the countries with which we trade, 
particularly those within our sphere of 
influence, shall maintain peace and order, 
that they shall develop agriculturally, 
industrially and commercially, free from 
exploitation; that they shall respect prop- 
erty rights, including contracts, and that 
they shall treat us on precisely the same 
footing as their other customers. These 
material necessities go hand in hand with 
our interest in, our sentiment with refer- 
ence to, their social development. In 
Mexico, for example, there must be estab- 
lished, first and foremost, industrial stabil- 
ity. To seek to impose upon that country, 
so long as it is independent, our form of 
government, our ideals of civilization, 
when its people are not prepared for any- 
thing of the kind, is to endeavor to build 
a monument from the capstone down. 

As a matter of fact, disguise it to our- 
selves as we may, the United States is being 
driven inexorably to the point of exerting 
direct control over Mexico and the coun- 



THE WORLD TO COME 243 

tries of Central America. In the establish- 
ment of this control, there will be a cost to 
pay in lives and money. To leave them 
as they are is to shirk our moral responsi- 
bilities; to refuse to lift them from their 
social degradation is to suffer commercial 
loss and to leave untapped the wealth 
which could be utilized for the benefit of 
mankind. To establish control is to pay 
the price; but the American people have 
never refused to honor their bills when 
justly incurred. 

Of course, the United States has no 
divine mission to right the wrongs of the 
world; but it has a direct interest in evils 
elsewhere, for those evils react upon its 
own happiness, its own welfare and its 
own prosperity. Therefore, it is manifestly 
concerned in the preservation and extension 
of human liberty, the existence and promo- 
tion of human welfare; and it is justified 
in acting whenever and wherever broad, 
humanitarian principles are at stake. 

It is imperative, especially at a time 
when the east and the west are aflame, that 



244 IMPERILED AMERICA 

the United States should take stock of its 
necessities, its duties and its obligations, 
and determine whither they are leading it. 
It is imperative for it to study and to know 
the conditions which the clash of arms is 
developing, and to be prepared against the 
time when negotiations shall write the set- 
tlement the war will force. Great world 
issues will be involved in that settlement; 
and in its terms the United States will have 
a direct interest. We could not escape the 
effects if we would. In spite of our non- 
participation in the war, it is important 
for us to figure in the negotiations of peace, 
preferably as mediator. That we can play 
such a role is exceedingly doubtful; for, 
as a result of our diplomacy, the Central 
Powers will not be disposed to confide their 
interests to our charge in the preliminaries 
leading to a direct exchange of views with 
their enemies. A like unwillingness is 
developing among the Allies. 

If we do not serve as mediator, we must, 
through other channels, acquire accurate 
information as to the proposals discussed. 



THE WORLD TO COME 245 

Some of them will touch the welfare and 
development of the United States, and call 
for our protest and even resistance. Should 
there be a Peace Congress, China will 
desire admission in order to appeal for a 
world guarantee of her integrity. Japan 
will oppose her admission, and in this 
attitude is likely to have the support of 
Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy — 
should those countries cling together — in 
view of their general agreement to deter- 
mine in common before the negotiations 
the terms they will lay down. The United 
States will have to decide whether it is 
advisable, whether it can afford, to back 
China and antagonize Japan and the 
powers behind her. Vast areas of terri- 
tory will change hands. In the project 
of the Allies to restore Belgium to the 
Belgian people, the majority of Ameri- 
cans have a sentimental interest; all of 
us have a vital interest in the fate of the 
islands wrested from Germany in the 
Pacific. Our Americans of Polish and 
Jewish birth will desire the support of 



246 IMPERILED AMERICA 

the Washington government in the move- 
ment to re-establish the independent King- 
dom of Poland and to obtain equality for 
the Jews in Europe. 

It is impossible, of course, for the Allies 
to annihilate the German people, just as 
it is impossible for the Central Powers 
to annihilate the British, the French, or 
the Russian people. Yet there is certain 
to be a remaking of the map of Europe. 
The way it will be done appears of 
remote concern to us; nevertheless, it will 
determine the question whether the peace 
arranged shall be temporary or compara- 
tively permanent, and it will compress or 
expand economic forces which will influ- 
ence our future. 

The bitterness the war has engendered 
will exclude Allied goods from German 
markets and German goods from Allied 
markets for years to come. In anticipa- 
tion of this situation, the Allies already 
are providing favorable exchange condi- 
tions as between themselves and their pos- 
sessions, and the British government and 



THE WORLD TO COME 247 

British merchants are devising plans to 
hold the trade left by the war, and to 
develop and extend it. When the war 
shall end, Germany's warriors will return 
to shops and factories, and the formidable 
industrial and commercial organization of 
that country, perfected to greater efficiency 
and speeded with greater energy by neces- 
sity, will devote itself anew to the peaceful 
conquest of world markets. The rapidity 
of the flow of a stream is determined by 
the width of its banks ; and the tremendous 
volume of output of Europe will drive 
with terrific force upon the United 
States and the markets in which we trade. 
To meet this danger, if we ourselves suc- 
ceed in remaining at peace, there must be 
a more intensive industrial, commercial 
and financial organization in the United 
States; close co-operation in foreign sell- 
ing; establishment of " free ports," similar 
to Hamburg and Copenhagen; a scientific 
readjustment of our tariff rates in accord- 
ance with the views of a nonpartisan com- 
mission, and a revision of all our commer- 



248 IMPERILED AMERICA 

cial treaties; an increase in our merchant 
marine and the relief of our shippers 
from the disadvantage of exorbitant 
charges and rebates; and the wise exer- 
cise by our bankers of the power of 
financing our trade and extending foreign 
credits. 

It is apparent there presses upon the 
American people the need of a permanent 
and continuous foreign policy, not rigid 
but fluid, a policy that will realize our 
moral, our political and our commercial 
aspirations. It, of course, should be non- 
partisan, lifted above the plane of domes- 
tic politics, and in no sense the football 
of party expediency or the whim of dif- 
ferent administrations. It should be essen- 
tially national; laws should be passed 
empowering the federal government to 
intervene in judicial processes involving 
foreigners and foreign interests in the sev- 
eral states. It should place national honor 
above national welfare; for to tarnish the 
former is to place a stain forever upon the 
flag. It should be careful of national 



THE WORLD TO COME 249 

prestige. A country is judged in the light 
of its past conduct and is treated by for- 
eign governments accordingly. It should 
maintain the faith, for scrupulous fidelity 
in the discharge of obligations is as impor- 
tant to a nation as reputation is to a man. 
Therefore, the greatest care should be 
made in the negotiations of treaties, to 
bind ourselves only to those things which 
we intend to and can observe. Germany 
to-day is suffering from the shame of 
violating the treaty guaranteeing the 
neutrality of Belgium. 

Our policy in the Western Hemisphere 
must be based upon the enforcement of 
the Monroe Doctrine, upon our vital 
interests in the Caribbean Sea and upon 
friendly relations with Latin America; 
and generally upon our vital interests in 
the Pacific and upon the principle of 
equal opportunity throughout the world. 
It is to our interest to encourage the 
creation of arbitral tribunals, but we 
should be careful not to agree to the 
reference in advance to such tribunals of 



250 IMPERILED AMERICA 

any question which might result in popu- 
lar repudiation of the award made; and 
in this possibility lies the grave objection 
to the all-inclusive arbitration treaties 
negotiated by the TaftAdministration and 
the all-inclusive investigation treaties 
signed by Mr. Bryan and ratified in 
the early days of the war, when " safety 
first " was the base refuge of the represen- 
tatives of the people. 

How can a permanent and continuous 
foreign policy be created in the United 
States? There is nothing easier. Through 
our wonderful press, conducted by the 
brainiest minds in the country, and 
through other mediums, it is not difficult 
for the government to ascertain the senti- 
ment of the people upon any important 
issue. It is necessary only that this senti- 
ment shall be grounded upon facts and 
influenced by a knowledge of conditions 
abroad. Before the war our interest in 
foreign affairs was impersonal, casual. 
Since the war began it has become per- 
sonal, vital. There thus exists an oppor- 



THE WORLD TO COME 251 

tunity to inaugurate a scheme of educa- 
tion, based on broad lines of statesmanship 
and modern diplomacy. 

In the conduct of a permanent and con- 
tinuous foreign policy, it is essential that 
we have statesmen, not politicians, at the 
head of our State Department. Solely 
because Mr. Bryan aided him to get the 
Democratic nomination, and because of 
the political power and prestige he 
enjoyed. President Wilson named him as 
Secretary of State. For more than two 
years the United States suffered from 
amateur diplomacy, from an effort to 
apply domestic political methods to inter- 
national affairs. There must be main- 
tained a permanent force in the State 
Department, secure, well-paid, equipped 
to apply to developments the pre-deter- 
mined policies required by the nation's 
needs. There should be maintained also 
permanent diplomatic and consular serv- 
ices, as contemplated by the measures 
inaugurated by President Roosevelt. 

The consular service is well established 



252 IMPERILED AMERICA 

since the people, early in the Wilson 
Administration, indicated they would not 
look with favor upon the displacement of 
tried men by political workers. As our 
diplomats we must have men of the world, 
aware of our needs and purposes, students 
of international law and history, familiar 
with the complicated relations between 
nations, including their alliances and 
friendships and the reasons therefor, and 
acquainted with the natural and inevitable 
tendencies of peoples and their laws and 
customs and policies with regard to finance 
and trade. It is to create dangers for our- 
selves to reward politicians by appoint- 
ment to diplomatic office; for agents 
abroad must be able not only to report 
an event and its significance, but to advise 
as to the attitude their government should 
adopt. 

It is a sign of weakness, save in special 
emergencies, to send special commissioners 
abroad. Such action is accepted as a 
reflection upon the capacity of the man 
duly and regularly appointed, and affects 



THE WORLD TO COME 253 

his influence with the government to which 
he is accredited. Mr. Wilson pursued 
this unfortunate policy, sending agents in 
bewildering succession to Mexico, and 
from time to time he has dispatched to 
Europe a personal friend, who had had 
no experience whatever in the intricate 
web of war diplomacy. All these com- 
missioners have ability; but, as indicated, 
their appearance was harmful to the diplo- 
mats on the ground. Moreover, Congress, 
and particularly the Senate, is placed in 
the position of having to act upon meas- 
ures advocated by the President at the 
instance of a personal agent whose char- 
acter and capacity it does not know, 
whereas in the selection of diplomatic 
representatives, it has had an opportunity 
to ascertain their qualifications. 

President Wilson truthfully described 
our perilous situation when he said, in 
advocating preparedness, a year and a half 
after the war had begun, that the develop- 
ments of a day or even an hour might 
plunge us into conflict. It is unfortunate 



254 IMPERILED AMERICA 

for the country that an effective program 
of defense was not immediately advo- 
cated and adopted at the outbreak of 
the struggle. A year and a half of 
precious time was lost, and it will require 
fully that period to create an effective 
army and to make even a real start in 
providing an adequate navy. 

It is obvious that if foreign nations 
consider us able to resist, they will be 
disposed to respect our rights and pay 
attention to our wishes. It is equally 
obvious that as the war continues, friction 
with all the belligerents will increase. We 
face the grave danger of being drawn into 
the maelstrom while it is swirling; we 
face the even graver danger of war when 
peace shall be restored abroad. It will 
be no news to the American people to 
tell them that we are to-day without a 
real friend in the world. Our diplomacy, 
the utterances of our statesmen in office, 
have not been calculated to win the sup- 
port of any nation, save, perhaps, those 



THE WORLD TO COME 255 

of South America; and the Latin-Ameri- 
cans remain suspicious of our purposes. 
Not that the United States should have 
alliances — the advice of Washington is 
as good to-day as when given. But 
friendly neutrality is a valuable asset in 
time of w^ar, and w^orth the efforts to 
assure it. 

Will not the debt-ridden belligerents, 
when they have returned to peace as 
between themselves, look with envy upon 
our riches gained from their needs? 

President Wilson has proclaimed the 
view that we should have the greatest 
navy in the world. Is it likely that Eng- 
land, without resistance, will abdicate the 
position of mistress of the seas? Would 
it not have been far better from the stand- 
point of national interest quietly to have 
pursued the policy of up-building the 
fleet until it attained a size both in per- 
sonnel and materiel and an expertness of 
administration and operation, which would 
assure the protection of our home terri- 



256 IMPERILED AMERICA 

tory, the protection of our foreign posses- 
sions, and the protection of our foreign 
commerce and interests? 

Pacifists assert that the belligerents will 
be so exhausted by the end of the war 
that they will be unable to embark upon 
a new struggle. History points to the 
contrary, except in the case of the defeated 
which has been saddled with a huge 
indemnity. When the Civil War termi- 
nated, the Union, which had expended in 
all about forty per cent of its national 
wealth (Great Britain is spending six 
per cent annually), threatened European 
powers because they had endeavored to 
control Mexico while the United States 
was in the throes of revolution. Rather 
than battle with our magnificent fleet and 
magnificent veteran armies, those powers 
withdrew from Mexican soil. Here then 
is evidence upon which to base the state- 
ment that the belligerents in the present 
war, especially those who gain the victory, 
will not be so exhausted that they can not 
move against the United States, if they 



THE WORLD TO COME 257 

will. It follows that if the United States 
desires to save itself from war or to 
protect its territory and interests, it must 
develop a sufficient fleet before the Euro- 
pean struggle shall end. That fleet must be 
supported, not by a makeshift, untrained 
force, but by a regular, efficient and ade- 
quate mobile army, backed by a trained 
citizenry. Under such conditions, the 
navy will be free to observe the primal 
principle of strategy — find the enemy 
upon the seas and destroy him. 

This is no policy of militarism; it is a 
policy of common sense. The people of 
the United States are not moved by any 
spirit of aggrandizement. The only vic- 
tories they want are the victories of peace. 
They have no desire for conquest, save the 
conquest of themselves; no desire for sov- 
ereignty save the sovereignty over them- 
selves. They respect the independence and 
sovereignty of the weakest nations precisely 
as they respect the independence and sover- 
eignty of the strongest nations. They stand 
for equality, for righteousness, no less in the 



258 IMPERILED AMERICA 

things of the spirit than in the things of the 
flesh. They wish to be prosperous them- 
selves, to maintain law and order within 
their own territories, and to exercise their 
right of freely carrying out their own des- 
tinies with due regard to the destinies of 
others. Because they realize there can be no 
permanent prosperity and no permanent 
happiness in one section of the world unless 
there be permanent prosperity and per- 
manent happiness everywhere, they are 
inspired by ideals which are based upon 
the doctrines of common justice and 
common good. 



INDEX 

American Cargoes, Seizure of 1 66 

American Fleet, Official Trips 45 

Balkan Campaign 185 

Belgium, Invasion of 35> 41 

Belligerent Rights 186, 189 

Violation of 189, 194 

Blockade, Use of by U. S. During Civil War. ... 193 
Bryan, William Jennings — 

Peace Plan 34 

Treaty with Denmark 98 

Castro, General, Exclusion of 77 

China and the Great War 124-127 

Hay Policy in 129,131 

Cleveland, Grover, and Monroe Doctrine 57 

Consular Service, Weakness of 252 

Reform of 250-253 

Cuba, U. S. Withdraw^al from 20 

Danish West Indies, Proposed Purchase of . . . .67,97 

Embargo on Munitions 200, 23 1 

France — 

In Mexico 214 

Position in Pacific no 

Territorial Situation of 21-25 

259 



260 INDEX 

Frye Case i68 

Justification of 170 

Galapagos Islands, Attempted Purchase of 15 

Germany — 

Activities in America 44 

In Mexico 49 

Diplomatic Activities in U. S 222-228 

In Latin America 221,224 

In China 116 

In the Philippines 213 

Pledges Concerning Submarines 176 

Points of Conflict with U. S 27 

Territorial Situation of 21-25 

Trade with Holland and Denmark 186 

Great Britain — 

Embargo on Cotton 230 

Embargo on Foodstuffs 229 

Territorial Situation of 21-25 

Treaty with Japan 113 

Grey, Sir Edward, Peace Program 207 

Holleben, von. Policy in America 44 

During Venezuelan Crisis 64 

International Law, Violations of — 

By Submarines 161 

Floating Mines 162 

Neutral Flags 164 

War Zone Declaration 164 

Japan — 

Entrance Into War 115 



INDEX 261 

Occupation of Kiao Chou ii6 

Occupation of Pacific Islands 1 17 

Recent Wars of 142 

Relations with U. S 142 

California Complications 143, 147 

School Question I44 

Rise of 141,142 

View of Monroe Doctrine 68 

Visit of U. S. Fleet to I45 

Jefferson, Thomas, View of Monroe Doctrine. .53.54 

Korea, Acquisition of by Japan 1 14, 124 

Lansing Proposal ^77 

Latin-American Republics — 

Finances of 9o 

View of Monroe Doctrine 71.95 

Lodge Resolution 70. 1 5^ 

Louvain, Destruction of i59 

Lusitania, Sinking of 172 

Roosevelt Stand on 1 73 

Wilson View i74 

McKinley, Stand on Cuba 20 

Mexico — 

Feeling Against U. S 93 

France in 214 

Need of Intervention in 89, 242 

Value of Petroleum in 9i 

Monroe Doctrine — 

Against Whom Originally Directed 50 

Against Whom Used 50 

British Interest in 59 



262 INDEX 

Enforcement of 249 

Essential Principles 55 

German Violations of 60, 61 

Latin- American View of 7 1 , 95 

Purpose of 51 

Recognition Accorded 51,52 

Suggested by England 53 

Views of the Doctrine — 

Thomas Jefferson 53, 54 

Grover Cleveland 57 

Moroccan Dispute, U. S. Intervention in 16 

Netherlands, The, Position in Pacific 109 

Neutral Rights 197 

Violation of 189, 194 

Orders in Council 1 90 

Protests Against 191 

Oregon Dispute 56 

Pacific Ocean — 

Our Possessions in 107 

Powers in 109-1 1 1 

Predictions Concerning 102 

Strategic Points of 108 

Trade with Countries in and Bordering 106 

Panama Canal — 

Defense of 84 

Dispute with Colombia Over 94 

Guarantees Concerning 99, lOO 

Importance of 85 

Petroleum Pipe Line to 92 

Value of in Pacific 121 



INDEX 263 

Piatt Amendment 88 

Prince Henry, Visit of 45 

Prinz Eitel Friedrich, Case of 168 

Roosevelt — 

Monroe Doctrine 62, 67 

Stand in Moroccan Controversy 34 

Root, Elihu — 

On Japan 1 42 

On Panama Canal 87 

Root-Takahira Agreement 117, 145 

Rush-Bagot Agreement 212 

Russia — 

Ambitions in Asia II2 

Naval Demonstration During Civil War 46 

Territorial Situation of 21-25 

Santa Domingo, Financial Protectorate Over. ... 16 

Six Power Loan 131 

Sternburg, von, Policy in America 44 

Submarines, Use in Present War 160 

Justification For, by Germany 161 

Trans-Manchurian Railroad, Proposed Neutral- 
ization of 1 12, 152-153 

Treaty of Portsmouth 129,155 

Trent Affair, The 163 

United States — 

Effect of Great War on 198 

Foreign-born Population of 36 

Influence of 36-38 

Points of Conflict with Belligerents 25 



264 INDEX 

Possessions In Pacific Ocean 107 

Sentiment in Present War 42 

Sentiment in Russo-Japanese War 46 

Trade with Countries Bordering Pacific 106 

Withdrawal from Philippines 15 

Venezuela, Blockade of 58 

Washington on Neutrality 37 

West Indies, Powers Represented in 97 

Wilson Administration, The — 

And China 135, 137 

And Lusitania Case 32,174 



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